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Abstract: 
Shortly after the Union, the Treason Act 1708 revoked Scotland’s separate treason law in favour of 
England’s treason law. Historically, English treason law was imposed on Scots criminal law and was 
not always sensitive to the differences in Scottish legal institutions and culture. A review of the law 
of treason is in contemplation, it being under general attention more than at any time since the end 
of World War II. If there were to be a revival of UK treason law, the creation of a separate Scottish 
treason law may be a logical development given Scotland’s evolving devolution settlement. The 
thesis attempts to answer the question whether there should be a new, distinct, Scottish law of treason. 
If so, how might it be reformed for the modern era, refined for the Scottish context, and fit into the 
devolved system? An essentially ‘black-letter’ approach has been adopted – considering this issue in 
a strictly law-centred and legalistic manner – while making appropriate allowance for external factors 
such as policy and political considerations. Based on my normative evaluation of treason law, this 
thesis puts forward an argument that though current treason law is problematic, there is still 
justification for it. My original contribution to knowledge is to demonstrate how it can be rendered 
relevant for the modern Scottish context. Firstly, I argue that allegiance, traditionally at the heart of 
treason law, seems archaic and suggest the ways in which it can be modernised and reconstructed. 
The primary resources for doing so can be found in the Lauterpacht and Williams debate which 
followed Joyce. Treason’s core duty of allegiance can be re-interpreted in terms of Williams’ duty-
based contractual model. Building on that modelling, a negative duty of allegiance (or duty of non-
betrayal) emerges. Secondly, while thinking of treason to the UK as a general offence of breaking 
the bond of allegiance, there is room for a more Scottish inflexion in the way in which the offence 
might apply. This includes a Scottish political object of allegiance – incorporating Scottish political 
institutions as a complementary focus for potential allegiance – specifically, the Crown-in-Scotland. 
Its essential elements – actus reus, jurisdiction, mens rea and operable defences – can be recalibrated 
for any such revised allegiance model, with suitable Scottish inflexion. With this analysis, only a 
limited range of betraying acts emerges. Its actus reus can be reframed in terms of a construct 
grounded in ‘Adherence Treason’, referable to a national security harm principle and insisting that 
its commission involves providing material assistance to the enemy. The negative duty is underlined 
by removal of the commission of treason by only omission. Referencing the Draft Scottish Criminal 
Code, express statutory recognition might be made for the operation of the general common law 
defences of necessity, coercion and obeying superior orders. Its exceptional character commends 
provision for new specific statutory defences with contemporary resonance – including a ‘Public 
Interest Defence’, ‘Government Whistleblowing Defence’ and the Australian ‘Humanitarian 
Defence’. Formulating a Scottish treason law might provide a suitable template for UK reform. But 
this is more than a pragmatic justification. Though not materially different in terms of its offence 
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elements, its defence elements should reflect a principled Scottish deviation in the availability of 
common law defences of necessity, coercion and obeying superior orders.  
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I. Context: 
British treason law appears to be irrelevant. Treason is not addressed in the (Scottish) Jury 
Manual. Gordon’s Criminal Law provides only the most cursory consideration and was not 
intended as a modern reappraisal. The editors of Archbold have omitted it from all editions 
after 2009, declaring: "it seems unlikely that there will be any such prosecutions in the 
foreseeable future".1 The Law Commission’s distant 1977 Working Paper on modernising 
the law of offences against the state was never implemented.2 There is a paucity of 
contemporary sources and no recent precedent explaining how its core concepts might be 
defined in terms which are fit for purpose – though its continuing existence is expressly 
recognised by amending legislation and tentative allusions in case law.3 The literature is 
scant and it has received relatively little academic attention in this country. It is no longer 
part of any Scottish undergraduate course syllabus on criminal law. The tendency to ignore 
it in theorising about criminal law and explaining the general elements of criminal liability 
evidences its atavistic character.4 Although not formally abolished and remaining in the law, 
it plays a greatly restricted role.  
Even if not technically obsolete, current treason law appears to be regarded as no longer 
relevant – problematic even. It has lost its normative appeal and practical efficacy.5 Policy 
Exchange, a centre-right think tank, expressed concerns in their 2018 paper Aiding the 
Enemy that the existing law of treason is not a secure basis on which to bring prosecutions – 
that it is unfit for purpose, unworkable and should be updated.6 Confident of long-standing 
external security and internal stability, we have managed successfully without treason 
prosecutions. There may have been a reluctance to prosecute what was until 1998 a 
 
1 Archbold: Criminal Practice and Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2020, para. 25-1 – though this is less 
emphatic than the suggestion in previous editions that it was "unlikely in the extreme that there will … be any 
such prosecutions." 
2 Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law, Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Law Com No 
72, 1977) 
3 Niall O’Gallagher, “Ancient treason law to be used in Clara Ponsati extradition case” BBC (5 July 2018): 
 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-44726376 
4 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193; George P. Fletcher, “Ambivalence 
About Treason” (2004) 82 NCLRev 1611, 1619  
5 Shai Lavi, “Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States and Israel” 
(2010) 13(2) NewCrimLRev 404, 408 
6 Richard Ekins et al., Aiding the Enemy, How and why to restore the law of treason Policy Exchange (2018), 
48 
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mandatory capital offence. Americans may be generally less squeamish about the death 
penalty but, despite waging a so-called ‘war on terror’, common law countries have generally 
distanced themselves from the traditional notion of treason based on a breach of allegiance, 
even in circumstances where terrorist activity has undoubtedly fallen within the compass of 
treason.7 Although the US obtained its first treason indictment since World War II in 2006 
against American citizen Adam Yahiye Gadahn, this was no revival.8 Post-war prosecution 
marking policy has expediently avoided charging offenders with treason – lest political 
justification be pled and secular martyrdom ensue – it being deemed preferable to 
characterise treasonable conduct in terms of ordinary criminality.9 The Law Commission 
recognised:10  
" … from the practical point of view it is normally found more expedient to charge 
ordinary criminal offences than to imply that importance is being attached to the 
activities by treating them as treasonable, or that there could be any political 
justification for the conduct, even in the mind of the offenders". 
 
Government Ambivalence: 
The Government has been inconsistent in its approach toward revival. In 2001 it was 
suggested that British Muslims who take up arms against US or British forces in Afghanistan 
could face treason charges.11 In 2005 it was reported that the Attorney-General’s Office was 
considering the possibility of charging three prominent Islamic clerics for lauding acts of 
terrorism against civilians in the UK and attacks on British soldiers abroad, with solicitation 
to murder and incitement to treason.12 None of this happened and although the Law 
Commission intended to review the law on treason in 2008 (alongside laws on kidnapping 
and public nuisance), the treason element of the project was ultimately jettisoned. It reasoned 
that it was an example of an area of the law shaped by political and social conditions which 
had "ceased to be of contemporary relevance" – and that new offences have been developed 
 
7 Lavi, “Revocation of Citizenship”, 409 
8 United States v. Gadahn, SA CR 05-254(A) (CD. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), First Superseding Indictment: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/adam_indictment.pdf 
9 Law Com WP 72, para. 58 
10 Ibid.; Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (2011), 5.172 
11 “British Muslims who fought with Taliban face prosecution” Guardian (20 November 2001): 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/nov/20/september11.world  
12 Vikram Dodd et al., “Islamist clerics face treason charges” Guardian (8 August 2005): 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/08/july7.terrorism 
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that were far better suited for tackling the problems afflicting society.13 While the Law 
Commission has no plans to review the law of treason,14 political conditions have since 
evolved in a way to suggest that treason law might again be best suited for tackling the 
problem of betrayal by significant numbers of home-grown Jihadists. In September 2014, 
Justice Minister Simon Hughes of the then coalition Government – when asked in Parliament 
whether the offence of treason was "available for use by prosecuting authorities against UK 
citizens participating in jihad in the Middle East" – responded that the offence of treason 
was outdated and that counter-terrorism powers were enough.15 But in October 2014 the then 
Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond told Parliament that British citizens who had sworn 
personal allegiance to the so-called Islamic State and fought with insurgents in Iraq and Syria 
could have committed an offence under the Treason Act 1351.16 Policy Exchange tabled a 
serious treason reform proposal – carefully crafting arguments favouring reform and 
rebuttals to counter-arguments, as well as a draft template offence. In May 2019, possibly 
inspired by their Paper, the then Home Secretary Sajid Javid, announced overhaul of treason 
law in a new Espionage Bill. Hostile state actors, such as spies, assassins or hackers, directed 
by the government of another country, were to be targeted by refreshed espionage laws – 
with officials also examining treason laws to see whether they could be updated to include 
British nationals, or those settled in the UK, operating on behalf of a hostile nation.17 Javid 
said: "Our definition of terrorism is probably broad enough to cover those who betray our 
country by supporting terror abroad. But if updating the old offence of treason would help 
us counter hostile state activity, then there is merit in considering that too."18 However, 
 
13 Law Commission, Tenth Programme of Law Reform HC 605 (Law Com No 311, 2008), para. 2.30 
14 Lizzie Dearden, “New 'treason law' which would jail jihadis is not being considered by government” 
Independent (25 July 2018): 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/treason-law-isis-jihadis-security-russia-government-
plans-policy-exchange-a8463761.html 
15 Hansard HC Deb. vol. 585 col. 747, 9 September 2014 
16 Hansard HC Deb. vol. 586 col. 482, 16 October 2014 
17 Jamie Grierson, “Sajid Javid announces overhaul of espionage and treason laws” Guardian (20 May 2019): 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/20/sajid-javid-announces-overhaul-of-espionage-and-
treason-laws 
18 Charles Hymas, “British citizens who help Isil could face life in prison under updated treason laws” 
Telegraph (20 May 2019): 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/05/20/british-citizens-help-isil-could-face-life-prison-updated-
treason/?WT.mc_id=tmgliveapp_androidshare_AsgtnTNcSq3d 
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Jonathon Hall, current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), rejected any 
such renewal of treason laws in his inaugural speech of September 2019.19 Then, in the most 
recent Queen’s Speech of 19 December 2019, the Government announced that it was to 
consider the case for updating treason law as part of a new Espionage Bill to enable 
prosecution of anyone who participates in ‘harmful activity’ with a hostile foreign state.20 
Significantly, Australia remodelled its treason law in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.21 It seems we continue to be unsure whether treason is the appropriate mechanism 
for criminalisation as opposed to other criminal offences. Nonetheless, the idea of treason 
law endures. It remains important and I will argue that there are even positive reasons for its 
renewal.  
 
II. Value of Scottish Treason Law: 
It may well be that if the revival of treason law were pursued at Westminster, this could also 
be done separately and concurrently by the Scottish Parliament – assuming prior adjustment 
of the Scottish constitutional settlement and amending treason law from reserved matter 
status (also including the constitution, foreign affairs and defence) to devolved matter status. 
In practical terms this would involve repealing s. 1 of the Treason Act 1708 and amending 
sch. 5, pt. 1, para. 10 of the Scotland Act 1998. Insofar as there is precedent for amending 
the Scotland Act in this way, this is not an insurmountable legal impediment. Though 
unlikely, the Westminster Parliament could alternatively pass a specifically Scottish treason 
law.22 I now explain why it might be worth thinking about a Scottish law.  
 
“Home Secretary speech on keeping our country safe” (20 May 2019): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-speech-on-keeping-our-country-safe 
19 Jamie Grierson, “Terror legislation watchdog rejects call to change treason laws” Guardian (10 September 
2019): 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/sep/10/terror-legislation-watchdog-rejects-change-treason-law 
Jonathon Hall, “Changing Times, Changing Treason” (9 September 2019): 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190909-Treason-
Speech-to-RUSI.pdf 
20https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853886/Q
ueen_s_Speech_December_2019_-_background_briefing_notes.pdf 
21 The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 – now superseded by the National Security 
Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 
22 Official secrets and terrorism are also reserved matters. 
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Devolution Plus: 
The significance of treason law is that it has historically established the relationship between 
the state and citizenry and is wrapped up with the notion of how a state defines itself. But at 
what point does it become appropriate for a jurisdiction which is not an independent state to 
have its own law of treason?  
Virtually all states continue to maintain a treason law (even if rarely applied). Treason laws 
frequently have concurrent application at provincial government level in federal common 
law systems such as Australia and the US – meaning there is scope for enforcement in terms 
of either federal or local law. The ever-expanding legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament and executive responsibility of the Scottish Government distinguishes the 
Scottish polity from mere local government. Though an asymmetrical settlement, Scotland’s 
political and legal autonomy is comparable to that of a provincial or state government in a 
typical federal system. Having accreted more powers than most federal provinces or states, 
it may genuinely be "one of the most powerful devolved administrations in the world".23 
What is significant is that UK Sovereignty has become increasingly fragmented and Scotland 
might reasonably be expected to create its own treason law as the devolution settlement 
becomes more entrenched.  
There is limited precedent for the existence and operation of a separate Scottish treason law 
within the Union. The old Scots law of treason had continued in force following the Union 
but was abolished after the failure of Scots juries to convict those involved in the Jacobite 
Expedition of 170824 – and the new Parliament of Great Britain’s insistence that an identical 
law of treason in both countries was essential for public safety.25 Parliament judged it 
 
23 “5 reasons why Scotland is more powerful as part of the United Kingdom”, Office of the Secretary of State 
for Scotland: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/5-reasons-why-scotland-is-more-powerful-as-part-of-the-united-
kingdom 
“Holyrood gains new powers under Scotland Act 2016” BBC (23 May 2016): 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36353498  
24 Insofar as the pre-Union Scots law of treason had been more complicated and extensive in its application 
and in many respects more severe than its English counterpart (Alison, Principles, I, 596) – to the extent that 
Hallam excoriated it as "one of the most odious engines of tyranny ever designed against public virtue" 
(Constitutional History of England (1827), 818) – its repeal was hardly a regressive measure. 
25 J. Irvine Smith and Ian MacDonald, “Criminal Law: The Sources of Criminal Law” in An Introduction to 
Scottish Legal History (1958) 280, 284 
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reasonable that the whole UK should be governed by the same law, as the obligations of 
loyalty were the same.26 This resulted in the introduction into Scotland of the English law of 
treason and English procedure. On its passing, the Treason Act 1708 was considered a breach 
of that clause under the Treaty of Union providing for the continuation of Scotland’s separate 
legal system (art. XIX).27 It arguably violated the Treaty’s spirit.28 Its purpose was to create 
a uniform law of treason and affirm allegiance to the British monarchy – it having been 
described in its introductory test as "an Act for improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms 
… that the said Union may be more effectually improved". As the continuing validity of this 
justification would be a political decision, I might turn the question round. The prevailing 
context was of the continuing existence of a separate Scottish treason law possibly 
undermining a fledgling Union. Would a separate Scottish treason law do so three centuries 
hence – given that any current existential threat is far removed from the ‘Dynastic Treason’ 
problem of Jacobitism? A separate Scottish treason law could no longer be seriously rejected 
on the early post-Union pretext of public safety. If anything, this might be regarded as an 
exercise in restoring the Union settlement as originally envisaged by the Treaty’s drafters, 
respecting the separate Scottish legal system, particularly in criminal law. The Treason Act 
1945 was a modest step in the direction of repatriating treason law, repealing the rule that 
treason trials in Scotland had to be conducted according to English criminal procedure and 
evidence.29 
The experience of other common law nations commends that local treason laws are not 
exceptionable. Australian citizens owe allegiance to their sovereign and their country at both 
federal and state level. While at federal level it is treasonable conduct to levy war or do any 
act preparatory to levying war against the Commonwealth of Australia,30 s. 12 of the Crimes 
Act 1900 (New South Wales) extends the offence of levying war (derived from s. 3 of the 
1848 Act) to putting any force or constraint upon the Parliament of the State of NSW. 
Levying war also covers constraining of the Parliament of the State of South Australia.31 
 
26 Ersk. IV 20 (1181)  
27 Smith and MacDonald, “Criminal Law”, 280, 284 
28 Steffen, Defining a British State, 74 
29 S. 289 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 restates the position (clarified by s. 39 of the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 1980) that the procedure and rules of evidence in proceedings for treason and misprision 
of treason shall be the same as in proceedings according to the law of Scotland for murder. 
30 Criminal Code Act 1995, s. 80.1 
31 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 7 
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Insofar as there are no state laws against treason in Western Australia, Northern Territory 
and Queensland, separate provincial provision seems optional.32 The only Australian 
twentieth century treason prosecution – in 1946, of Australian Army Major Charles Cousens 
for broadcasting wartime propaganda on Japanese radio – was under NSW law since the 
Commonwealth law of treason was not then in place.33 Most American states retain distinct 
treason provisions in their own constitutions or local statutes mirroring the US Constitution. 
Following the outbreak of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress passed a 
congressional resolution in June 1776 that each of the thirteen colonies enacted laws defining 
and punishing treason. The colonies responded by enacting state treason statutes which 
generally corresponded to the resolution and the definition in the Constitution.34 Many state 
constitutions continue to incorporate similar definitions – invariably in terms of levying war 
against the state or of adhering to or aiding the enemies of the state. Constitutional provisions 
or criminal statutes defining treason against the state are retained by 43 states.35 Local 
treason laws were created at a time when federal courts were not as strong.36 Scholars have 
not seriously queried the validity of state treason laws in over a century37 – the issue having 
largely vanished from legal discourse.38 It is unlikely that local treason laws would be 
deployed and the breach of only a local allegiance invoked. The following dicta from the 
dissenting judgment of Justice Scalia in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (where the Supreme Court 
considered the case of an American citizen captured while allegedly fighting for Taliban 
troops in Afghanistan and detained under military authority as an ‘enemy combatant’) is 
instructive in affirming the convention to prosecute treason at federal level: "Where the 
Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been 
 
In 1977, a SA law reform committee considered a state law of treason unnecessary since it was adequately 
covered at Commonwealth level. 
32 The equivalent VIC legislation only speaks of levying war against the Commonwealth of Australia. 
33 Ex Parte Cousens; Re Blackett (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 145 – though the NSW Attorney-General discontinued 
the prosecution after committal proceedings 
34 US Constitution, art. III, s. 3 
35 Since 21 states have not paired their constitutional provisions with a criminal statute, it could be argued that 
their state treason laws are not self-executing, but non-justiciable and merely symbolic (J. Taylor McConkie, 
“State Treason: The History and Validity of Treason Against Individual States” (2013) 101(2) KYLawJ 281, 
298-300). 
36 Oswald Garrison Villard, John Brown: 1800-1859: A Biography Fifty Years After (1910), 477 
37 McConkie, “State Treason”, 281 
38 Ibid., 282 
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to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime."39 The circumstances in 
which Hamdi was originally detained and held (firstly at Guantánamo Bay and finally at a 
US Naval Brig in South Carolina) suggest the federal court would be seised of jurisdiction 
by dint of its territorial jurisdiction. Discrete political and legal circumstances might allow 
for a treason prosecution to take place outwith federal court under only local treason law. 
Meanwhile, Canadian criminal law is entirely federal, being under the exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. It has no provincial concurrence, though its treason 
law provides for protection of provincial political institutions in that it extends to attempting 
to use force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing any provincial government (or 
legislative body).40  
Regardless of whether renewal of UK treason law is pursued, enacting a separate and distinct 
Scottish treason law could be regarded as a logical development given Scotland’s evolving 
devolution settlement and the enhanced ‘provincial’ statehood of the Scottish political 
system. This would be a matter of political will and timing.  
Would the creation of a separate Scottish treason law enhance or undermine the Union? 
Some nationalists might resent a perceptibly unionist and monarchist imposition. 
Conversely, unionists might view changing treason law from reserved to devolved status as 
pandering to nationalist sentiment – more Fabian strategizing in securing further trappings 
of Scottish nationhood. Unionists might fear a Scottish treason law being used against them 
in a future independent Scotland. Similar fault-lines might apply. I will argue in Chapters 2 
and 3 that the Scottish political institutions are not a separate or competing sovereign power 
– but a complementary and subordinate development – and that the object of the duty of 
allegiance under a Scottish treason law remains the Crown-in-Scotland. A separate Scottish 
treason law need not bolster (or diminish) the Crown or British or Scottish identity. 
 
39 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004), 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
40 Criminal Code, s. 46(2)(a)  
The old Law Reform Commission of Canada proposed a legislative scheme in which the aspect of treason 
involving using force or violence to overthrow the government would extend to the use of force or violence 
for the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional government of Canada or a province – or to extort or prevent 
a decision or measure of a federal or provincial legislative, executive or judicial organ of State (Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Crimes Against the State (LRCC No 49, 1986)). 
15 
 
 
As devolution has increasingly changed the relationship between Scotland and the rest of 
the UK, it might be thought that there is no longer a political impediment to a separate 
Scottish treason law – assuming British treason law is not regarded as obsolete and otiose. 
 
III. Relevance of Treason Law: 
I now consider the positive reasons why British treason law might still be considered 
potentially relevant and will explain why treason law might matter.  
 
(i) ‘Fair Labelling’ and Moral Wrong of Betrayal: 
There is something arguably deeply unsatisfactory about Michael Adebolajo and Michael 
Adebowale, the admitted killers of Fusilier Lee Rigby, being prosecuted on a ‘mere’ murder 
charge for their 2013 attack on Rigby, an off-duty solider, who had been returning to 
Woolwich Barracks. They drove a car at him, knocking him to the ground. They then 
attacked him with knives and a cleaver and attempted to behead him, telling passers-by they 
had killed Rigby to avenge the killing of Muslims by British Armed Forces. They had 
intended to commit this barbaric murder for political and ideological purposes – their actions 
being aimed against the British state – to have the maximum effect to promote the misguided 
cause they espoused. They gloried in the murder and sought to use it to advance their cause 
by publicising it and making the statements they did. Their life sentences could not have 
been more severe in reflecting their savagery. Adebolajo was sentenced to a whole life term 
and Adebowale given a minimum term of 45 years.41 These were Britons who were waging 
war against the British state and other Britons, targeting Rigby specifically because he was 
a British soldier. The libelling of the crime of treason might have conveyed the sense of this 
fundamental notion of betrayal of the British state and the British people by British citizens 
– of the moral wrong and peculiar offensiveness of betraying one’s country.  
This thesis is not about the specific issue of how to deal (legally) with Islamist Extremism 
(IE) – that radical Islamist ideology, where people effectively have an identity at variance 
with the nation-state, profess allegiance to something which is not their country and are 
actively willing to fight against this country. Countering IE may demand some legal 
innovation, but rebooting treason law could only ever be part of the appropriate (criminal 
 
41 R. v. Adebolajo and Anor [2014] EWCA Crim 2779 
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law) response to it. This thesis is about envisaging what an updated (Scottish) law of treason 
would look like – though I may incidentally address the issue of responding to new problems 
of this kind. I suggest that a treason charge evinces ‘fair labelling’ – fitting in with public 
sentiment about home-grown Jihadist treachery and that fighting for a foreign enemy is 
treason.  
The word-choice still evokes betrayal and underlines the stigmatising nature of the crime. It 
makes clear to the public that this is about more than violations of person or property. A lay 
jury is likely to regard it as a more familiar concept than the statutory charges for treasonable 
acts brought under anti-terrorist legislation or the Official Secrets Acts. Though people might 
be bewildered by the statutory alternatives and not always appreciate the subtleties of the 
legal principles involved, they still intuitively grasp what treason means. Even if disused, 
public understanding persists since the idea of treason features prominently in the English 
literary canon. This idea of loyalty continues to be widespread, instinctive, and deep-
rooted.42 Lord Judge, former Lord Chief Justice, explained in his foreword to the Policy 
Exchange Paper:43 
"Treason is a heinous crime. It should be marked as such. If a citizen of this country 
chooses to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan against British forces, his crime is 
more than terrorism. It is treason, and should be prosecuted accordingly." 
 
Though a big and old-fashioned word, it is still the appropriate term for this issue. The 
bringing of treason charges is the most efficacious way of communicating the seriousness 
and emphasising the wrongdoing of betrayal. The nomen juris is consistent with ‘fair 
labelling’ – the (taxonomical) principle which has become common currency in criminal law 
scholarship over recent decades.44 This is one of many normative principles governing 
criminal liability – one which is unobjectionable. Properly, the offence name should have a 
symbolic and declaratory function – evoking condemnation and signalling to both society 
and offender how the offender should be regarded. Even if unlikely to have a deterrent 
effect,45 the use of this offence would benefit the general public in making clear the 
description of the offending and conveying the essential nature of the wrongdoing – and also 
 
42 Adrian Weale, Patriot Traitors: Roger Casement, John Amery and the Real Meaning of Treason (2001), xiii 
43 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 9-10 
44 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, “Fair Labelling in Criminal Law” (2008) 71(2) MLR 217, 224 – the 
term was coined by Glanville Williams (“Convictions and Fair Labelling” (1983) 42 CLJ 8) 
45 Chalmers and Leverick, “Fair Labelling”, 230 
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in differentiating it from modern statutory offences that fail adequately to capture and 
express the vital moral prohibition on betrayal.46 Addressing the ‘wrong’ of treason in 
Chapter 2 will underline why revival is consistent with ‘fair labelling’ sensibilities. 
  
(ii) Legal Certainty: 
The principle of legal certainty – a central requirement of the rule of law – commends that 
something must be done with treason law to make it comprehensible and transparent to the 
public. That it is simply not being used would suggest that the law on treason might be 
regarded as obsolete and thus entirely predictable – ironically invalidating any argument 
about a lack of public understanding. However, the position is unclear. Some might be 
concerned that it is still available to be used, possibly in an arbitrary way. It could 
conceivably be dusted down for wartime exigencies. It is anomalous to continue to have this 
serious crime on the statute book (with the default punishment setting of life imprisonment) 
– neither completely ignoring it nor repealing it (cf. its recently-departed, sister crime 
sedition47). Further, it is difficult to discern the inward meanings of the terms used in the 
‘living instrument’ which is the 1351 statute. There is the important legal fiction that 
prospective traitors should be able to regulate their conduct with certainty – that they do not 
break this law – and can protect themselves from the abuse of state power and over-
criminalisation. Laws should be made so people can comply with them and it is wrong in 
principle that treason law should be quietly allowed to disappear through disuse, and not by 
repeal or amendment, nor by any formal process.48 Having an offence on the statute book 
which cannot be used is unsatisfactory. If a law is not being enforced in practice, there can 
be no justification for its retention. It might as well be formally abolished altogether, rather 
than ignored – as Lord Judge suggested in his Policy Exchange foreword.49  
So, what do we do with it? Properly, there needs to be a discussion about whether to update 
or completely abolish the law on treason, rather than allowing it to languish in limbo. 
Consistency is needed and if we cannot charge people with treason, we may as well remove 
 
46 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 6, 11, 12, 22 and 33 
47 The allied common law offences of sedition and leasing-making have been abolished (Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s. 51) – as have been the common law offences of sedition and seditious libel 
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 73). 
48 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 9 
49 Ibid., 8-10 
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it, sweeping away this medieval clutter, rendering our criminal law more orderly. If, for 
political reasons, we cannot abolish it, we might as well use it – and if we plan to use it, we 
must modernise it – for if a law is to remain in place, it should be a good one. There is a 
principled case for doing so in Scotland without waiting on the rest of the UK. 
 
(iii) Moral Duty to Prosecute Home-grown Traitors: 
I am conscious of the dilemma posed by cases such as Jack Letts, a British-Canadian Islamist 
in Kurdish detention – and Shamina Begum, the British-born ISIS bride of Bangladeshi 
parentage from Bethnal Green – who seek vindication of their citizenship status and right of 
abode in the UK. Over 100 ISIL associates have had their British citizenship removed since 
2016.50 Public opinion is divided as to what to do with ISIS returnees and it is uncertain how 
pending litigation will unfold. I submit that, as a matter of principle, the British state has a 
legal and moral duty to ensure that our nationals are repatriated to face justice here and held 
accountable for their actions. For the Government unilaterally to revoke their citizenship and 
disavow them – not prosecuting and punishing them domestically – is deeply unsatisfactory. 
It smacks of the arbitrary, or of tyranny even. Removing people’s nationality has deeply 
unpleasant connotations with practices of totalitarian regimes.51 Repatriation for prosecution 
in the UK (rather than exile) is a correlating but distinct issue from arguing this policy should 
be pursued to prosecute specifically for treason. Positively seeking the return of home-grown 
traitors to prosecute them for treason underlines that they are not being disowned but being 
held accountable precisely because of their British citizenry and their allegiance owed by 
that – in a way that repatriating to indict statutory alternatives might not quite communicate. 
I will argue in Chapter 2 that allegiance might be better policed by treason law rather than 
citizenship deprivation laws – even if issuing treason indictments might expediently 
disincentivise some prospective returnees.  
 
 
 
 
50 “Don’t revoke citizenship: update our treason laws” Telegraph (23 February 2019): 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2019/02/23/dont-revoke-citizenship-update-treason-laws/  
51 Invariably, the first act of Nazi invaders was to denationalise the occupied country’s Jewish population, 
rendering them stateless – P. Weis and R. Graupner, “The Problem of Statelessness” (1944). 
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(iv) Improving Risk Management for IE Offenders: 
Significant numbers of IE prisoners are now being released, without apparently being de-
radicalised and rehabilitated.52 Ex-IRTL Max Hill suggested some returning ISIS fighters 
were naive and could be rehabilitated.53 Redemption and rehabilitation may be noble 
objectives in relation to normal criminality. IE is not normal crime. Its aim – indiscriminate 
massacre to instil terror and undermine Western civilisation – differs. Home-grown Jihadists 
present a real risk to national security and a continuing terrorist threat. They remain enemy 
combatants – albeit for an enemy which no longer has a territorial Caliphate. Rehabilitation 
of the radicalised may be fanciful54 – paradigmatically an exercise in ‘pathological altruism’; 
leading to irrational, counterproductive self-harm for the nation.55 A low threshold of 
suspicion about the veracity of the professedly reformed – and the efficacy of clinical risk 
assessment – is reasonable. Overstretched security services do not have the resources to 
constantly surveil hundreds of returned ISIS fighters or that first wave of paroled prisoners.  
Preventive detention of suspect terrorists as controlees under such controversial 
administrative measures as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (formerly 
Control Orders) is problematic.56 Lord MacDonald queried this approach:57  
"The reality is that controlees become warehoused far beyond the harsh scrutiny of 
due process and, in consequence, some terrorist activity undoubtedly remains 
unpunished by the criminal law. This is a serious and continuing failure of public 
policy."  
 
Pre-emptive detention represents a fundamental change in classical notions of justice – 
antithetical to the principles of common law systems of criminal justice.58 Meanwhile, 
 
52 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 7 
53 Lizzie Dearden, “More than 400 British Isis jihadis have already returned to UK, report warns” Independent 
(24 October 2017): 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-british-jihadis-return-uk-iraq-syria-report-islamic-
state-fighters-europe-threat-debate-terror-a8017811.html 
54 Lord Faulks, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 801 cols. 279-280, 8 January 2020 
55 Barbara Oakley et. al., eds., Pathological Altruism (2012) 
56 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 
57 Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: A Report by Lord MacDonald of River Glaven QC (Cm 
8003) (2011), 10 
58 Alan M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A knife that cuts both ways (2006), 37 
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statutory alternatives do not consistently provide for the option of life imprisonment with 
ongoing post-release supervision.  
Though possibly considered only a resourcing or sentencing issue (and for future offenders), 
treason law allows for prosecution of potential terrorists who have not yet escalated their 
actions to terrorist acts but still pose serious security risks. Since the sentencing entry point 
for treason is mandatory life imprisonment,59 successful treason prosecutions could deal with 
this lacuna – ensuring more effective management of what would be paroled IE life 
prisoners, who can be more closely monitored on pain of immediate (arbitrary) recall. 
Invoking treason law is practically and philosophically preferable. It avoids legally dubious 
preventive detention. It recognises the impossibility of constant surveillance – but provides 
for proactive policing of released IE life prisoners, who are more likely to be circumspect in 
their conduct than those liberated on determinate sentences. Deprivation of liberty under 
treason law will at least follow due process and be ‘human rights’ compliant. Suspects will 
be informed of the charge against them; obtain effective legal assistance of their own 
choosing (not an appointed Special Advocate); have their case heard in public; before a 
competent court; determined by an independent jury, who must be satisfied of their guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt. The offenders are not punished without charge. Nor are they 
primarily sentenced to protect the public from possible future behaviour – rather under 
conventional sentencing principles, principally retribution and deterrence. An indeterminate 
sentence need not be excessive or disproportionate – because the sentencer retains discretion 
to limit the length of the punishment part – with provision for periodic reviews after 
completion.  
 
(v) Vengeance and Retribution: 
Invariably, those who have done harm to Britain’s interests over the last century have not 
been prosecuted for treason. Instead, it has been an exceptional response – to deliver 
retribution to those who have taken a political stand against the British state during wartime 
– however pathetic their actions might have been.60 It might be significant that William Joyce 
and John Amery (two of the four who were prosecuted for treason at the end of World War 
 
59 Treason Act 1814, s. 1 (as amended by Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 36(4)) 
60 Weale, Patriot Traitors, 244-245 
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II) and Sir Roger Casement61 were borderline establishment figures who were public 
propagandists.62 Their offences involved more provocative behaviour than crimes of 
espionage and deception. Joyce (‘Lord Haw-Haw’), the radio voice of ‘Germany Calling’, 
had, in his sneering affected upper-class accent, mocked, and taunted the British people 
during the War’s darkest hours. Though you might think that the criminal justice system 
should rise above this unfashionably primal focus on vengeance and catharsis, retribution 
(their legal expression) remains a relevant and justifiable basis for prosecution and a 
sentencing imperative – especially where the ultimate complainers are the British state and 
people. The desire for retribution is unsurprising and human. Of course, this is not the only 
basis for justice, but it is an inescapable aspect of it. Properly, what should be avoided is 
misplaced vengeance. Again, I will consider the ‘wrong’ of treason in Chapter 2 as 
underpinning retribution as a relevant factor in reviving treason law. 
 
IV. Problems with Reviving Treason Law: 
It was recognised in the Policy Exchange Paper that any proposals to revive the law of 
treason are likely to encounter fierce criticism. A 2015 Guardian editorial criticised the 
Government flirting with revival of the existing treason law:63  
"Indeed, at a time when ministers insist they are intent on reassuring apprehensive 
Muslim communities, they could not have selected a more emotive law. It would also 
be counterproductive, given that the most famous offenders under the 18th-century 
treason laws are current-day heroes: the American revolutionaries who drew up the 
declaration of independence. The use of such laws now should be squashed as 
promptly as possible." 
 
Lord MacDonald described discussion about using the archaic legislation against Britons 
fighting with Islamic State (ISIS) or pledging allegiance to the militant group as "a juvenile 
response to a grown-up problem".64  
 
61 Though his knighthood was forfeited in 1916, the Cabinet record of the 1965 decision to repatriate his 
remains refers to Sir Roger Casement (National Archives, CAB/128/39). 
62 Weale, Patriot Traitors, xvii 
63 “Use existing Laws” Guardian (9 August 2015) 
64 Deborah Haynes, “Treason charge a ‘badge of honour’ for jihadists” Times (18 October 2014): 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/treason-charge-a-badge-of-honour-for-jihadists-p05n7bn2qtz 
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I now address the problems associated with any attempted revival of treason law – whether 
principled, pragmatic, or technical – and the possible rebuttals to them.  
 
(i) Treason, the Anachronism: 
There is a serious credibility problem with treason law insofar as it is perceived as 
anachronistic – a medieval offence, a feudal concept, designed for a different society, where 
the king took most decisions of national importance. The feudal bases of treason are possibly 
considered inconsistent with the liberal version of contemporary criminal law that prefers 
"systematic and scientific control of violence" to the symbolism of ancient treason law.65 
This is an area of the law where you might have expected – with the emergence of liberal 
democracy in the nineteenth century – a liberal transformation and abandonment of feudal 
principles of obligation. But this never happened.66 Treason law has been rightly lampooned 
for its more eccentric, obviously obsolete, provisions. While it might be plausible to retain 
certain ancient institutions and rituals for historical and nostalgic reasons, why bring more 
Medievalism into our law? It might signal state paranoia. A government that is perceived to 
need to reinforce its residents’ allegiance in this way may unnecessarily reveal its insecurity 
about their loyalty and exaggerate the magnitude of the threat from within. Despite the 
intended deterrent effect of prosecution, the Government might signal weakness sufficient 
to trigger, rather than deter, additional treasons.67 
Fletcher suggests that there is an ambivalence towards treason and that because of its feudal 
origins, it no longer conforms to our shared assumptions about the liberal nature and purpose 
of criminal law, such that it is difficult to convert it into an offence with liberal contours and 
reconcile it with a liberal legal culture.68 It is a feudal crime surviving in a post-
Enlightenment criminal law based on liberal principles of harm, privacy of the internal 
sphere and universality (in the sense of the substantive definition of offences, focusing on 
every individual as perpetrator and victim). He argues that one of its principal anti-liberal 
characteristics is that the crime is addressed to that bond of loyalty between a sovereign and 
 
65 J. Richard Broughton, “The Snowden Affair and the Limits of American Treason” (2015) 3 LMULawReview 
5, 11; Fletcher, “Ambivalence”, 1628  
66 Ibid., 1622 
67 Kristen E. Eichensehr, “Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason's Return 
in Democratic States” (2009) 42 VandJTransnatlL 1443 
68 Fletcher “Ambivalence”, 1612-1613 
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subordinate subjects.69 Certainly, we seem to be embarrassed to talk about such big ideas as 
allegiance, betrayal and treason.70 But it is not immediately clear why the relational aspect 
of the crime should be regarded as anti-liberal – an issue I will explore in Chapter 2.71 
Further, treason laws are only anti-liberal if they have not been amended or re-interpreted to 
focus on the traitor’s acts rather than their internal beliefs – a matter I will address in Chapter 
4.  
Antiquity need not be equated with obsolescence, for many crimes are old, timeless even. 
Trial by jury and common law are also medieval concepts. There are good reasons why the 
1351 Act has survived for over 650 years. You may embrace modernity, though some things 
are universal and perpetual – and the core idea of acting with malice against your own 
country is one of them. The American founding fathers were anything but medieval or 
feudal, and still enshrined a treason law in their Constitution. The Australian Sheller 
Committee (the independent Security Legislation Review Committee) of 2005 rejected the 
proposition that the offence of treason is not appropriate in a modern democratic society.72 
Treason is regarded as a crime by most people today as it was in the past – though treason 
law has, of course, evolved as the idea of the nation has evolved, and needs to be updated 
for twenty-first century conditions.  
Partly because of their archaic language, the Treason Acts have rarely been invoked in 
modern practice and alternative offences are available for prosecution. There are practical 
and presentational difficulties with the existing law. While founded in a concise medieval 
statute, written in a form of long-obsolete Norman French, its clear wording has allowed for 
liberal and broad judicial interpretation.73 Disparate legislation created separate, overlapping 
offences – but the 1351 Act is still the living law of treason and the outmoded language 
persists.74 Its terminology connotes a sense of deference by the subordinated subject – 
submission or subservience even – seeming hopelessly undemocratic in a less deferential 
age. Authoritative recommendations have previously been made for modernisation. The Law 
Commission concluded in 1977 – as did Lord Goldsmith, in his 2008 Citizenship Review – 
 
69 Ibid., 1619-1622 
70 Lord Bethell, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 793 col. 1379, 31 October 2018 
71 Eichensehr, “Treason in Terrorism”, 1464 
72 Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of Security and Counter 
Terrorism Legislation (4 December 2006), Ch. 4 
73 Alan Wharam, “Treason in Rhodesia” (1967) 25(2) CLJ 189, 192 and 194 
74 Law Com WP 72, para. 51; Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008), 41 
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that there was a good case for retention, but that the existing statutes should be repealed and 
replaced with new legislation – in much the same way as other common law countries have 
done (notably Canada, Australia and New Zealand), drawing on our law and incorporating 
the offence of treason in similar though updated form in their Criminal Codes.75  
The Law Commission’s view was that because of the extent of the present offences of 
treason in peacetime and their difficult language, it was necessary to restate the offences in 
simple language, if they were, indeed, needed at all.76 Lord Goldsmith found that there are 
difficulties in prosecuting "due to it being couched in archaic language of ambiguous 
ambit"77 The scope of each of the offence elements was unclear. It would be difficult to 
determine how the statutory language might apply in a modern context, and present a treason 
case in easily explicable and intelligible terms.78 Even in 1940, the then Home Secretary, Sir 
John Anderson, commended the Treachery Act to the Commons as necessary because the 
Treason Acts were antiquated, excessively cumbrous, and invested with a dignity and 
ceremonial that seemed wholly inappropriate.79 
Many of the provisions have given rise to difficult questions of interpretation.80 Notoriously, 
treason prosecutions have encountered difficulties arising from obscurities about the 
substance of treason offences; with archaic terminology affecting elements such as 
allegiance, residence, territoriality and even the impact of words alone.81 It is often suggested 
that Casement was ‘hanged on a comma’ (because of the grammatical ambiguity of the 
original unpunctuated text) – and how unsatisfactory it was, even then, that this most serious 
of criminal offences should have turned on the construction of language some 600 (now over 
700) years old,82 which was both obscure and difficult.83  
 
75 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 81 
76 Law Com WP 72, para. 57 
77 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 7, 41, 81; Joyce v. DPP [1946] AC 347 
78 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 79  
79 Hansard HC Deb. vol. 361 col. 191, 22 May 1940 
80 David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (1980), 1232 
81 R. v. Mitchel (1848) 3 Cox CC 509; De Jager v. Attorney-General of Natal (1907); R. v. Casement [1917] 1 
KB 98; Joyce; Walker, Terrorism, 5.172 
82 Lord Reading CJ, 123 
83 Law Com WP 72, para. 21, referencing Casement; Goldsmith, Citizenship, 79; Alastair Brown, “Offences 
against the State” (2005), para. 540 in The Laws of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 5, 
Criminal Law, 19 
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Treason law also tends to apply to conventional war between nation-states – and not the 
modern phenomenon of ‘war’ or, more specifically, armed conflict being waged against 
nation-states by organisations. There is a difference between international armed conflict 
and non-international armed conflict – or other conflicts falling short of non-international 
conflict. But this form of warfare still represents an existential threat. 
To conduct prosecutions under an Act which is that old and contains definitions so broad, 
would need to be tested and we do not know what would happen if it were so tested. If 
Scotland were to have a usable treason law, it must be re-drafted to reflect modern conditions 
and sensibilities.84 This is precisely the problem with which I will engage. 
 
(ii) ‘Patriotic’/Nationalistic Treason – ‘The (British) Empire Striking Back’: 
For many, the difficulty of a revived treason law is that it may evoke a patriotic treason 
which involves the ‘wrong’ kind of patriotism; that it would result in the targeting of 
minorities or cause them to be treated with undue suspicion; perhaps focusing on one 
sizeable community in particular, or will at least be perceived to do so. A Scottish law of 
treason is still likely to demand a British allegiance and some Scottish British citizens or 
residents may consider that they may be conflicted by a competing allegiance. In Chapter 2, 
I will consider the potential difficulties arising from treason law in a plural and multicultural 
state – and how this issue might be approached.  
Some argue, with states fragmenting and the nation-state becoming ever more subordinate 
to and subsumed into supranational institutions – that we are now approaching a ‘post-
national’ future. There is a cosmopolitan notion that nationality is morally irrelevant and 
national boundaries are morally insignificant, even entirely arbitrary.85 Without endorsing 
full-blown cosmopolitanism, increasingly fragmented sovereignty seems indisputable. How 
much protection is genuinely attributable to our domestic political institutions as to warrant 
 
84 “The Guardian view on fighting Isis: medieval treason laws are the wrong weapon” Guardian (19 October 
2014): 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/19/guardian-view-on-fighting-isis-trason-laws-wrong-
weapon 
85 Youngjae Lee, “Punishing Disloyalty? Treason, Espionage, and the Transgression of Political Boundaries” 
(2012) 31 LawPhilos 299, 307-308; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” Boston Review 
(1 October 1994): 
http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism 
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a correlating duty of allegiance? Treason is premised on an extinct sense of loyalty to the 
state – and interconnectedness of the modern world scarcely lends itself to earlier notions of 
strict national allegiances and the attendant obligations.86 If national boundaries do not carry 
moral weight, it is unclear whether there is a moral obligation to support your country, or 
even at least refrain from helping its enemies – unless it happens, somewhat implausibly, to 
be on the morally-correct side of every single conflict.87 The nation or political community 
can hardly have a claim upon individuals in some essentialist fashion – and make exclusive 
demands upon their moral conscience. There may be other political, moral, or religious 
communities to which people can channel their allegiance and through which they can 
express their values or political aspirations. Who is to say that these are morally inferior or 
any less valid? Why should the citizen owe a special duty of loyalty to the state? Treason 
remains linked to the nation-state and to patriotism, which is perceived in certain influential 
quarters as chauvinistic, irrational, and dangerous. Some will think that there is something 
inherently ‘creepy’ about the state making demands about where one’s heart belongs. This 
could easily be misconstrued as promoting a sense of tribal identity. Surely, we should now 
be transcending our arbitrary loyalties to these relics of the past. This is a meta-issue which 
denies nationality, patriotism and allegiance or loyalty. But the nation-state seems to be 
experiencing a striking renaissance. With the coronavirus outbreak, EU member states have 
peremptorily reclaimed sovereignty88 – though Zielonka argues the prevailing trend had 
already been against globalisation and European integration,89 having passed ‘peak 
globalisation’. 
The Policy Exchange Paper recognised this anxiety about how the public, especially British 
Muslims, would receive treason prosecutions. Rather than promoting community cohesion, 
a revived treason law might exacerbate an already fraught political situation. Absent 
consensus, the case for revival may be doomed because "ultimately the authority of the law 
depends on the support given to it by public opinion".90  
 
86 Suzanne Kelly Babb, “Fear and Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National 
Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh” (2003) 54 Hastings LJ 1721, 1732 
87 Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (2002), 152 
88 Jan Zielonka, “Has the coronavirus brought back the nation-state?” Social Europe (26 March 2020): 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/has-the-coronavirus-brought-back-the-nation-state 
89 Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (2018) 
90 Hersch Lauterpacht, “Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens” (1947) 9 
CLJ 330, 334 
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Is consensus achievable? If juries consistently refused to convict of treason, opting instead 
for statutory alternatives, that would suggest it is not. A pattern of jury nullification would 
indicate public opposition to a revived treason law, and should, pragmatically, prompt its 
discontinuance. But this might be regarded presently as a speculative concern which denies 
the validity of the ‘fair labelling’ argument. Meanwhile, it may well be that it is impossible 
to rebuild trust with alienated communities – and perhaps gloomily accepting that there is a 
division, managing it on the majority’s terms, in defiance of political opposition. A fraught 
political calculus may be involved – but that is not to invalidate the legally-principled case 
for revival and reform.  
 
(iii) Undue Deference to Monarchy and Political Institutions: 
Perhaps by its original premise of personal allegiance to the sovereign, British treason law 
is associated with deference or subservience even to monarchy – perceptibly a lèse-
majesté (‘leasing-making’) law, too heavily-wedded to the idea of monarchy and thus 
regarded as undemocratic. The Treason Felony Act 1848 still renders republican activists 
technically traitors. But the judgment in the Guardian’s unsuccessful challenge to much of 
the 1848 Act in Rusbridger underlined that disseminating republican ideas does not fall 
within the ambit of treason law.91 Nonetheless, not everyone is content to leave matters to 
prosecutorial discretion – or is comfortable with continuing over-criminalisation – and the 
potentiality for interference with Convention rights.92  
I will argue in Chapter 2 that a revived treason law should instead focus on core concerns 
and dispense with such fripperies. I will submit that the central role of the Crown in any 
Scottish treason law should not be an exercise in promoting royal power – simply recognition 
of a long-standing constitutional settlement involving combined sovereignty, in 
circumstances in which there is presently little organised opposition to monarchy or desire 
for a rival theory of government. It may well be that attitudes about loyalty to monarch and 
country have changed; and will possibly crystallise once the second Elizabethan age ends. 
But you do not require to have a monarch for a separate Scottish treason law or a monarch 
with a central role in it. You need not reference the monarch (or Crown) at all. In Chapter 2 
 
91 R. v. Her Majesty's Attorney General ex parte Rusbridger and another [2003] UKHL 38 – comprehensively 
summarised in Gordon, Criminal Law, 3rd ed. Supplement (2005), para. 37.24 
92 Clare Dyer “Judges block treason challenge” Guardian (23 June 2001): 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jun/23/monarchy.claredyer 
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I will consider whether there is scope for protectable interests or objects of allegiance in a 
Scottish treason law other than the monarchy. 
Further, British treason law affirms a Protestant monarchy – and, impliedly, the Protestant 
faith – and thereby might be deemed non-inclusive by some, many even. Why should 
religion – and this branch of this religion in particular – be afforded such special privilege? 
But the Christian majority (59.6% in the 2011 Census93) – and the Protestant majority 
component of that – have rights too. It is not as if the UK has ever attempted to promote 
itself as a secular state. In any event you cannot simply view the contemporary British state 
in denominational and ideological terms. You should do so primarily in secular and 
functional terms – for the UK is essentially a secular or ‘agnostic’ nation. Rather than 
affirming the Protestant succession, the likelihood is that an ambivalent Coronation Oath of 
a future monarch could be sworn by the Defender of faith – not Defender of the Faith.94 
I will consider in Chapter 3 whether separate provision could always be made outwith the 
law of treason for offences involving the sovereign, though this may have certain unintended 
consequences. To diminish the role of the monarch is to subvert its status relative to the 
Supreme Governor of the Church of England and Protector of the Faith – which might in 
turn precipitate the disestablishment of the Church of England and the Church of Scotland 
as the state religions – if these institutions no longer have the same specific legal standing 
and ceremonial relations with the monarchy. It might be appropriate to have that debate, or 
expediently avoid it, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will argue that the (Protestant) 
sovereign need not necessarily be critical to a new Scottish treason law.  
 
 
 
 
93 Office for National Statistics, “Religion in England and Wales 2011”: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglanda
ndwales2011/2012-12-11 
The progressively downward trend in Christian belief is evidenced by the 56.6% figure from a 2019 ONS 
survey:  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/article
s/researchreportonpopulationestimatesbyethnicgroupandreligion/2019-12-04#population-estimates-by-
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(iv) Discredited by Historical Abuses: 
Treason law has suffered much reputational damage by the long history of abuse of the 
treason charge.95 The Policy Exchange Paper recognised these many injustices.96 It has 
unfortunate baggage as an instrument of class oppression for crushing republican or radical 
dissent – lois scélérates (‘villainous laws’) – a manipulable political crime to defend the 
established order and repress social movements. Indeed, I will consider the historical abuse 
of treason law by ‘constructive treasons’ in Chapter 4. Treason law has also been discredited 
by totalitarian abuses elsewhere. To modern sensibilities only tyrants and the weakest of 
nations still need treason laws. Nations secure in their identity can comfortably survive 
without its invocation.97 Unscrupulous governments will conflate society and state, 
homeland, and nation, to demand unquestioning loyalty – prosecuting political opponents 
and nonconformists as enemies of the state. Consider the excesses of the People’s Court (the 
notorious Volksgerichtshof) which had jurisdiction over political offences including 
treason against the Third Reich98 – and the Moscow Trials (1936-1938).99 More recently, 
the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe have exploited treason laws to bolster their 
fledgling democracies – paranoid of betrayal and anxious to assert supremacy over threats 
from within.100 Expanding the scope of treason law and exploiting it for sinister purposes is 
hardly a farfetched concern given the prevailing trend toward ‘soft’ authoritarianism.101 UK 
and devolved Governments have just used emergency law-making powers to enact far-
reaching measures, with little Parliamentary scrutiny. Can we have faith in the essential 
goodness of future governments not to abuse revitalised treason legislation and pursue an 
authoritarian path? Because treason is characteristically a political crime, it perceptibly risks 
 
95 Cramer v. United States, 325 US 1 (1945) – Cramer is an excellent resource for both British and American 
treason law in so far that leading American scholar James Willard Hurst produced a comprehensive historical 
survey for the US Government’s brief.  
96 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 50; Lisa Steffen, Defining a British State: Treason and National 
Identity, 1608-1820 (2001), 4-7 
97 Fletcher “Ambivalence”, 1626-1627 
98 Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany (2004), 398-399 
99 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (1990), 386 
100 Tom Humdley, “Old Crimes Still Haunt New Europe” Chi. Trib (29 June 2003); Vera Chelishcheva, “Spy 
mania 2.0: the rise in 'crimes against the state' in Russia” Guardian (24 February 2016): 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/24/spy-mania-rise-in-crimes-against-state-treason-russia-
ukraine 
101 Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, “An Authoritarian Turn in Europe and European Studies?” (2018) 25(3) J Eur 
Public Policy 452 
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politically inspired abuses of process. Its status as a political crime does not invalidate it, but 
neither should it be overlooked. Could a revived treason law – and overreaching treason 
prosecutions – be used to curb freedom of expression and non-violent protest? The perceived 
threat might have further foundation in the rhetorical abuse of treason on the flimsiest 
pretexts although the precedents for suppressing political and religious speech are poor. 
Laws tend to leak into areas for which they were not originally designed – to succumb to 
‘mission creep’ and evolve beyond their original purpose, if convenient for rulers. "Any 
Government which acts or asks Parliament to act against treason … has to meet the criticism 
that it is seeking not to protect government, but to protect the Government, and keep itself 
in power."102  
However, the characterisation of treason as a political crime does not invalidate it as a 
relevant crime. Offences against the state are still a legitimate genre or legal classification in 
substantive criminal law. The British state (and the Scottish component of that) is entitled to 
protect its very existence, the nation’s territorial integrity, and its people, to challenge acts 
of war committed against it and its people – including and especially external-sponsored 
terrorism committed by British subjects. Suppressing treason should be one of the first 
concerns of all governments.103 Meanwhile, these historical and autocratic allusions are lazy. 
This is scarcely a recognisable risk in the modern British context. The Policy Exchange 
Paper argued that it does not follow that this troubled history somehow invalidates its key 
concepts of loyalty and betrayal.  
I will argue that concerns about abuse can be alleviated by framing any new Scottish offence 
in suitably narrow terms. In Chapter 2 I will propose that allegiance be recast in terms of a 
narrow duty of loyalty or duty of non-betrayal – specifically, not to betray this country by 
aiding its enemies in their attacks against it – and only then as a corollary to the state’s duty 
of protection such that it can be conceived in terms of the social contract. Allegiance under 
this model will not be an unduly burdensome impediment, as far as any restriction on 
personal freedom is concerned. In Chapter 3 I will suggest that an appropriate safeguard 
against any new Scottish treason law being used to criminalise political dissent will be the 
requirement for identification with a foreign enemy – and that it be narrowly defined in terms 
of helping an enemy in the perpetration of or preparation of attacks on the UK – adopting 
the argument advanced in the Policy Exchange Paper. In Chapter 4 I will focus on the 
 
102 Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 142 
103 Fletcher, “Case for Treason”, 193  
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importance of intentional treasonous action.104 The specific, limited wrong of betrayal will 
be aiding the UK’s enemies in attacking this country; and narrowly defining Scottish treason 
law should equally make clear exactly what it is not. 
 
(v) Ample Alternatives: 
There are ample equivalent statutory crimes against the state which address precisely this 
kind of criminality – in a more nuanced way – without risking further politicising and 
needlessly complicating prosecutions with possibly limited benefit. It is difficult to conceive 
a treasonable act that would not fall within the definition of some other crime. Various 
statutory public order offences – as well as common law mobbing and rioting – adequately 
cope with serious civil unrest and a new (Scottish) treason offence would add little by way 
of criminalisation. As terrorism is a relatively modern phenomenon, the treason offences are 
arguably ill-equipped to deal with it.105 Terrorism submits to a wide definition.106 In 
particular, s. 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006 gives extra-territorial effect to s. 5 which reaffirms 
the criminalisation of the preparation of terrorist acts. Given the options for indeterminate 
sentencing – that terrorist offences generally produce the same resultant sentencing product 
– deterrence is scarcely compromised. It is a recognised aggravating factor in sentencing if 
the offence of preparation of terrorist acts is committed with a view to engaging in combat 
with UK armed forces – albeit this is a non-statutory aggravating factor and one of 14 factors 
listed in no particular order in the English Sentencing Guidelines.107 The abuse of the 
position of trust when allegiance is owed has been confirmed as an aggravating factor in 
terrorist sentencing.108 Acknowledging that treason law is obsolete would not leave the state 
powerless against violent subversion, although the dismal reality is that updating the treason 
laws may do little to stop IE terrorism. Should we be so hung up on the label which is used 
to charge home-grown Jihadists in what is, objectively, low intensity conflict?  
But the equivalent statutory crimes are somewhat anodyne in that they do not reflect the 
distinct wrong of betrayal – and by that understate the gravity of such offending and may 
not reflect the public mood. They do not tap into the sense of betrayal of homeland, felt on 
 
104 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 50 
105 Law Com WP 311, para. 2.29 
106 R. v. Gul [2013] UKSC 64 
107 Sentencing Council, Terrorism Offences Definitive Guideline (2018)  
108 R. v. Farooqi and Ors [2013] EWCA Crim 1649, per Lord Judge LCJ, 162 
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almost a primal level. In contrast, treason signals the gravity of the wrong where a citizen 
(or resident) helps an enemy engaged in attacking the UK.109 Even though they involve 
criminal activity, terrorist acts are not simply crimes. By their character and intent, they are 
more akin to acts of war. They may not be so regarded by governments because that might 
confer legitimacy on their perpetrators and create a sense of entitlement to privileges 
ordinarily accorded enemy combatants, but escalating terrorist acts to treason charges 
recognises that these are indeed acts of war, while still retaining the criminal law context. 
Prosecutions under current treason law would not be without their own difficulties of proof 
and legal complexities – principally, archaic, and obscure terminology; jurisdictional issues; 
and proof of ‘protected person’ status – but the statutory alternatives are not without their 
own complications either. Terrorism legislation is validly objected to for its lack of definition 
and clarity.110 It can similarly be impugned for unjustly repressing minorities. However, 
unlike much anti-terrorism legislation, treason law does not necessarily endanger democracy 
by creating a relentless state of exception which allows the conditions for (soft) authoritarian 
government. Meanwhile, it has become increasingly apparent that the statutory alternatives 
do not provide for adequate punishment and post-release risk management – which treason 
convictions with their resultant life sentences undoubtedly would.111 
 
(vi) Peacetime Irrelevance: 
Modern treason is essentially a wartime phenomenon. Prosecutions are rare and only occur 
in wartime or its immediate aftermath, when emotions might be expected to be raw. The 
Law Commission considered it questionable whether treason offences are required in 
peacetime.112 It might well be that wartime is apt for legislative activity, but we are not now 
engaged in a regular war (de jure). Certainly, the principal threat of twenty-first century 
terrorism is linked to IE. Ethnic or sectarian terrorism is scarcely a new phenomenon – and 
the current threat appears to be manageable. Indeed, it is at a significantly lower level of 
intensity than the Irish Troubles (1969-1998). To contextualise, more than 3,500 people were 
 
109 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 5, 33, 41 and 51 
110 https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190909-Treason-
Speech-to-RUSI.pdf 
111 “London Bridge: Attacker had been convicted of terror offence” BBC (30 November 2019): 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-50610215 
112 Law Com WP 311, para. 2.30 
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killed in the Troubles.113 The conflict was declared in 1971 by the then Home Secretary Reg 
Maudling as being at ‘an acceptable level of violence’ – a notorious gaffe which came to 
denote the security policy of successive UK Governments, prepared to tolerate paramilitary 
activity, so long as it remained at manageable proportions.114 In contrast, since 2001 there 
have been ‘only’ 100 or so terrorist-related deaths in Great Britain, the majority of which are 
attributable to IE.115 Our political institutions, police and military are not so fragile that they 
are unable to absorb these threats. Demographics militate against any serious insurrection 
aimed at the establishment of a British Caliphate. Given that there is no genuine existential 
danger posed by attacks from non-state actors to our society and its existence as a great 
power with economic, diplomatic and strategic influence – or of full-blown invasion of the 
UK, assuming we were embroiled in further conflict in the Middle East – perhaps there is 
little purpose in thinking about treason, as the threat is not an existential crisis and does not 
warrant panic.  
Since treason is relevant in wartime or its immediate aftermath – or following an enormous, 
unprecedented terrorist spectacular – why not update it for precisely those eventualities 
which are hardly hypotheticals? Home-grown Jihadists are still perfectly capable of 
committing atrocities and of waging war against the British state and people – and causing 
serious injury to it and them. This is the nature of much modern warfare – often perpetrated 
by non-state actors, possibly funded to fight a proxy war against the UK and its Western 
allies. The issue is the fact of their betrayal and their intent. Treason law can and should deal 
with this in what might be peacetime. If treason law were viewed as being on ‘stand-by’ for 
the unwelcome day on which the UK again declares war, it should not be repealed – and if 
it should not be repealed, then it should be updated and rendered fit for purpose in that 
eventuality.  
 
V. Making Scottish Treason Law Relevant: 
Enacting a new Scottish treason law is an opportunity for the creation of a usable treason 
law, re-drafted to reflect modern conditions and sensibilities. It allows for the creation of a 
 
113 Malcolm Sutton, “Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland”, CAIN: 
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/ 
114 “Maudling Statement Arouses Ulster Parliament” NYT (16 December 1971) 
115 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number CBP7613 Terrorism in Great Britain: the statistics (7 
June 2018) 
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new lexicon to deal with the presentational difficulties of arcane terminology – especially 
treason’s peculiar and convoluted actus reus and mens rea – that a treason case might be 
prosecuted in easily explicable and intelligible terms. It accords with ‘fair labelling’ 
expectations and promotes legal certainty. It could engage with the present existential threat 
on a more principled basis than anodyne statutory alternatives – reflecting the ‘wrong’ of 
treason. It would carry significant weight, theoretically and symbolically, and allow for more 
effective criminal sentencing, even providing the blueprint for modernising British treason 
law.  
Assuming the case can thus be made for a separate Scottish treason law, the second principal 
research question with which I will engage is what would a separate Scottish treason law 
look like? How might it be modernised and made relevant – that it might serve a useful 
purpose and be successfully litigated?  
To answer this and the first main research question, I must address the following sub-
question: how can the duty of allegiance – pivotal to the theory of the crime of treason – be 
re-fashioned for modern conditions and placed in a viable theoretical context and restated in 
a form fit to be enforced? I will look in Chapter 2 at the contemporary dynamics of 
sovereignty, allegiance and national identity and consider whether treason’s core idea of 
allegiance is survivable – and in what form. The prospect of a Scottish treason law raises 
fundamental questions at the most general level as to whether the obligations of loyalty 
would be the same. What would be the object of its (duty of) allegiance? Should it extend to 
Scottish political institutions? It might be appropriate to distance treason from patriotism 
and I will engage with the issue of how allegiance in a Scottish treason law (or revived 
British treason law) might be reconceptualised in terms of a narrow, negative duty (or duty 
of non-betrayal) not to betray this country to its foreign enemies and be operable under a 
non-patriotic contractual model – thus allowing for any fears of emotive patriotic distractions 
to be assuaged.  
To answer the second main research question, I will consider how its essential elements 
might be expected to work under any revised allegiance model to determine the viability of 
the whole project. In Chapter 3 I will consider what type of conduct would breach this 
revised duty of allegiance and how the actus reus of a reformulated Scottish crime of treason 
might be expected to look. I will explore how the requirement for adhering to the UK’s 
enemies in all surviving heads of treason – that the surviving treasons be essentially 
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‘Adherence Treason’116 or derivatives or sub-categories of it – might further address such 
concerns. 
The particular thing about treason is its intent and in Chapter 4 I will consider what mens 
rea requirement may be appropriate to this contractual duty-based allegiance model. In 
Chapter 5 I will test the proper limits of that modelling and the conditions under which 
protected persons should not be criminally responsible for conduct falling within those limits 
– by investigating what defences should be available even where there has been a material 
and intentional breach of this duty of allegiance. 
 
 
 
 
116 This terminology applied in Broughton, “Snowden”, 11. Giving ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’ has been 
described as ‘Exterior Treason’ (John N. Hazard and William B. Stern, “Exterior Treason: A Study in 
Comparative Criminal Law” (1938) 6(1) UChiLRev 77). 
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I. Introduction:  
Treason is an offence against allegiance and is historically based on the concept of allegiance 
of the British subject to the Crown. Crucially, to commit treason you have to first owe 
allegiance to the Crown. Allegiance is traditionally at the heart of the law of treason, but the 
common law notion of allegiance is problematic in a twenty-first century, multi-cultural 
constitutional monarchy. It may be perceived as being unduly deferential to monarchy and 
emphasising British identity. It seems archaic and complicated. The fictional judge in a 
treason-related episode of the 1970s courtroom drama Crown Court consoled the lay jury: 
"The concept of allegiance is perhaps a little difficult".1 Lord Goldsmith in his 2008 
Citizenship Review referred to the complexities in the concept of allegiance and 
recommended reforming the law of treason to make the duty of allegiance relevant to modern 
conditions.2 The principal question to be asked in this chapter is how to re-think the core 
duty of allegiance that it might be re-interpreted for modern conditions? In short, how might 
we fix it? 
In the first (post-introduction) section I will consider the traditional meaning and view of 
allegiance, including demonstrating the extent to which it is a core concept in the crime of 
treason – to properly appreciate why it cannot be taken to fully work under contemporary 
conditions. In the second section I will address the problems with the concept of allegiance 
as presently constituted in treason law: viz., its archaic language; its central notion of 
allegiance of the British subject to the Crown, its association with monarchy; its possibly 
nationalistic overtones; and the potentially confusing conflation of allegiance and 
citizenship. Insofar as there remains mileage in the concept of allegiance, it might be thought 
that modern ideas of citizenship could assume a greater importance in any new model. I will 
consider in the third section whether one way of modernising allegiance might be to invoke 
fashionable notions of citizenship – before rejecting this as something of a distraction. 
Further, while the protected person could otherwise be defined as a citizen rather than as 
subject (given the emotive invocations of monarchy and subservience associated with the 
traditional phraseology), I will consider whether this terminology should be dismissed as 
imprecise and unsuitable. I will focus in the fourth section on what might be meant by the 
 
1 Crown Court, Treason: R. v. Clement, ep. 52 (1973) Alan Bromly, dir. – where an Anglo-Belgian mercenary 
was found guilty of treason after leading an uprising in a fictional British dependency – and sentenced to death 
(it still being formally punishable by execution at the time of broadcast): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvnWK-ul1Jw&t=10s 
2 Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008), 7 and 81 
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‘wrong’ of treason – to help us decide whether we should persist with allegiance or consider 
some other basis for grounding the law of treason. Insofar as it emerges that treason is still 
best understood in terms of allegiance and disloyalty – and that treason and betrayal can only 
ultimately be defined by reference to allegiance – I will argue that allegiance must continue 
to be the core concept in the offence of treason. Because allegiance is as an idea worth 
holding on to, I will try to develop a model by which it can be justifiably retained.  
In the fifth section I will attempt to reconstruct allegiance by considering the competing 
analyses of allegiance arising from the thorny case of Joyce v. DPP.3 Many felt genuine 
discomfort with the prosecution for treason of the Nazi propagandist William Joyce, who 
had voluntarily sided with Germany after an Anglo-Irish upbringing and education, given 
that at the time of his ostensibly treasonable broadcasts he was neither a British subject nor 
on British soil.4 When he was convicted, he was a German citizen. It was moot whether 
Joyce had owed allegiance to the Crown, the nexus being his lapsed British passport, 
obtained by false pretences, and the resultant slender international protection derived from 
it. The Court relied upon his having applied for and received it as a basis for estoppel such 
that he was not entitled to deny his duty of allegiance. The two outstanding legal 
heavyweights of their day re-fought the case, slugging it out through the medium of the 
Cambridge Law Journal – Sir Hersch Lauterpacht weighing in for the Law Lords and 
Glanville Williams counterpunching with devastating effect.5 Lauterpacht’s approach was 
based on the familiar concept of the mutuality of protection and allegiance.6 In contrast, 
Williams’ refinement of the conceptual structure was in terms of a mutuality of a duty of 
protection and a duty of allegiance, thus allowing for a ‘patriotism-free’ version of that duty.7 
This meant not protection juxtaposed against allegiance – but rather a duty of protection 
correlating to a duty of allegiance. I will adopt Williams’ model of allegiance – a non-
patriotic (or, at least, a not overtly patriotic) contractual, ‘duty-based’ model – and explain 
why his theoretical justification is to be preferred. As a matter of nomenclature, I will 
consider whether we should persist with a duty of allegiance – or substitute a more 
 
3 [1946] AC 347 
4 Glanville L. Williams, “The Correlation of Allegiance and Protection” (1948) 10 CLJ 54; Hersch Lauterpacht, 
“Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens” (1947) 9 CLJ 330, 347; Alan 
Wharam, Treason: Famous English Treason Trials (1995), 236 
5 Brian Harris, Injustice, State Trials from Socrates to Nuremberg (2006), 51 
6 Lauterpacht, CLJ, 334  
7 Williams, CLJ 
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comprehensible duty of loyalty or fidelity (or duty of non-disloyalty even) that it might be 
otherwise expressed in more contemporary and familiar terminology. I will find other 
surrogates for personal allegiance to the Crown. Building on Williams’ modelling, I will 
argue that the duty of allegiance be conceptualised as only a negative duty – and will attempt 
to define what a negative duty of allegiance means and involves. Indeed, I consider that there 
is much to commend the argument advanced in the Policy Exchange Paper Aiding the Enemy 
that a new law of treason could and should ‘recognise and reinforce the duty of non-betrayal’ 
incumbent on all citizens.8  
Bringing Scottish government into being has been to arguably create a new form of 
allegiance for its inhabitants. In positing a new, separate, Scottish offence of treason, in issue 
will be how its duty of allegiance might be characterised in terms appropriate to Scotland. 
In the sixth section, I will thus consider to whom or what this duty of allegiance would be 
owed (its object); the class of people who would owe it (the subject of the duty of allegiance 
or ‘protected person’); and define what it is exactly that they would owe by it (its content). 
Complexities arise in respect of who may be said to owe the duty of allegiance.9 I will 
attempt to pre-empt problems with this reconstruction – identifying possible objections to it 
in the seventh section and suggesting how they might be met. In particular, I will assess 
whether competing allegiance and the cultural assimilation of protected persons should 
genuinely matter – because if not citizenship modelling, what to do with probationary 
citizens and other residents? 
 
II. Treason and Allegiance – the Traditional View: 
Treason, allegiance, and sovereignty can be treated as inseparable concepts. Sovereignty is 
the right to govern and includes the right to demand allegiance of the governed. If the 
sovereign power demands allegiance, it necessarily possesses the power to prohibit and 
punish the breach of allegiance. Allegiance is the price citizens pay for the state’s 
corresponding obligation to provide protection.10 Treason is essentially a breach of 
 
8 Richard Ekins et al., Aiding the Enemy, How and why to restore the law of treason Policy Exchange (2018), 
5 
9 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 41 
10 J. Taylor McConkie, “State Treason: The History and Validity of Treason against Individual States” (2013) 
101 Kentucky LJ 281, 324  
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allegiance and can be committed only as between persons united by a bond of allegiance.11 
It is a ‘relational crime’ in the sense that there must be a pre-existing relationship between 
the betrayer and the betrayed.12 The treason is based on a mutuality of protection and 
allegiance – and the breach of that protective relationship by the protected person.13 By this 
mutual relationship between the state and the subject, the state provides the subject with 
protection and in return the subject owes allegiance to the state. This can be considered in 
terms of reciprocity of benefit and duty.14  
In the UK, treason is a breach of allegiance to the Crown. Classically, the breach of the duty 
of allegiance involves a betrayal of the trust owed by the subject to the Crown. Only those 
who owe allegiance to the Crown can commit the crime of treason – consistent with the 
common understanding that to betray, there must be a pre-existing relationship between the 
betrayer and betrayed. "Treason … consists of a behaviour that is presumed to have betrayed 
trust and breached faith" – and "establishing an act of treason requires an a priori act of 
establishing a relationship of trust and loyalty."15 Treason is paradigmatically a crime which 
is committed by a person in a special position of trust – a ‘special capacity’ offence.16  
Allegiance has always been the pivotal concept in the crime of treason – something more 
than even an essential fact (factum probandum) or necessary element of the offence, but its 
very essence. The ancient notion of allegiance can be seen historically to be at its core. 
Allegiance was/is the mechanism by which the state secured or lost the attachment of its 
subjects.17 High treason originally reflected the element of betraying a personal protector, 
namely the King, both as embodiment of divine authority and the supreme figure in the 
feudal system.18 It was about breaching personal loyalty to the sovereign – being based on 
the feudal, personal duty of loyalty of all subjects to the monarch.19 The subject turning 
against their king and waging war against him was a criminal wrong of great proportions.  
 
11 Gordon, Criminal Law, 4th ed. Vol. II (2017), para 43.17 
12 Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty (2001), 107 
13 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193, 194 
14 Lauterpacht, CLJ, 330, 334 
15 Ben-Yehuda, Betrayals and Treason, 107 
16 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 255 
17 Lisa Steffen, Defining a British State: Treason and National Identity, 1608-1820 (2001), 1 
18 Fletcher, “Case for Treason”, 193, 195 
19 Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law, Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Law Com No 
72, 1977), para. 12 
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The importance of the duty of allegiance to high treason is underlined in the following 
passage from Foster’s Crown Law20 – approved in R. v. Casement:21  
"High treason, being an offence committed against the duty of allegiance, it may be 
proper … to consider from whom and to whom allegiance is due. With regard to 
natural born subjects, there can be no doubt. They owe allegiance to the Crown at all 
times and in all places. This is what we call natural allegiance, in contradistinction to 
that which is local. …  
Natural allegiance is founded on the relation every man standeth in to the Crown 
considered as the head of that society whereof he is born a member: and on the peculiar 
privileges he deriveth from that relation which are with great propriety called his 
birthright; this birthright nothing but his own demerit can deprive him of; it is 
indefeasible and perpetual; and consequently the duty of allegiance which ariseth out 
of it and is inseparably connected with it, is in consideration of law likewise 
unalienable and perpetual." 
 
It is also elucidated in this passage from Casement:22 
"The subjects of the King owe him allegiance and the allegiance follows the person of 
the subject. He is the King’s liege wherever he may be and he may violate his 
allegiance in a foreign country just as well as he may violate it in this country." 
 
But allegiance is not a one-sided relationship. The logic of the law is that if the state gives a 
citizen protection, it has a claim to his allegiance – and if he gives it his allegiance, it is 
bound to give him protection.23 It might be thought that allegiance is given only in exchange 
for protection – though it is not a defence if the offender has not availed himself of that 
protection.  
Lord Jowitt (the Lord Chancellor) illuminated this principle in Joyce:24  
"The principle which runs through feudal law and what I may perhaps call 
constitutional law requires on the one hand protection, on the other fidelity: a duty of 
the sovereign lord to protect, a duty of the liege or subject to be faithful. Treason, 
‘trahison’ is the betrayal of a trust: to be faithful to the trust is the counterpart of the 
duty to protect." 
 
20 Fost. CL 183 (1762) 
21 [1917] 1 KB 98, 130 
22 Ibid., 137 
23 Rebecca West, The New Meaning of Treason (1964), 361  
24 368 
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This had previously been encapsulated by Coke, in the sixteenth century, in the following 
maxim: "Protection draws allegiance, and allegiance draws protection" (protectio trahit 
subjectionem, et subjection protectionem).25 A more literal translation is – from allegiance 
to protection and from protection to allegiance – such that it is possible to argue both ways.26 
Hume narrated that treason "include(s) all such offences as are more immediately directed 
against the person and Government of the King; and amount to a violation of that fidelity 
and allegiance which is due to his Majesty from all his subjects in return for the protection 
of his laws and dominion."27 Hale highlighted the significance of the breach of trust:28 
 
"Because as the subject hath his protection from the King and his laws, so on the other 
side the subject is bound by his allegiance to be true and faithful to the King …  
And hence it is, that if an alien enemy come into this kingdom hostilely to invade it, if 
he be taken, he shall be dealt with as an enemy, but not as a traitor, because he violates 
no trust nor allegiance. … 
But if an alien, the subject of a foreign prince in amity with the King, live here, and 
enjoy the benefit of the King’s protection, and commit a treason, he shall be judged 
and executed, as a traitor; for he owes a local allegiance." 
 
 
West in The New Meaning of Treason, the definitive literary critique of the crime of treason, 
emphasised the mutuality of the relationship, dismissing any suggestion that the duty of 
allegiance need be unflinchingly owed to a capricious ruler:29 
 
"Allegiance is not exacted from a subject simply because the Crown is the Crown. The 
idea of the divine right of kings is a comparatively modern vulgarity. According to 
tradition and logic, the state gives protection to all men within its confines, and in 
return exacts their obedience to its law; and the process is reciprocal. When men within 
the confines of the state are obedient to its laws they have a right to claim its 
protection." 
 
Historically, this personal bond of allegiance was unconditional. Allegiance was owed no 
matter what. The subject was supposed to trust in the sovereign and their representatives in 
government. This concept is hardly consistent with modern understandings of the state. 
 
25 Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1 
26 Williams, CLJ, 56 
27 Hume, Commentaries, I, 512 
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Nonetheless, we can historically trace the transition of the monarch’s role from a personal 
into an institutional or even symbolic object of allegiance or model of sovereignty. Foster 
argued that the relationship between king and subject was societal, not familial. Man’s 
relationship to the greater society determined allegiance – a more abstract and remote 
relationship for creating allegiance than the intimacy and mystery of the paternal imagery of 
Hale and Coke.30 Consistent with modern social contract theory, the sovereign’s Coronation 
Oath underlines the contract or bargain made between the Queen and her people – 
recognising the rule of law – in a bond which is reciprocal.31 Though there may be a dearth 
of direct authority, it seems to be incontrovertible that a breach of the Oath will absolve 
subjects from their allegiance.32 
 
III. Problems with Allegiance in ‘Current’ Treason: 
I now consider the legal problems with the concept of allegiance as presently constituted in 
British treason law. Certainly, it might be thought that insofar as its central notion is of 
allegiance of the British subject to the Crown and betrayal of the sovereign, it involves an 
antiquated and outmoded view of society.  
 
(i) Archaic Language: 
There are presentational difficulties with the arcane language of allegiance and its 
comprehensibility not just for modern juries, but also modern lawyers. The word ‘allegiance’ 
derives from the Anglo-Norman French ‘alleggeance’ – defining the loyalty of the liegeman 
(or vassal) to his feudal lord or king.33 The word itself bears the marks of this history.34 It 
evokes a sense of deference – subservience even, to the monarchy and seems hopelessly 
undemocratic. We tend to associate allegiance with a pledge of allegiance or swearing an 
oath of allegiance, but we no longer generally inhabit an oath-taking society. The idea of 
allegiance to our country may be considered unfashionable.35 Lavi asserts that it is an 
 
30 Steffen, Defining a British State, 86-87 
31 Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief (2005), 185 
32 Alan Wharam, “Treason in Rhodesia” (1967) 25(2) CLJ 189, 190, n. 7 
33 OED Online, March 2020 
34 Shai Lavi, “Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States and Israel” 
(2010) 13(2) NewCrimLRev 404, 406  
35 Lord Faulks, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 793 col. 1377, 31 October 2018 
44 
 
 
anachronistic term – though previously adequate for the protection of the Crown – and is 
incapable of facing modern challenges of security and defensive democracy, which require 
preventive measures and efficient enforcement that allegiance cannot guarantee.36 The 
breach of allegiance seems to have lost its normative appeal and practical efficacy.37 
 
(ii) Centrality of Monarchy: 
British treason law has never extinguished the centrality of the monarch.38 This renders it 
too heavily wedded to the idea of monarchy. These unfortunate royalist or even feudal 
connotations – evoking the undue deference associated with a bygone era, seem hopelessly 
undemocratic for modern sensibilities. It might be thought that the notion of duty to the 
sovereign embodied in the concept of allegiance runs contrary to the kinds of social 
obligations which are necessary to make a free, democratic society work. This may be a 
problem for reluctant subjects who prefer to consider themselves citizens or who may have 
different ideas about what their relationship with the sovereign should be. Accordingly, it 
could be considered appropriate to distance treason law from the idea of the subject being 
beholden to the sovereign and the hereditary principle.  
Since the state was characteristically personified by a king – on whose person was focused 
the loyalty of the subject – allegiance was historically conceptualised in this way. But while 
notionally the allegiance owed to the sovereign appears to be a personal bond, the Crown 
can be conceived as the personification of the British state – the symbol of British authority. 
The Law Commission’s 1977 Working Paper on modernising the law of offences against 
the state spoke of a contemporary breach of duty of allegiance in terms of either a breach of 
personal duty to the sovereign – or a breach of duty to the constitutional system of the realm, 
which has its embodiment in the sovereign.39 This acknowledges that the Courts have long-
since transformed the feudal concept of treason as a breach of loyalty to the royal person 
into the modern one of a breach of loyalty to the institutions on which the social order rests.40 
Allegiance need not be regarded as a personal obligation of the subject (or citizen) to the 
sovereign – rather as something institutional owed by the subject to the nation’s political and 
 
36 Lavi, “Punishment and Revocation of Citizenship”, 407-408  
37 Ibid., 406  
38 Steffen, Defining a British State, 8 
39 Law Com WP 72, para. 34 
40 S.C. Biggs, “Treason and the Trial of William Joyce” (1947) 7 UTLJ 162, 171 
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security institutions. Allegiance does not have to be projected upon the person of the 
sovereign – or even the Crown as an abstract – but on the British state and its institutions, 
and (as I will consider in Chapter 3) even its sub-national institutions. While the focus was 
originally upon threats to the sovereign in person, now it is concerned with threats to the 
democratic order.41 Though it might be anti-liberal if treason were still based on loyalty to 
the person of the king, this is no longer the conception of the object to which allegiance is 
due in the UK.42 
Indeed, a modern treason law need scarcely be about allegiance to monarchy. Modern 
allegiance is not predicated on personal or political allegiance – but institutional allegiance. 
This is not about defending what is only theoretical monarchical authority. We can 
democratically argue for other forms of government and about whether the goals of the 
nation-state, at any point in time, are sensible or desirable. However, we have a modern 
constitutional monarchy (or perhaps more precisely a ritual or titular monarchy), operating 
within the parameters of a representative (Parliamentary) democracy, and whose role is 
wholly symbolic, a ceremonial figurehead – with the loyalty asked of the subject merely 
being to the political and constitutional system of the realm, and not to any individual or the 
content of state decision-making. The allegiance is effectively owed not to the person of the 
monarch, but to the Crown or the monarch as the head of state, the symbol or personification 
of the British state – and on whose person are focused the allegiances and loyalties of the 
subject. The Crown encompasses the Queen, Parliament, and nation in its large embrace – 
more specifically, the Queen-in-Parliament (or a united Crown-in-Parliament), and 
according to law (the rule of law). The Crown is thus a concept implying the integrating of 
the Queen into the body of the community of the realm.43  
Of course, it would always be possible in reviving treason law and creating a new Scottish 
treason offence, to remove that head of treason which involves compassing the death of the 
sovereign and thus end the notion of personal allegiance by subject or citizen to the monarch. 
This would be in much the same way that US treason law excludes all references to the 
executive or that German treason law regards the abstract which is the current constitutional 
 
41 Alastair Brown, “Offences against the State” (2005), para. 531 (in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia) 
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order, as the protectable interest or object of the duty of allegiance.44 You could otherwise 
make separate provision outwith the law of treason for offences involving the sovereign. 
You do not require to have a monarch to have a new Scottish treason law – or, if there is a 
monarch, to assign them a central role. You could conceivably have a new Scottish treason 
law which does not reference the monarch (or the Crown) at all – and involves another 
definition of the sovereign power or object of the duty of allegiance. The form of the state 
(and the system of government) may make little difference in the basic principle underlying 
the definition of the crime of treason – although the form may account for the inclusion (or 
exclusion) of particular acti rei.45 
Insofar as allegiance has latterly had more to do with the office rather than the person of the 
sovereign, there may be scope for projecting the subject’s duty of allegiance onto a different 
sovereign object or protectable interest – more specifically, the political institutions on which 
the social and democratic order rests.46  
 
(iii) Nationalistic Allusions: 
Because treason is or can be conceptualised as a crime of disloyalty, it can be easily 
misconstrued as a crime compelling loyalty – thus having deeply unpleasant overtones for 
some, with connotations of nationalism, militarism even, and evoking an imperial past. Its 
opponents have rejected the notion of the duty of allegiance and sanctioning its breach 
because of its authoritarian origins.47 
But the concept of allegiance need not necessarily have nationalistic connotations. Patriotism 
should and can be rightly distinguished from nationalism. Of course, the case could be made 
for a patriotic allegiance on the basis that patriotism is the central virtue, given the 
 
44 S. 81 of the German Penal Code speaks of high treason against the Federation – and criminalises the forcible 
change of the constitutional order based on the Basic Law of the Federal Republic. 
45 John N. Hazard and William B. Stern, “Exterior Treason: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law” (1938) 
6(1) UChiLRev 77, 79 
46 Law Com WP 72, paras. 14 and 17 (citing the Irish case of R. v. Sheanes (1798) 27 St Tr 255, 387), 59 and 
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significance of the nation for its people’s lives.48 Nonetheless, I recognise that this approach 
would not be universally accepted. While patriotism may certainly be one approach or 
answer to this kind of question – and I concede that there are problems with it – there is 
scope for considering models of sovereignty and allegiance, other than patriotic allegiance. 
However, what you can do is to downplay the significance of patriotism – and I intend to do 
so by relying on Williams’ contractual model – such that this emotion, while not entirely 
taken out of the equation, is not a factor alienating those not so politically-aligned.  
 
(iv) Conflating Allegiance and Citizenship: 
It should be appreciated that allegiance and citizenship are not synonymous concepts. Non-
citizen residents appear to be bound by the same duty of allegiance – a local duty of 
allegiance – insofar as while they stay here, they continue to enjoy the protection of the 
Crown and the legal system. Though residency is not citizenship, it might be regarded as a 
form of probationary or associate citizenship, coming with certain conditions. In issue with 
treason law is whether it applies to all those who live in the UK or otherwise remain 
connected to it. The Law Commission’s 1977 Working Paper recognised that there are 
"somewhat complicated rules for deciding whether allegiance is owed or not".49 Therefore, 
should its ambit be limited to UK citizens – particularly because allegiance is no longer 
required to regulate citizenship? If not, there are still difficult distinctions to be made 
between settled and non-settled residents or only sometime residents. Simplification and 
clarification might assist. Indeed, there may be some purpose in confining the duty of 
allegiance only to citizens. This might allow the subject of the duty of allegiance to be 
defined, less pejoratively for some, as citizens. 
Accordingly, I will consider whether some form of citizenship model of allegiance might 
work. 
 
 
 
48 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” (1984) in Patriotism, Igor Primoratz, ed. (2002) 43, 48; 
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IV. Citizenship and Allegiance Modelling:  
(i) Citizenship:  
I now explore whether the relevant nexus in a new version of this crime – and any reinvented 
allegiance model – could be citizenship. Of course, citizenship is not strictly necessary to 
owe a duty of allegiance. Treason can only be committed by persons owing a duty of 
allegiance to the Crown – viz., British natural-born citizens, British subjects (wherever they 
may be) and British protected subjects, including naturalised subjects. This extends to aliens 
residing within the realm – and, more controversially, aliens who having settled within the 
realm and are temporarily removed, while continuing to have their family and effects within 
the realm. Under the common law, not only British Citizens, but all those protected by the 
law owe that duty of allegiance. However, since the late 1980s citizenship has become a 
focal point for political discourse – following on the vogue for the cognate idea of 
‘community’50 – and warrants consideration. The object of the crime of treason might reflect 
a more conventional social contract model of citizenship in which the state or constitutional 
order replaces the Crown as the object of allegiance. The citizen’s duty might then be 
characterised as a duty owed to the whole (political) community and not just the sovereign. 
It could be defined in terms reflecting something of the political and moral expectations of 
what British Citizenship and Scottish identity means today – as something more than loyalty 
to a hereditary monarch. For example, the idea of a duty of allegiance which has as its object 
the whole Scottish political community still connotes a national identity – involving a 
common connection to the nation-state – evoking social solidarity and the fabled Scottish 
democratic intellect. Citizenship entails a duty of allegiance that means that citizens have a 
duty not to betray their country by aiding its enemies. It could be defined in terms of a model 
of citizenship participation – albeit not a particularly active one – involving (only) the 
negative duty of the citizens not to be disloyal and not to align themselves with the UK’s 
enemies. This would reflect the reciprocal relationship between citizens and the political 
community in which they live and its political institutions (as opposed to its political actors) 
– with citizenship and community replacing the personal relationship of subject and 
sovereign. The subject of the duty of allegiance would be defined less pejoratively 
(depending on viewpoint) as a citizen, rather than subject (though that redefinition could still 
 
50 Robert Reiner, “Citizenship, Crime, Criminalization: Marshalling a Social Democratic Perspective” (2010) 
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occur under the present model). An allegiance model could be ascribable to the idea that a 
citizen’s rights are contingent on earning membership in a political community, with the 
duty of allegiance being a feature of one’s corresponding responsibilities.51  
 
(ii) Limitations of Citizenship: 
But citizenship has its limitations in understanding the normative aspects of the crime of 
treason. It should be remembered that treason is about a breach of allegiance and not a breach 
of citizenship as such.52  
Dubber was not convinced by the potential of the concept of citizenship as an explanatory 
and analytical tool in criminal law generally. While it can play a useful role in providing 
descriptive accounts of penal practice, it contributes nothing to a normative theory of 
criminal law, being either empty as a proxy for personhood, or pernicious, as a proxy for 
‘insiderhood’.53 He rejected the pernicious influence of the rhetoric of citizenship – and, if 
anything, expected that a normative theory of criminal law would seek to eliminate, rather 
than to centralise, the discourse of citizenship.54 
Ryan was scathing about how citizenship and community could be cited in aid of positions 
at all points on the political spectrum:55  
"Goering reached for his revolver when he heard the word culture. Now it is tempting 
to do the same when people talk about citizenship, the great, but wholly indistinct, 
good thing that parties and voters agree we should have more of … But is there 
anything concrete hidden in the clouds of rhetoric, or has the idea of citizenship 
reached a state of vacuity?"56 
 
On its face, allegiance bears little relevance to contemporary citizenship. Vasanthakumar 
suggests two illustrative competing conceptions of allegiance. In the liberal account, it is 
 
51 Lucia Zedner, “Security, the State and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime Control” (2010) 
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reduced to a ‘thinner’, minimalist approach involving only a political obligation to obey the 
law generally – rendering citizens and residents indistinguishable, undemanding of affection. 
At the other end of the spectrum is a potentially ‘thicker’ civic republican model, whereby 
allegiance informs a more robust conception of citizenship – cultivating civic virtue, 
communitarianism, patriotism, national identity, and shared values – consensual not 
contractual, albeit accompanied by problematic, inchoate distinctions between ‘true’ and 
‘so-called’ citizens.57  
I argue for a thinner still approach (a ‘lite’ version), reducing the obligation to obeying only 
treason law, not the law generally – to deal with the imperative of national security and 
avoiding harm to it (as I will explore in Chapter 3). While there might be other legal contexts 
where good citizenship genuinely matters, it is not a relevant or appropriate basis for 
grounding the law of treason or its major concept of allegiance. The gravamen of the crime 
is the subject’s conduct being synonymous with a foreign enemy. It has nothing to do with 
civic virtue, properly fulfilling the role of a citizen, deviating from social norms, or lacking 
‘team spirit’. There is no legal requirement (for the purposes of treason law) for the protected 
person to be a ‘good’ citizen – to pay taxes or comply with the regular criminal law. Civic 
duty or activism, though commendable, are superfluous. This is not about fulfilling 
responsibilities in society or having a shared national pride. The protected person’s 
allegiance or loyalty is not contingent on ‘responsiblized’ crime-preventing active 
participation in the life of the community.58 Protected persons who are lazy, indifferent or 
lacking in civic duty – characteristically ‘non-loyal people’ – should not be labelled as 
disloyal under treason law when they do nothing constituting betrayal.59 The lawbreaking 
citizen or recusant is not a traitor. The posited negative and non-patriotic nature of the new 
duty of allegiance – and the requirement for involvement with the enemy (as I will propose 
in Chapter 3) – renders poor citizenship irrelevant in committing this high-end offence. 
Though allegiance might be an essential element of citizenship, citizenship is not an essential 
element of allegiance. In short, you do not have to be a conscientious protected person 
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(subject or citizen) to elide criminal responsibility for treason because no positive duty is 
posited, the crime being against conjoining with the state’s enemies. 
Citizenship might explain how the sovereign power has the moral standing to hold the 
protected person accountable – and the fact that each citizen has an interest in the wrongdoer 
being punished is what is sufficiently important to justify conferring such a power upon it.60 
But criminalisation has no relationship with the processes of political and social inclusion 
(or exclusion) which go under the banner of citizenship in other legal areas.61 There is a 
difference in emphasis.  
Further, there is no purpose in disapplying treason law to non-citizen residents. Concepts of 
exclusion (a perennial theme in immigration law) do not apply here. Why exclude new 
immigrants from treason law? If anything, the protected person is defined in terms of an 
overarching or looser form of citizenship than British Citizenship in the legal sense. 
Conflation of citizenship with the owing of allegiance is, therefore, needlessly confusing.  
 
(iii) Whether Subjects or Citizens: 
Standing what I suggest is the irrelevance of citizenship to any new allegiance modelling, I 
do not propose to define the protected person as a citizen, rather than as a subject. There is 
little principled objection to the use of the term ‘citizen’. Logically, if you owe a duty of 
allegiance you are the subject correlating to the object which is the sovereign. In a 
constitutional monarchy, ‘subject’ is the technically correct term. ‘Subject’ is a frequent 
pejorative insult of citizens of monarchies by the citizens of republics – particularly 
American. The sneering implication is of serfdom – that only citizens in republics have rights 
– and that subjects are condemned to be ruled at the whim of an arbitrary and capricious 
ruler in a hereditary dictatorship, forever compelled to practise archery for allotted annual 
hours. It should also be appreciated that a subject is a person who has rights and privileges, 
possessing a certain dignity by virtue of that. Historically, the subject is a free man, living 
under the law, otherwise acting as he wishes, whereas citizens derive their freedoms from 
the state which requires certain duties from them. 
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The use of the term ‘citizen’ in the definition of this crime would be problematic – even if a 
crime-specific definition were provided in any new legislation. Given that there are issues 
of definition already, I do not propose further avoidable complications. ‘Citizen’ has a 
restrictive meaning in immigration law. It would be a distracting conflation – because some 
non-citizen inhabitants will be relevant protected persons owing a duty of allegiance for the 
purposes of treason law – but it could justifiably be argued that one of the central elements 
of the offence will not have been proven if they are not citizens, and thus not protected 
persons.  
Perhaps the focus on a ‘protected person’ would convey something of the meaning and 
significance of the state discharging a duty of protection and why the protected person owes 
a correlating duty of allegiance – underlining a symbiotic relationship. 
 
V. The ‘Wrong’ of Treason: 
Given that the concept of allegiance has these problems (particularly in seeming archaic) 
and that the citizenship model does not appear to be the corrective it might have been thought 
to be, I now consider what exactly the ‘wrong’ of treason might be – to help us decide 
whether we should continue to stick with allegiance or consider some other basis for 
grounding the law of treason. 
Insofar as treason is a crime against allegiance, it involves a breach of the allegiance owed 
to the sovereign power. The allegiance is characteristically breached by betrayal. The 
specific wrong of the breach of allegiance is in the betrayal of the sovereign power (the 
protector). In the treason of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’, the betrayal involves 
joining and acting with enemy states or organisations dedicated to the destruction of the 
sovereign power, and even possibly the extermination of its people and civil society. The 
complicity with enemy states or organisations might aggravate other heads of treason, 
though it is not a precondition of liability in ‘current’ treason law. The wrong consists not 
only in conduct which equates to that of the foreign enemy, but in the element of personal 
betrayal of the sovereign power. That is what makes the treason.62 Indeed, without the 
betrayal there can be no treason. Betrayal is not just an incidental or aggravating factor in 
the crime of treason (though it would otherwise be for conventional terrorist or espionage 
offences). It is the essence of the offence. Devoid of this, the crime of treason (if not the 
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criminality involved) is meaningless. Betrayal is not some minor aggravating feature to be 
left to the sentencing judge as Baker suggests.63 That would be to completely misconstrue 
the offence. As a generality, the wrongfulness of modern treason could thus be encapsulated 
in the notion that the breach of allegiance by betrayal of country is morally blameworthy. 
The breach remains central. Unlike conventional crime, its focus is on wrongdoing which 
offends not simply against the collective interest or morality of the nation-state but 
challenges its existence altogether and involves an attack on its people. The modern idea of 
treason might be conceived in terms of betrayal of not just one’s sovereign, but country – 
and by a co-citizen against a whole nation of people. In ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s 
Enemies’, the moral wrong is, more narrowly, betraying one’s sovereign, country, political 
community and neighbourhood to a foreign enemy. The betrayal is treason, a clear moral 
wrong. The protection the sovereign provides might be regarded as generating moral 
obligations of loyalty (or, more specifically, I will argue, of non-disloyalty) which render 
disloyal acts morally blameworthy – because they undermine or threaten the existence of the 
protector. While the betrayal has been conceptualised as a breach of trust,64 the breach of 
allegiance has previously been approached in absolutist terms and means something more 
than a mere violation of trust. 
The breach of allegiance has been historically considered to be fundamentally wrong. 
Consider the Oration famously ‘attributed’ to Cicero as he vainly pleaded to save the Roman 
Republic from tyranny:65 
"A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason 
[betrayal] from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and 
carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, 
his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government 
itself. For the traitor appears not a traitor; he speaks in accents familiar to his victims, 
and he wears their face and their arguments, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep 
in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation, he works secretly and unknown 
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in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it 
can no longer resist. A murderer is less to fear." 
 
Fletcher figuratively discusses treason in terms of "the sin of betrayal".66 Jonathon Hall, 
current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, concurred with the authors of the 
Policy Exchange Paper that there is such a thing as disloyalty and such a thing as betrayal.67 
This is the ‘wrong’ of treason which explains why vengeance and, more specifically, 
retribution (the legal expression of vengeance) are relevant factors, if not overriding 
considerations, in making the case for reviving treason law (as I suggested in Chapter 1).  
I argue that modern treason can and should be conceptualised, more precisely, as a crime of 
disloyalty. This is a subtly but significantly different from the idea of it being a crime against 
loyalty. It is not (or should not be) predicated on failing to discharge some special duty of 
loyalty. Indeed, we should purposely avoid confusing talk of loyalty, patriotism, and fidelity 
– for patriotism is not necessarily the same thing as loyalty and an absence of patriotism (or 
indifference towards it) need not be synonymous with disloyalty. Patriotism is only an 
emotion and not a legally relevant concept. It is a romantic passion which can even provoke 
people into breaking the law. Though patriotism might loosely be described as a kind of 
loyalty,68 loyalty itself is more closely connected to the idea of law.69 But modern treason 
should be suitably distanced from authoritarian notions of sanctioning any perceived failures 
to exhibit demonstrable loyalty or deference. This means that in general terms treason would 
not typically be committed by omission – including by the absence of loyalty or of basic 
gratitude for our society’s benevolence. There would require to be positive acts of disloyalty 
involving a breach of allegiance. Acts of disloyalty would not necessarily suffice on their 
own. Properly, to be treasonable, the disloyalty must find expression in the violation of 
allegiance. That is how the distinction is made from mere disloyalty – and from the notion 
of treason being a crime against loyalty. Without the requirement for allegiance, you cannot 
have betrayal – and without betrayal, you cannot have treason. You may well otherwise deal 
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with acts of terrorism, espionage or propagandising on their own terms – approaching them 
in the same way as conventional criminality – but if you try to approach these crimes against 
the state in terms devoid of disloyalty and the resultant betrayal by that, they cannot amount 
to treason. 
Because treason is thus still demonstrably best understood in terms of allegiance and 
disloyalty – and, indeed, standing that treason and betrayal can only ultimately be defined 
by reference to allegiance (because it is allegiance that creates the obligation of non-
disloyalty) – I submit that allegiance should continue to be the core concept in the offence 
of treason. So, how might we proceed to reconstruct allegiance? I will argue that disloyalty 
in this sense can be reconciled with the idea of allegiance if we consider how it might have 
dialectically evolved in terms of the Lauterpacht v. Williams debate. 
 
VI. Reconstructing Allegiance: 
I now address which model of allegiance, and by that what theoretical justification should 
be preferred. The purpose is to move towards a modern duty of allegiance. I will embark on 
this by discussing the fall-out from Joyce involving Lauterpacht and Williams. 
Professor (and later judge) Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was a Polish-British lawyer, who had 
completed his doctorate at the LSE after he had been unable to graduate from law school in 
western Ukraine when the university excluded Jews. He was arguably the last century’s most 
influential international lawyer, having played a prominent role in forging the modern 
system of international law.70 Glanville Williams has been described as the leading British 
academic criminal lawyer of the twentieth century. From humble Welsh Congregationalist 
origins, he had a reputation of something of a ‘radical outsider’ and hugely effective law 
reformer. He was eulogised in his obituary as "a kind of legal Asterix, whose boundless 
energy and unquenchable optimism led him into endless battles against unjust laws, many 
of which he won despite the overwhelming odds against him".71 It was rumoured he was 
denied a knighthood, having been a wartime conscientious objector, but in reality, declined 
it – thinking it incongruous that a man, who had refused to wield a bayonet, should 
 
70 Phillipe Sands, “My legal hero: Hersch Lauterpacht” Guardian (10 November 2010): 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/nov/10/my-legal-hero-hersch-lauterpacht 
71 J.R. Spencer, “Glanville Williams Obituary” (1997) 56(3) CLJ 437 
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theoretically bear a sword.72 Williams might have been expected to take the contrarian 
position. 
 
(i) Duty of Allegiance arising from Duty of Protection – Fall-out from Joyce v. DPP – 
Lauterpacht v. Williams: 
Following capture near the German-Danish border in May 1945, Joyce was tried at the Old 
Bailey on three counts of treason – including that between 18 September 1939 and 2 July 
1940 (before his naturalisation as a German subject), being a person owing allegiance to the 
King, he did traitorously adhere to the King’s enemies by broadcasting propaganda. With 
disclosure of his American nationality, it appeared there was no jurisdictional claim for 
treason based on personality. He could hardly betray a country that was not his own. He was 
acquitted of those charges libelled for the period after he assumed German citizenship. But 
Attorney General Sir Hartley Shawcross successfully argued that by his continuing 
possession of a British passport until July 1940, Joyce was still entitled to British diplomatic 
protection in Germany, and thus owed allegiance to the Crown when he started working for 
the Germans – notwithstanding that he had fraudulently misrepresented his nationality to 
obtain it. On this basis Joyce was convicted of the third treason charge and sentenced to 
death in September 1945. Joyce’s story involves reconciling his multifaceted identity 
contradictions as an American, Irishman, Englishman, and then a German.73  
 
Allegiance and Protection in Joyce: 
The jury were directed that when Joyce had applied for his British passport, he had, beyond 
a shadow of doubt, owed allegiance to the Crown – and, on the evidence, nothing had 
subsequently happened to relinquish that allegiance. By possession of a live British passport, 
Joyce obtained the possibility of international protection – and, by that, continued to owe 
allegiance. Issuing the passport had created a legal duty of protection. The Law Lords were 
unanimous on this issue of substantive law – per Lord Porter: " … if an alien is under British 
protection he occupies the same position when abroad as he would occupy if he were a 
British subject" – and that "each of them owes allegiance, and in so doing each is subject to 
 
72 Ibid., 439 
73 Joyce did not commit treason against the US because when Germany became an enemy of the US, he was 
already a German citizen and thus owed the US no allegiance. 
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the jurisdiction of the British Crown".74 The defence sought to limit the application of 
protection on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and under reference to the 
nature of protection in general. They argued there was no basis in law for establishing the 
relation of protection – and the corresponding duty of allegiance – because the state was not 
entitled to issue a passport to a non-national. Given the fraudulent misrepresentation by 
which the passport had been obtained (Joyce having falsely claimed an Irish rather than 
American place of birth), it could not afford effective protection abroad. Since Joyce had 
obtained his British passport by fraud, he could not owe allegiance in return for the protection 
he derived from it. The protection which attracted the allegiance could not be mere protection 
de facto but had to be protection de jure – not actual protection, only the legal right to it. As 
a man who had obtained his passport by fraud was not receiving its protection lawfully, there 
was no reciprocal legal duty of allegiance. A tainted passport might be regarded as only 
voidable – and not void ab initio – and incapable of unilateral reduction by the holder or the 
issuing authority until the administrative process has run its course. Otherwise a person who 
fraudulently obtained a British passport would be in a stronger position than someone 
obtaining it legally – because he would still receive protection without having to give 
allegiance.75 The likelihood is that Joyce would have still been granted a British passport in 
any event given his education and long-term residence in England; his pre-partition Irish 
antecedents; and through his Manchester-born second wife (who never sought to renounce 
her British Citizenship). Though the discovery of the fraud could have justified its 
withdrawal, that prospect would have been remote. His continuing possession of the passport 
– implied by its non-return to a British Consul – perpetuated his duty of allegiance after he 
left England. Whether a state is entitled to issue a passport to a non-national is a matter for 
its own domestic law. A person holding a passport and describing themselves as a national 
is entitled to be treated as a protected person – though that might be challengeable – contrary 
to the allegation of the passport which amounts to prima facie evidence of nationality. That 
protection could still be exercised by proxy. If interned in Germany, Joyce could have always 
requested the assistance of the Swiss Embassy – the protecting power appointed to safeguard 
the interests of British Citizens (and combatants) in occupied enemy territory – under the 
 
74 375-376 
75 The circumstances of Shamina Begum may be analogous in so far as she stole her older sister’s British 
passport to exit the UK fraudulently – “Shamina Begum: IS teenager to lose UK citizenship” BBC (20 February 
2019): 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47299907 
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prevailing Geneva Convention 1929. Lord Porter dissented on the narrow ground that the 
issue of whether Joyce’s duty of allegiance had ended was a question of fact (an essential 
fact) for the jury to determine rather than a purely legal question for the trial judge. 
 
(ii) Lauterpacht’s Defence of Joyce – Mutuality of Protection and Allegiance: 
Lauterpacht affirmed the correlation between allegiance and protection as expressing a 
compelling principle of political ethics and the security of the state as not just an artificial 
and obsolete relic of the past. This was of such a fundamental character that no serious effort 
had been made in Joyce to challenge it.76 Though alien residents abroad continue to owe 
allegiance to their own sovereign state, they will become subject to another allegiance – 
concomitant with the protection of the law which has been sheltering them. It is legally 
irrelevant whether there is at any given point an equivalence of duty and benefit – of 
allegiance and protection – or of an actual disposition to fidelity and capacity to afford 
protection. The duty of allegiance is not affected by the temporary and involuntary absence 
of protection.77 Lauterpacht emphasised the significance of protection manifesting itself in 
the overarching scope for diplomatic intercession – which extends to its citizens in enemy 
territory – by the threat of reprisals against enemy nationals and the prospect of exacting 
post-conflict compensation (or retribution).78 The Lords rejected Joyce’s argument that the 
kind of protection which had previously been the basis for the duty of allegiance was only 
protection by the law (the right to go to law) – in distinction to the administrative protection 
provided by the state abroad (diplomatic protection and consular assistance79) – because, 
historically, the protection enjoyed by the alien within the realm was also an ‘administrative’ 
protection, exercisable as part of the royal prerogative.80 In Joyce’s situation nothing short 
of a formal act of renunciation of protection – involving revelation of his true nationality – 
would have been sufficient to end that mutuality of protection and allegiance.81 An alien 
 
76 Lauterpacht, CLJ, 336-337 
77 335 – founding on De Jager v. Attorney-General of Natal [1907] AC 326 
78 336  
79 Diplomatic protection and consular assistance are not absolute rights afforded to all nationals – exercisable 
as a matter of ‘very wide’ executive discretion, not legal obligation – albeit that discretion is judicially 
reviewable: R (Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598, 
CA, discussed in Goldsmith, Citizenship, 34.  
80 336 
81 338, n. 25 – citing Lord Porter’s dissent in Joyce, 374-381  
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already subject to the duty of allegiance – because of his residence within the realm – 
continues to owe allegiance if, on leaving the realm, he applies for and obtains the continued 
protection of the Crown.82 The Crown’s exercise of protection can be seen in terms which 
Thucydides (by his Melian Dialogue) and Machiavelli might have approved – by its 
projection of raw power, even unprincipled realpolitik, regardless of legality under 
international law. This reflected the prevailing sensibility that not all nations could be 
adjudged to be civilised or the basing of jurisdiction on the idea of reciprocity between equal 
nations. But this notion of vicarious protection continuing a duty of allegiance which would 
have otherwise ceased, seems rather tenuous.83 
 
(iii) Williams’ Critique – Mutuality of Duty of Protection and Duty of Allegiance: 
Williams suggested that the duty of allegiance should be deduced only from a duty of 
protection. It was a fallacy to mistake the meaning of protection for the purpose of the legal 
rule. When it was suggested that protection was correlative to allegiance, what seemed to be 
meant was that the duty of protection is correlative to the duty of allegiance. The Crown did 
not owe Joyce a duty of protection while he was in Germany – or attempt to exercise it in 
any way. As it was, Joyce’s passport only conferred a possibility of de facto protection – and 
it was legally unsound to argue that this raised a correlative duty of allegiance. Properly, it 
was the duty of protection which raised the duty of allegiance – not just protection in fact. 
The correlation should be understood generally in terms between duty and duty – not fact 
and duty. The duty of allegiance persists even if protection were not in fact being given 
(because of enemy occupation) and is not affected by the temporary and involuntary absence 
of protection. The duty of allegiance is not so much supported by the fact of protection, but 
by the duty of protection. The duty of allegiance is brought into being only by a duty of 
protection, yet Joyce denied this. Meanwhile, the duty of allegiance persists even if the 
subject were not acting in the spirit of his duty of allegiance. The mere fact that an alien may 
feel a spirit of allegiance – and acts in accordance with it – by, for example, aiding British 
agents abroad – does not create in the Crown a duty of protection.84 Joyce could not have 
been convicted of treason except as a result of a legal argument based on the correlation 
between allegiance and protection – and given the misapprehended meaning of ‘protection’, 
 
82 341  
83 Biggs, “William Joyce”, 189 
84 Williams, CLJ, 56-57 
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the decision slips away.85 Though Williams’ argumentation was admittedly pure 
technicality, so was the legal reasoning for the decision.86 Lest we forget: "legal 
technicalities are the stuff of law".87 Williams considered that the precedent set by the House 
of Lords was virtually beyond recall – though the substantial passage of time might now 
allow for its revaluation.  
Williams provides some elucidation as to what that duty of protection entails. Protection 
might be thought to manifest itself in the provision of a police force, defence by armed 
forces, protection by diplomatic representations or simply the law-abidingness of the 
executive in relation to the individual. Lord Goldsmith similarly put protection in these 
terms, espousing domestic protection in terms of the operation of the rule of law.88 Williams 
had already refined this in terms of either a Crown duty of ‘positive (or active) protection’, 
where the sovereign (or British state) exerts itself actively on behalf of the individual – or 
‘negative protection’, where there need only be an absence of illegal interference with the 
individual. The Crown owes a duty of positive protection to all within Crown dominions – 
whether British or alien (except for members of an invading force). It does not owe such a 
duty to anyone outwith – possibly except those in protectorates.89 ‘Negative protection’ is a 
concept, signifying the exclusion of the defence of act of state. It is enjoyed by a British 
Citizen (or subject) wherever he may be – and an alien (other than a member of an invading 
force) who is within the Crown dominions – or the departed alien, who retains a British 
passport, has left family and effects behind – or has left only temporarily (animo 
revertendi).90 
It was not strictly correct for Williams to have argued that any Crown breach of that duty of 
protection is not an offence punishable by law. Rulers who oppress their own people can be 
brought to justice. The crime of tyranny was formulated to punish a leader who destroys law 
and liberty or who bears command responsibility for the killing of his own people or orders 
the plunder of innocent individuals. Consider Henri de Bracton’s statement which has 
reverberated down the centuries: "The King shall be under no man’s authority, yet he is 
 
85 Ibid., 75 
86 Ibid. 
87 Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (1975), 121 
88 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 35 
89 A British protectorate is not British soil – Williams, CLJ, 68-70  
90 An exception to the principle of local allegiance – Joyce, per Lord Jowitt (Lord Chancellor), obiter – without 
reference to precedent (Williams, CLJ, 62-63) 
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under God and the Law, for the Law makes the King (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, 
sed sub Deo et Lege, quia lex facit regem)" – invoked by Lord Chief Justice Coke when he 
politely rebuked King James VI (and I) that he had to abide by the common law.91 The charge 
of tyranny which John Cooke proffered against Charles I, began with the fundamental 
proposition – that the King of England was not a person, but an office, whose occupants 
were entrusted with a limited power to govern "by and according to the laws of the land and 
not otherwise". It had been with the criminal intent of securing unlimited and tyrannical 
power that Charles had levied war against Parliament – and had set out to destroy the people 
whose life and liberty he was obliged to preserve. The point is that the monarch (and her 
ministers) have responsibilities too – militating against any concept of sovereign immunity 
and the impunity of tyrants. A certain symmetry is involved.  
 
Williams’ Better Modelling: 
What was significant is that Williams – a moderniser of social democratic sensibilities – was 
attempting to use the common law in a creative way to update the law of treason and promote 
individual rights. The recruitment of the common law evoked British exceptionalism – 
allowing Williams to champion a more modern, credible idea of the crime of treason – in 
which the duty of allegiance turned instead on the exercise of the British state’s duty of 
protection. In doing so, he shifted the emphasis from the idea of purely natural allegiance 
and birth-right – or personal bond – to a duty of protection which reflected more 
contemporary complications of dual nationality. Williams’ skill was to make sense of the 
crime of treason in the context of contemporary institutions in a constitutional monarchy – 
but relying imaginatively on the common law to do so – invoking the law of contract.  
 
(iv) What Emerges – A Version of Non-disloyalty Treason: 
I answer this chapter’s principal question by arguing for the adoption of a non-patriotic (or, 
at least, a not overtly patriotic) contractual, ‘duty-based’ model by which the subject’s duty 
of allegiance correlates to the duty of protection discharged by the sovereign power – 
inspired by Williams’ deconstruction of the Lords’ decision-making in Joyce and his 
analysis of the conceptual framework of treason.92 Developing this idea, I propose that the 
 
91 Reproduced in Coke, Twelfth Report (ed. 1777) 64 
92 Williams, CLJ, 54-76 
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subject/citizen’s duty be further refined by the adoption of a narrower still negative duty of 
allegiance (or duty of non-betrayal). The British subject’s duty of allegiance is re-
conceptualised in terms of a non-patriotic, negative duty of allegiance, falling on the 
subject/citizen not to be disloyal by aligning themselves with Britain’s enemies – in short, 
to do no enemy-backed harm to their homeland. The subject’s duty only compels inaction. 
This is not a positive duty to be loyal – but a negative duty not to be disloyal. The subject is 
not being asked to love their country – or even admonished not to hate it – merely not to 
loathe it by enlisting with the enemy and committing acts of sabotage against it. This ‘Do-
No-Harm’ principle is a corollary of the British state discharging its duty of protection to the 
subject/citizen. This is conceived in terms of a symmetrical relationship, no longer quite so 
heavily wedded to the notion of monarchy.  
I argue for this model because it affords balance to the relationship between the subject of 
the duty of allegiance and the sovereign power. This will not be a submissive relationship in 
which the subject is a mere supplicant, even to a beneficent Lord or King. It emphasises that 
this is not a one-sided relationship. It need not be contingent on British (or Scottish) 
exceptionalism or even referable to British (or Scottish) values – and should be about 
transcending divisive identity politics. Such values might provide a colourable explanation 
as to how the British state and its devolved institutions exercise their duty of protection in a 
certain way – and are the essence of what this country stands for and which need to be 
defended – but they are not the only reason why the duty of allegiance is owed. This will be 
a modern democratic approach to treason law which affirms the social contract – and avoids 
the distraction of emotionally-charged issues such as patriotism or monarchism. This shift 
in conceptualisation will explain how any new law should be understood and applied. 
The reconceived offence should make it clear that the offence is committed by a protected 
person who, while owing a duty of allegiance to the Crown, equally enjoys the protection of 
the Crown. This could be more properly stated in terms of enjoying the protection of the 
Crown as the Crown discharges its duty of protection – though such wording in the offence 
might be regarded as somewhat convoluted. It would be better left to the explanatory notes 
and to be more fully contextualised in judicial instructions, as provided for in the Jury 
Manual. 
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(v) Nomenclature:  
Allegiance is not specifically used in Australian treason legislation.93 Nor is it used in 
Ireland’s treason legislation94 or under the German model. Again, these are treason models 
where treason can be committed by every person within territorial jurisdiction of the state. I 
do not propose such a model – and argue that treason law should specifically target only 
those owing allegiance, to capture the gravity of betrayal by one of our fellow citizens. 
Insofar as allegiance continues to be used in US, Canadian and New Zealand treason 
legislation, it might be reasonably inferred that the language is not obscure.95 
Any perceived language barrier is scarcely insurmountable – considering the complex legal 
concepts which lay juries are otherwise routinely expected to grasp. Indeed, the new British 
Citizen is required to take an oath (or affirmation) of allegiance – a loyalty oath which is the 
legal form of allegiance and British identity.96 Parliamentarians (including MSPs) take an 
oath of allegiance.97 By the Pledge of Allegiance, American school children understand the 
meaning and purpose in their expressing allegiance to the Flag and the Republic of the USA. 
If anything, the genuine difficulties of arcane language in treason law permeate its actus reus 
– a matter which I will address in Chapter 3. 
A duty of fidelity would be consistent with the traditional approach in that it is consistent 
with the present idea of high treason as amounting to the violation of that fidelity and 
allegiance which is due to Her Majesty.98 The original meaning of fidelity is associated with 
duty in a broader sense to the related, narrower, feudal concept of fealty, on which allegiance 
is based. In the legal context the duty of fidelity is classically associated with directors’ 
duties under company law and employees’ duties in employment law – referable to the 
notion of fiduciary trust. Certainly, fidelity connotes the sense of loyalty or faithfulness 
which is involved in this relationship of trust. But the idea of fidelity is perhaps too wide and 
does not quite capture the essence of the specific duty of non-betrayal of country, even if 
 
93 Criminal Code Act 1995, s. 80 
94 Treason Act 1939, s. 1 
95 18 USC § 2381 (1948); Criminal Code (Canada), s. 46(3); (New Zealand) Crimes Act 1961, s. 73 
96https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/258235/o
athofallegiance.pdf  
97 https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/swearingin/  
98 Hume, I, 512 
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now expressed in narrower terms of the negative duty of allegiance. Meanwhile, the 
Canadian notion of an obligation of fidelity and obedience, though relating the idea of how 
strong the duty of loyalty should be, ironically suggests greater subservience still. 
In any event the duty of allegiance corresponds with the new citizen’s oath of allegiance – 
also the familiar American Pledge of Allegiance. By their pledge of allegiance to ISIS – the 
Bay’ah (which in Islamic terminology is an oath of allegiance to a leader, as practised by the 
Islamic prophet Muhammad) – British Jihadists grasped the significance of allegiance and 
adherence.99 The point is that the traitor will already be acquainted with the concept of 
allegiance by embarking on this course of action. Allegiance, betrayal, and treason remain 
big ideas – recognisable, comprehensible legal concepts in this and most jurisdictions for the 
actors involved. We readily speak of sporting or political allegiance. The idea retains 
ritualistic importance. For Williams, the meaning of the duty of allegiance was clear – it 
signifies you must not commit treason.100 This is not a problematic concept. Insofar as the 
idea of allegiance to our country may be considered unfashionable, that approach verges on 
the decadent, showing a country lacking in self-confidence.101 
I suggest that the (negative) duty of allegiance could be used interchangeably with the duty 
of non-betrayal – a concept promoted in the Policy Exchange Paper. There may be occasions 
where there are subtle distinctions between the two concepts – because discharging a duty 
of non-betrayal may exceptionally compel action, whereas the negative duty is invariably 
discharged simply by inaction. The negative duty might otherwise appear more cumbersome 
by dint of its more elaborate wording. But I do not propose this as an alternative. Both 
concepts are still consistent with ‘fair labelling’ sensibilities (a concept I identified in 
Chapter 1). 
 
 
 
 
99 Reem Makhoul, “Pledging Allegiance to ISIS: Real Oath or Empty Symbolism?” Wall Street Journal Video 
(13 November 2014): 
https://www.wsj.com/video/pledging-allegiance-to-isis-real-oath-or-empty-symbolism/7B2650B8-A534-
4E97-B59F-0BF57BBB7AE9.html 
100 Williams, CLJ, 58 
101 Lord Faulks, Hansard HL Deb. vol. 793 col. 1377, 31 October 2018 
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VII. Allegiance in Scotland: 
I now consider how the duty of allegiance might be rendered appropriate to Scotland – 
addressing what would be the object, subject and content of that (Scottish) duty of allegiance. 
 
(i) Object of Scottish Allegiance: 
In issue is whether the object of the duty of allegiance in any Scottish treason law should be 
owed to the UK or Scotland or both – and whether it should be extended to or confined to 
the Scottish political institutions.  
At the core of sovereignty is the right to govern – and the sovereign has the right to demand 
allegiance of the governed. The Crown is the sovereign power in the UK – throughout the 
UK. It is the only sovereign power. The devolved settlement – involving as it does vertical 
and not horizontal devolution – does not countenance dual sovereignty and the potentiality 
for (legal) divergence by the Scottish institutions on foreign affairs. Logically, you cannot 
have treason against only a subordinate power such as the devolved institutions. Even if 
there were deemed to be a need for a specific law of treason protecting Scottish institutions, 
a specifically Scottish duty of allegiance would not be involved – allegiance to Scotland 
being only an idea or emotion, and not a relevant legal duty.102 
Accordingly, I propose that the primary object of a Scottish treason law – the local sovereign 
power or authority – would remain the sovereign but refined to the local manifestation which 
is the Crown-in-Scotland. This is consistent with the approach in the Scotland Act 1988 
which recognises the rights and liabilities of the Crown in its different capacities, viz., the 
rights and liabilities that may arise between the Crown in right of Her Majesty’s Government 
in the UK and the Crown in right of the Scottish Administration.103 The supreme authority 
in the land has long since been expressed in terms of a set of political institutions – the Lords, 
the Commons and the Queen – the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament. In this respect 
the Queen and Parliament are almost indivisible institutions. The Crown need not be 
perceived as an exclusively royalist concept because it embraces all these institutions – 
though the default setting is that the Crown is the definitive political institution in the UK, 
 
102 Curiously, the Federal Republic of Germany treated support of East Germany as only espionage since this 
still involved loyalty to one part of Germany: Conrad Black “Treason From 16 th-century England To 9-11” 
C2C Journal (1 March 2010): 
https://c2cjournal.ca/2010/03/treason-from-16thcentury-england-to-911/?_post_id=338 
103 Scotland Act 1998, s. 99  
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insofar as it symbolises the British state. We might visually associate the Crown with the 
iconic ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ posters – where this motivational slogan is displayed 
under a representation of the Tudor Crown, as a symbol of the British state. The Crown 
continues to remain the definitive political institution in Scotland. That is axiomatic unless 
Scotland became independent without becoming a Commonwealth realm or the UK became 
a republic. The ‘new’ Scottish political institutions might ultimately receive special 
recognition – an issue I will address in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, they should not be perceived 
as a separate or competing sovereign power (as object of any duty of allegiance) – rather a 
complementary, subordinate, sub-national development. After all, this is about 
acknowledging those political institutions which represent the local sovereign power – so 
the projection of non-disloyalty toward the Scottish political institutions would not involve 
a different obligation of loyalty – just the local expression or manifestation of it – in 
accordance with provincial Commonwealth experience.  
 
(ii) Subject of Scottish Allegiance: 
I now consider whether allegiance – effectively the issue that grounds jurisdiction in terms 
of the nationality principle – should be predicated on Scottish domicile and/or residence. I 
argue that allegiance and thus jurisdiction could be reasonably based on Scottish domicile 
or residence – and that jurisdiction should extend to the Scottish-domiciled or Scottish-
resident protected person, regardless of their nationality, and wherever they might be.  
The jurisdictional claim for treason is based on personality – the allegiance (invariably 
nationality) of the offending protected person – and is not conceived in terms of territory or 
universality.104 Allegiance, nationality and domicile are also not synonymous concepts.105 
Domicile is distinct from residence. Domicile of origin (acquired at birth) can be changed. 
There will be a presumption in favour of allegiance based on domicile absent evidence to 
the contrary. There may be anomalies in defining residence. If as an alternative to domicile 
that might imply it requires little territorial connection beyond brief presence. Proof of 
connection by residence would be an issue of fact – an essential fact. Domicile and/or 
residence could be established holistically by such factors as tax residence, suffrage, length 
of residence, property, employment, family residence and children’s education.106 The proof 
 
104 Gerald H. Gordon and Christopher H.W. Gane, Renton and Brown Criminal Procedure, 6th ed., para. 1-25 
105 Biggs, “William Joyce”, 185 
106 Home Office, Nationality policy: domicile Version 1.0 (14 July 2017) 
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required to establish that a domicile of origin has been displaced in favour of a domicile of 
choice is high.107  
This approach is not without complications. Can you distinguish citizens of other parts of 
the UK without a concept of Scottish nationality? Why should rUK British subjects, who are 
not domiciled and/or resident in Scotland – but otherwise owing allegiance to the Crown – 
not be guilty of Scottish treason for acts committed in Scotland? Should their duty of 
allegiance to the British state not extend to respect for Scotland’s constitutional settlement 
and its devolved institutions, wherever they might be? But domicile and residence are not 
unfamiliar concepts in litigation. The rationale might be that there is a supplementary 
Scottish social contract between the Scottish domiciled person (or resident) and the sub-
national Scottish polity – with this further duty of allegiance correlating to the exercise of its 
duty of protection. The rUK non-Scottish-resident derives no such protection or benefit from 
that quite separate contractual relationship. They do not influence the Scottish political 
institutions by suffrage or tax residence – and are not so connected by domicile or residence. 
 
(iii) Content of Scottish Duty: 
All that is required by the duty of allegiance will be the duty of the protected person (or 
subject) not to be disloyal to the sovereign authority – and transferring that loyalty to the 
Queen’s enemies. This negative duty could be understood as an aspect of or a manifestation 
of not adhering to the Queen’s enemies. This will only ever be a passive and scarcely an 
active duty. Only inaction is compelled. This will be a basic and undemanding negative duty 
– a duty which is difficult to violate. This is hardly an objectionable or remarkable demand 
of the subject. It should not be misconstrued as compelling the submission of the 
unquestioning subject – it being perfectly consistent with a liberal conception of the state. 
While the ordinary criminal law addresses egregious examples of bad citizenship, the 
requirements of the law of treason are less onerous – ‘Just do not be a traitor.’ The duty not 
to be disloyal by avoiding aiding the sovereign’s enemies is a duty which can be discharged 
by sitting on the couch and watching X Factor – not even Last Night of the Proms. It scarcely 
takes much to discharge this duty – and tacitly agreeing to do so, in consequence of 
‘protected person’ status – is hardly unreasonable.108  
 
107 Bell v. Kennedy [1868] UKHL 566_1 
108 Lee, “Punishing Disloyalty”, 326 
68 
 
 
VIII. Possible Objections: 
I now consider what would be the problems with this reconstruction – the possible objections 
to it – and how might they be met. 
 
(i) Persisting Sense of Subservience: 
It might be thought that retaining the Crown as the object of the duty of allegiance is still too 
subservient a concept for those of a Scottish/republican sensibility – and that it fails to 
successfully address problems of competing allegiance. This is not to advocate for 
monarchism or royalism – simply a reflection that we continue to operate as a constitutional 
monarchy – and that the sovereign power is a series of political institutions including a 
constitutional monarch. If those constitutional arrangements change, the projected object (or 
protected interest) would inevitably evolve. This is a contractual relationship with 
obligations on both sides. It should be remembered that the flip side of this transaction is 
that members of the executive, in failing to discharge their duty of protection, can be liable 
in extremis to the charge of treachery. I submit that the qualification of a requirement for 
foreign agency in treasonable conduct (which I will address in Chapter 3) renders this duty 
less exceptionable – negating any suggestion of prostrating the Scottish-domiciled British 
Citizen before the British state. 
 
(ii) Recognising Moral Blameworthiness of Treason: 
It might be considered that a contractual, non-patriotic model involves too clinical and 
anodyne an approach – as to detract from the notion that treason – the betrayal of the 
homeland or national trust – is so morally blameworthy, as to warrant special approbation 
and public denunciation. This might appear to ignore the moral wrong of treason which is, 
again, referable to ‘fair labelling’ – intended as one of the main purposes of the exercise. 
Without the concept of betrayal (the special breach of trust) the crime of treason (which is 
not a morally-empty crime) might appear to be stripped of meaning altogether – rendering 
the crime hopelessly vague. Should we reduce all our obligations – especially our most 
serious – to mere obligations of contract? Is this not a legitimate form of non-contractual 
obligation which is or should be a ‘given’ obligation? Can you truly still have the crime of 
treason without patriotism or at least without ignoring it?  
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Then again, breaching or breaking of allegiance will be characterised in terms of a 
fundamental breach of the contractual duty – as opposed to a non-material breach – and is 
referable in the definition of the offence to the fact of enjoyment of Crown protection as to 
underline its gravity and egregiousness. Most significantly, the evocative headline offence 
remains in place. These are simply its new building blocks. 
Nonetheless, while the overt act would be the critical evidence in any treason trial, 
circumstantial evidence of the accused’s loyalty and patriotism – or lack of it – might still 
be expected to feature prominently. Though not inherently criminal, such colourable 
adminicles of evidence would be relevant – going to the core issues of adherence and intent 
(or predisposition) (assuming they were not excluded as collateral matters). It is axiomatic 
that people will say things online that they would never dream of doing in real life – so there 
must be some recognition of the difficulties in policing social media and criminalising (in 
this way) the writings of keyboard warriors who are only non-violent blowhards. Those 
expressing disloyalty may well be culpable of only bluster. But while you are entitled to 
freedom of expression – if you are intent on committing treasonable acts, it might be 
imprudent to create a body of self-incriminating evidence – confirming alienation or 
disaffection – in your digital footprint.  
 
(iii) Competing Allegiance: 
The possibility of competing allegiance on the part of British Citizen members of immigrant 
communities and new British residents is problematic. I now consider what this narrow, 
negative duty of allegiance might mean for them. What kind of duty might they be expected 
to have or show to their host (or origin) country – and what responsibilities to, and 
expectations of such people, might the host nation reasonably have? Should a lack of cultural 
assimilation negate or mitigate any failure to discharge this duty?  
I do not consider that there is scope for a sliding scale of criminal responsibility to recognise 
different categories of protected persons, who will be afforded different levels of protection 
– such as ‘probationary’ British Citizens or foreign residents, who may only owe some 
possibly partial and temporary duty of allegiance, having voluntarily placed themselves 
under British protection – or, at the other end of the scale, public officials, who might be 
expected to owe a special or greater duty of allegiance still, as greater beneficiaries of state 
protection, or patronage even. Insofar as there will be a relationship involving, 
symmetrically, protection entitlements on some level, a correlating duty of allegiance will 
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be owed – the simple breach of which will trigger criminal liability. This is a binary concept. 
The duty of non-betrayal does not operate on a sliding scale which might be adjustable 
according to background and emotional identifications.109 There are no half-measures in 
treachery.110 It may be a question of degree and not of its existence. The character of the 
protected person will impact only on any assessment of their culpability and not upon their 
criminal liability as such – albeit this remains a potentially mitigating factor in sentencing. 
Instead it is about criminalising conduct involving sabotage of those institutions which 
safeguard national security in a way that acknowledges the absolute character – the 
allegiance – of the actor. Their national identity or residence (which evidences their 
allegiance) will be determined as an objective fact – and not contingent on any subjective 
assessment on their part. This approach is also consistent with the not unimportant principle 
of equality before the law. The case for taking this trenchant approach is warranted because 
of the basic, undemanding, and minimalist nature of the negative duty. 
Further, I contend that cultural assimilation is irrelevant to discharging the (negative) duty 
of allegiance (or duty of non-disloyalty). Cultural assimilation might be regarded as an 
aspect of good citizenship – though it is debatable whether citizens in a free society, 
indigenous or immigrant, should be pressurised into a community of shared values and 
mores – as common citizenship under the rule of law is what civic society can only (or 
should) reasonably require. Again, this is rejected as an irrelevant concept here. It is 
immaterial whether newer British Citizens integrate with the host community or even 
attempt to become truly British in the cultural sense – at least for the purposes of treason 
criminalisation – because this remains only a negative duty. A demonstrable duty is not 
postulated. Ghettoization and ‘poor British Citizenship’ are irrelevant. The extent of this 
legal duty is simply not to be disloyal to the British state and its manifestation at a devolved 
level. It need not conflict with the citizen’s religion or their moral or philosophical beliefs. 
Even if a British Citizen’s primary loyalty were to a religious cause which they perceive as 
superseding their national identity – deviation from a conceptual (British) national identity 
would not be treasonable unless an overt act of betrayal were involved – standing the overt 
act requirement (which I will consider in Chapter 4). This tolerant approach also precludes 
the operation of any ‘Cultural Defence’. 
 
 
109 Lee, “Punishing Disloyalty”, 332 
110 West, New Meaning of Treason, 105 
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IX. Conclusion: 
Admittedly, the concept of allegiance in the modern state might be problematic, but it is still 
workable. I propose that the duty of allegiance be recast by the adoption of Williams’ 
paradigm of a non-patriotic, contractual, ‘duty-based’ model.111 I argue for only a negative 
duty of allegiance (or duty of non-betrayal) which will not be a positive or affirmative 
patriotic duty – rather a narrow duty reaffirming the duty of the British Citizen not to betray 
their country by conjoining with its enemies and waging war against the British state and its 
people, their fellow citizens. Patriotic affection or its expression is not a sine qua non for 
discharging that duty. To reiterate, patriotism is a distraction to what the modern idea of 
allegiance might mean, for treason is in essence a crime of disloyalty.  
 
What it Means for the Existing Law? 
This duty will not and should not demand total loyalty. Though treason is a crime of 
disloyalty, I propose instead a ‘non-loyalty’ version. It will not be about good citizenship or 
promoting love, respect, or affection for this country (or for fellow citizens) or endorsing 
British (or Scottish) values on pain of criminal sanction. It will not be breached by the 
citizen’s primary loyalty being to their religion or some political ideal or sense of belonging 
to some supranational community, the global community of Islam (Ummah) – though the 
person, who aids others in attacking this country, because they think it is their religious duty 
to do so, acts wrongly and should be punished. It will be precisely framed to allow for non-
conformity, non-violent dissidence, and the expression of contempt for this country and its 
institutions. It will not require to be evidenced by overt acts of loyalty such as an oath of 
allegiance – or at least not any additional oath of allegiance. No one is being compelled or 
asked to fight a war in which they disbelieve. This offence will only curb individual freedom 
insofar as it denies that anyone should be free to betray their country to a foreign enemy with 
impunity.112 This will comprise only a negative duty of allegiance to do no (enemy-backed) 
harm (to the homeland) – the ‘Do-No-Harm’ principle. This will be the extent of the 
obligation.  
 
111 Williams, CLJ, 54-76 
112 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 16 
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The outlier might sympathise with the sentiment of Kim Philby’s classic riposte: "To betray, 
you must first belong … I never belonged."113 But disaffection and not feeling allegiance or 
warmth toward the British state is one thing – breaching a duty of non-betrayal, by positively 
betraying it and aligning with and aiding its enemies, attacking the British state and its 
people, is quite another – and is the essence of the violation. Cynicism about political 
institutions, whether at a British (or Scottish) level, should not blind us to the protections the 
British state provides in discharge of its duties to us – and the duty of allegiance which flows 
from that. At a time of crisis, we look to the state for protection, particularly for protection 
and relief from external threats, be they military or viral. This is the vital corollary. 
I propose that the (negative) duty of allegiance could be used interchangeably with the duty 
of non-betrayal. For ease of understanding, this negative duty of allegiance could be equally 
referred to as a duty of non-betrayal – to adopt the lexicon of the Policy Exchange Paper. 
This is also consistent with ‘fair labelling’ sensibilities. I propose that the subject of the duty 
of allegiance be the Crown – a term implying the integration of the Queen into the body of 
an older notion. The Queen is not the state or the exclusive sovereign power. This notion of 
the Crown recognises an abstract concept of the bond between the Queen and kingdom and 
is the personification of the British state. At the Scottish level, the sovereign power can be 
conceptualised as the Crown-in-Scotland. 
An essential element of the crime of treason is that the accused must be proven to owe 
allegiance to the UK. Treason is an offence which revolves around the concept of the 
mutuality of allegiance and protection and the breach of that protective relationship. More 
specifically, I have posited Williams’ refined conceptual structure, in terms of a mutuality 
of a duty of protection and a duty of allegiance. On the basis of this model, I suggest that the 
relevant offence elements of treason with regard to allegiance, would be that the accused:  
(1) had a duty of allegiance 
(2) breached that duty of allegiance 
(3) did so by the commission of treasonable conduct  
 
The Crown would only be put to the test on this issue if the special capacity – the fact of the 
accused being a protected person owing a duty of allegiance at the relevant time – were 
 
113 “Murray Sayle, Obituary”, Telegraph (21 September 2010): 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/culture-obituaries/books-obituaries/8016790/Murray-Sayle.html 
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challenged and such an evidential ‘concession’ were not forthcoming from the defence.114 
Whether allegiance continues to exist or has been cast off is strictly an element of the actus 
reus and not a substantive defence as such – though it might be strategically in issue as the 
first line of defence. 
I will consider in Chapters 3 and 4 what steps might be taken to reframe the actus reus and 
the mens rea of any new Scottish treason law in consequence of this and compliance with 
this revised allegiance model. I will identify what relevant treasonable conduct might breach 
this duty of allegiance. I will propose this qualification or refinement of a requirement for 
conspiracy with a foreign enemy – the disloyal alignment with the nation’s enemies – as a 
safeguard against political prosecution, an abuse of process. I will make clear that this duty 
(not to be disloyal) will not be breached by expressions of dissent – or through a lack of 
respect for Britain’s individual political (or even security) institutions – or from a failure 
even to prioritise the UK’s interests. I will underline the negative nature of this duty by 
proposing the removal of the commission of treason by only omission. This should underline 
the special character of disloyalty – as well as rendering treason a more coherent and tighter 
offence. I will recast all treasons in terms of ‘Adherence Treason’ – committed in concert 
with (‘adhering to’) the foreign enemy – to refine this idea of non-disloyalty. 
This duty is never one of blind allegiance. One corrective is the liability to the crime of 
tyranny by state actors who abuse their power – which regrettably is no longer a theoretical 
possibility in the British context. But its enforcement is a serious imposition on any citizenry. 
Accordingly, I will consider in Chapter 5 whether there is scope for bolstering or even 
creating new justification defences, as a mechanism of ensuring greater balance in the 
contractual relationship between the sovereign power and people (or protected persons). 
 
 
114 A special capacity is a capacity special to the accused and necessary to the commission of an offence. 
Treason is an offence only a restricted category of persons (‘protected persons’) can commit. The accused must 
deny the fact of holding that capacity by preliminary objection (CPSA s. 255) – otherwise it will be held as 
admitted and the Crown is under no obligation to prove it. 
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I. Introduction: 
Having argued in Chapter 2 that allegiance should be conceptualised in terms of non-
patriotic contractual modelling and a narrow, negative duty of allegiance (or duty of non-
betrayal) not to betray this country to its foreign enemies, I now address the question of what 
type of conduct would breach this duty of allegiance and how, given this understanding of 
treason, the actus reus of a reformulated Scottish crime of treason might be expected to look. 
In the first (post-introduction) section I will consider the problems with the existing actus 
reus of ‘current’ treason – the extent to which it is inadequate and incapable of fitting with 
this modelling. Predictably, there are issues of arcane language and definition. Jonathon 
Hall, current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), impugned the "frankly 
archaic sounding acts of compassing the death of the Sovereign or heir and ‘being adherent 
to the Sovereign’s enemies in her Realm giving them aid and comfort in Her realm, or 
elsewhere’",1 cautioning that considerations about genuine utility would be acutely relevant 
to any proposed new treason offence. Definition and proof of the sovereign’s enemies can 
be fraught with practical difficulties.2 It will not always be clear whether the UK is engaged 
in armed conflict with a state or organisation, and whether aiding that state or organisation 
amounts to treason. I will consider the issues arising from identifying the sovereign’s 
enemies given the complexities of modern conflict and whether breach of allegiance is 
engaged in non-international conflict and by adhering to non-state organisations.  
In the second section I will consider the extent to which the new offence might define 
relevant harm. If treasonable conduct is constituted by aiding an enemy state or organisation 
in attacking the UK or engaging in combat with UK forces abroad, there may be scope for 
determining the relevancy of treasonable conduct in terms of a construct involving a 
‘national security harm’ principle. I will review the relationship between the central elements 
of the actus reus which I propose be retained, and this ‘national security harm’ principle – 
and whether it should only be regarded as criminal if the ‘national security harm’ principle 
were satisfied – or whether that principle involves an alternative means of satisfying the 
 
1 Jonathon Hall QC, “Changing Times, Changing Treason” (9 September 2019): 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190909-Treason-
Speech-to-RUSI.pdf 
2 Attorney-General Jeremy Wright, Hansard HC Deb. vol. 590 col. 154, 6 January 2015 
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actus reus. I will address whether this principle should extend to an attack on the sovereign 
or whether provision separate from the law of treason should apply. 
In the third section I will then consider the implications of this modelling to explain how we 
might go about reconstructing the actus reus of the law of treason – allowing me to identify 
the core offences which should survive, and the duties involved with them. In the fourth 
section I will broadly propose how the actus reus of the core offences be recast. I will then 
address in the fifth section what exactly an enemy attack on Scotland might entail in terms 
of perpetration of relevant harm and how these reformulated core offences could be more 
specifically framed for the Scottish context and its devolved system, assuming the sub-
national Scottish political institutions warrant such respect or protection.  
 
II. Problematic ‘Current’ Actus Reus: 
As currently framed, the actus reus of the crime of treason can be committed in the following 
seven ways: 
 
• Compassing or Imagining the Death of the Sovereign 
• Violating the King’s Consort 
• Levying War in the Realm 
• Being Adherent to the Sovereign’s Enemies in the Realm, Giving Them Aid and 
Comfort in the Realm, or Elsewhere 
• Disputing or Hindering the Succession 
• Killing Judges 
• Counterfeiting Scots Seals  
 
Again, there are obvious presentational difficulties insofar as the language used in the 
Treason Act 1351 does not clearly reflect the kinds of act that might be considered 
treasonous today or specify the modus by which they may be committed.3 There is a paucity 
of contemporary sources. No recent precedent explains how treasonable acts might be 
defined in modern parlance. Anachronistic provisions and archaic language distract from 
 
3 Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond (2008), 80, para 41(ii) 
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what should be its core idea of non-disloyalty and betraying our country. I will critically 
evaluate each of these forms of acti rei with these shortcomings in mind. 
 
(i) Compassing or Imagining the Death of the Sovereign: 
(a) General Definition: 
Compassing or imagining the death of the sovereign involves conspiring to assassinate the 
sovereign. Judicial interpretation extended this from not only plotting the sovereign’s 
physical death, but their ‘political death’. It was broadened to include deposing the 
sovereign, overthrowing the Government, usurping Parliament, and the Constitution by 
force. This reflected the notion of challenging the state as a political abstraction. The 
compassing of personal harm to the sovereign evolved to incorporate the concept of 
‘restraint’ – by compelling the sovereign to change her measures. This changed the feudal 
notion of treason as a breach of a duty to a person (the person of the sovereign) into the more 
modern idea of "armed resistance, made on political grounds, to the public order of the 
realm".4 The protected persons falling within the person of the sovereign do not include the 
Prime Minister, whose (attempted) assassination might otherwise fall under the head of 
levying war against the sovereign in their realm.  
This head of treason appears to underline that treason law remains heavily wedded to the 
idea of monarchy and confuses the case for treason law with support for the monarchy. 
Separate provision could be made for offences committed against the sovereign. However, 
an act which harms the Queen is not just about threatening her personal safety, it being 
historically perceived as endangering the safety and security of the British state. Because of 
the way in which constitutional monarchy has evolved, with the sovereign’s personal powers 
curbed by constitutional conventions and the emergence of a wider concept of the Crown, 
the physical security of the sovereign is no longer conflated with the stability of the British 
state and there is arguably no longer the imperative for the protection of the person of the 
 
4 Gordon, Criminal Law, 4th ed. Vol. II (2016), para. 43.04; Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal 
Law, Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Law Com No 72, 1977), para. 14; Stephen, A General View of the 
Criminal Law (1863), 36; Law Reform Commission of Canada (LRCC) Working Paper 49, Crimes Against 
the State (1986), 6 and 26 
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sovereign to be the central focus of the crime of treason.5 Insofar as we have a modern 
constitutional monarchy, operating within the parameters of a representative (Parliamentary) 
democracy, and whose role is wholly symbolic – with modern allegiance being predicated 
on institutional allegiance and not personal or political allegiance – that need not be a 
concern. While the Law Commission’s 1977 Working Paper on modernising the law of 
offences against the state proposed that invasions of the personal security of the sovereign 
should be made a specific (peacetime) offence without being declared to be treason,6 it seems 
impossible to ignore the historic and continuing symbolic significance of the monarchy to 
the British state – and to have Parliament countenance an effective downgrading, particularly 
so given the recognised duty of the sovereign to be seen among her people, with the constant 
exposure to the risk of injury.7 
The 1351 Act might be thought to be defective in not expressly covering the situation where 
someone murders or kills the King or attempts to do so, only the inchoate act of conspiracy8 
– creating a casus omissus since it otherwise makes it treason to slay the Lord Chancellor 
and certain judges.9 There is a problem with arcane terminology. ‘Compassing’ and 
‘imagining’ no longer obviously mean ‘intending’. The core idea of conspiracy to murder or 
kill Her Majesty is readily understood – though it might be more comprehensible if so 
defined, adopting the phraseology of the Australian and Canadian treason laws.  
 
(ii) Violating the King’s Consort:  
The purpose of this head of treason of violating certain royal ladies (the King’s wife or eldest 
unmarried daughter, or the wife of the sovereign’s eldest son and heir) was to ensure the 
purity of the Royal bloodline.10 It is moot whether this underlying rationale is satisfied if no 
child were born; if the royal lady were (recently) separated, widowed, or no longer capable 
 
5 Law Com WP 72, para. 62. A similar conclusion was reached in LRCC WP 49, 50, with the proposal that 
killing (or assaulting) the Queen be excluded from its proposed revised mini-code of crimes against the state – 
and instead treated as a form of aggravated homicide (or assault). 
6 Law Com WP 72, paras. 64-66 
7 Ibid. para. 63 
8 Graham S. McBain “High Treason: Killing the Sovereign or Her Judges” (2009) 20(3) KLJ 457, 462 
9 Ibid., 465-466 
10 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. IV. 6th ed (1775), 81 
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of having children.11 The language of violation is arcane and unclear. The word ‘violate’ (in 
a sexual sense) is no longer used in English legislation. It may equate to ‘ravish’ (still used 
in Scotland), if not ostensibly requiring force – and, on a constructive interpretation, covers 
adultery.12 Consent was immaterial because this was, technically, unlawful (treasonable) 
sexual intercourse for either participant. It is scarcely considered in modern texts – dismissed 
as a ‘colourful anachronism’ in Harris’s Criminal Law.13 "It is a form of treason which may 
be supposed it is not in accordance with modern attitudes to enforce."14 To punish consensual 
sex with life imprisonment is disproportionate, having major human rights implications.15 
The affair of James Hewitt with Diana, Princess of Wales, then wife of the heir apparent to 
the throne, might have technically fitted this definition, but was never prosecuted, despite 
the risible (or facetious) efforts of the Daily Mirror urging its readers to make a citizen’s 
arrest of Hewitt. Authoritative recommendations have been made for formal repeal.16 
Notwithstanding Parliament’s failure to rationalise, these provisions can be regarded as 
otiose and effectively obsolete – or, in Scottish terminology, as having fallen into desuetude.  
Since the purpose of this oft-ridiculed head of treason (to prevent contamination of the Royal 
bloodline and ensure continuity of the royal house) does not remotely involve breaching the 
posited negative duty of allegiance (or duty of non-betrayal) by acting with a foreign enemy 
to perpetrate harm to national security, there is no principled case for its Scottish re-
enactment under the new modelling. 
 
(iii) Levying War in the Realm: 
Under this head it is treason to levy war against the sovereign in her realm. There are two 
kinds: ‘direct levying of war’ against the person of the sovereign, and ‘constructive levying 
of war’ against the majesty of the sovereign, as in the case of insurrection to effect a change 
in the law or redress a national grievance. This has been widely interpreted to include 
revolution or riot – political violence with a national object, not declaring war in the 
 
11 Graham S. McBain “High treason – violating the sovereign’s wife” (2009) 29(2) LegStud 264, 276 
12 Ibid., 276; 278-279 
13 S.F. Harris et al., Criminal Law (1973), 123; Law Com WP 72, para. 18 
14 Alastair Brown, “Offences against the State” (2005), para. 537 (in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia) 
15 McBain “Violating”, 279 
16 Law Com WP 72, para. 48 
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international law sense, but the use of armed force by a considerable number of people 
against the lawful Government to achieve some public or general purpose.  
Again, there is an issue with the arcane terminology of ‘levying war’ evoking the 
iconography of warring feudal barons or Jacobite Rebellions. It lacks contemporary 
resonance. It is uncertain whether a formal declaration of war is required or whether 
‘levying’ amounts to any act which might lead to war, such as domestic acts of terrorism.17 
This form of treason might be more comprehensible if re-classified in terms of ‘political 
insurrection’; or as ‘the sabotage of military or other critical infrastructure’; or even (less 
obscurely) ‘engaging in war’. It might be made clearer that it is about engaging in political 
violence and that it is treasonable to use force or violence for the purpose of attempting to 
overthrow constitutional government or influence its (foreign) policy – ‘levying civil war’ 
even. Treason must be something more sinister than an aggravated public order offence. It 
is suggested in the 1986 Canadian Law Reform Commission’s Working Paper on crimes 
against the state that a carefully-worded provision should – with the assistance of the 
inchoate offences of conspiracy and attempt – be able to deal with the problem of violent 
rebellion.18  
Treason is a political crime and with political prosecutions, there are actual or perceived 
risks of oppression or abuse of process. In the modern era, it is unlikely that treason law 
would be deployed to criminalise political dissent even in circumstances involving agitation 
to overthrow the state by anti-democratic and illegitimate means. Given that non-violent 
insurrection is more obviously and historically associated with sedition (now expressly 
repealed), its prosecution as treason would almost certainly be regarded as an abuse of 
process and inconsistent with a reasonable and conscientious exercise of independent 
prosecutorial discretion – a legitimate expectation. It would negate ‘fair labelling’ principles. 
More pragmatically, juries would be unlikely to convict, causing avoidable reputational 
damage to those implicated in its prosecution. In any event, the current existential threat is 
not the prospect of internal rebellion resulting in the overthrow of stable and secure political 
institutions, the risk of Soviet-backed communist insurrection or industrial agitation having 
greatly diminished following the end of the Cold War. However, small terrorist cells can still 
inflict significant damage.  
 
17 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 80; LRCC WP 49, 35 
18 LRCC WP 49, 26 and 35 
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It is not clear that this head of treason is about protecting the British people from violent 
attack. I will argue that it should not just address levying war against the sovereign but 
levying war against, or, attacking the British people. It should focus on foreign-sponsored 
terrorist attacks by British actors on our political institutions, the military, our critical 
national infrastructure (CNI) or on the British people. 
 
(iv) Being Adherent to the Sovereign’s Enemies in the Realm, Giving Them Aid and 
Comfort in the Realm, or Elsewhere: 
(a) General Definition: 
This provision has been relied on to prosecute acts of assistance to the enemy in wartime – 
the most common form of treason in recent times – thus inferring that it might now be the 
most important.19 It is treason to adhere to the Queen’s enemies by giving them aid and 
comfort anywhere, which is how you adhere to the enemy.20 A person may be guilty of this 
treason by giving aid and comfort in the realm to enemies in the realm – or by giving aid and 
comfort elsewhere to enemies elsewhere.21 Any act which tends to strengthen the Queen’s 
enemies or to weaken the Queen’s power to resist or attack them constitutes giving aid and 
comfort.22 That assistance might be practical, material or moral23 – for example, disclosing 
information (intelligence)24 or participation in enemy (wartime) propaganda broadcasts.25 
Hume speaks of treasonable adherence by: "Those … of his Majesty’s subjects who adhere 
to such open enemies, and, contrary to their allegiance, give them aid and comfort" – and of 
the "hostility on the part of (those), who have broken the allegiance which they owe".26 
Adherence to the enemy requires something more than intent to render aid and comfort and 
 
19 R. v. Lynch [1903] 1 KB 444; R. v. Casement [1917] 1 KB 98; and Joyce v. DPP [1946] AC 347 
20 J. Richard Broughton, “The Snowden Affair and the Limits of American Treason” (2015) 3 LMULawReview 
5, 13 
21 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.11; Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 18th ed. (J. Cecil Turner, ed., 2013), 
para. 407; Casement 
22 Casement, Reading CJ., 133 
23 Andrew Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, 4th ed. (2016), para. 19.3 
24 Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law in Scotland, 5th ed. (1948), 174; Hume, Commentaries, 
I, 527; Alison, Principles, I, 612, 613 
25 Joyce; R. v. Steane [1947] KB 997; Ex parte Cousens: Re Blackett (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 145; Charles Warren, 
“What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?” (1918) 27(3) YaleLJ 331 
26 Hume, I, 527 
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the commission of an overt act – and in principle requires a deep emotional identification 
with the enemy – psychological adherence to the enemy.27  
 
(b) Problems of Definition: 
Again, there are problems of definition. Similarly, lack of definition and clarity is an 
objection often raised at anti-terrorism legislation.28 Nonetheless, adherence remains a 
somewhat legalistic and ‘clunky’ concept. The significance of the duty of non-betrayal might 
be implicit, though it is not made expressly clear that it is involved. Properly, this head of 
treason should specifically recognise and reinforce the duty of non-betrayal involved – 
confirming this is the betrayal or the treason.  
Lord Goldsmith referred to the difficulties of identifying the Queen’s enemies.29 Should we 
even speak in terms of the sovereign’s enemies – insofar as this again underlines the 
centrality of the monarch? However, that is simply shorthand for the enemies of Her 
Majesty’s Government. It may be preferable to avoid the pejorative, sinister, Stalinist 
language of ‘enemies of the people’.30 Complexities can arise as to the meaning of the 
Queen’s enemies – particularly given that declarations of wars are now effectively obsolete31 
– and the likelihood that the UK will invariably be committed to different levels of military 
intervention, across the globe, at any given point in time.32 How might you precisely define 
the foreign enemy in circumstances where there may not have been any formal declaration 
of war, or prior open hostilities? What of strategic adversaries with whom we are formally 
at peace? As the UK faces the threat of attacks from organisations other than states and where 
UK forces are often deployed in armed conflicts where an organisation is an adversary, the 
obvious dilemma is whether non-state enemy actors or organisations, or proto-states would 
be relevant enemies for the purposes of treason legislation. Does an indirect enemy in an 
 
27 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193, 207-208  
28 Hall, “Changing Treason” 
29 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 41 
30 Clare Phipps, “British newspapers react to judges' Brexit ruling: 'Enemies of the people'” Guardian (4 
November 2016): 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-british-newspapers-react-judges-
brexit-ruling 
31 Waging War: Parliament’s role and responsibility, House of Lords (2006)  
32 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 80 
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undeclared war qualify? How does treason law deal with the clandestine terrorist group 
operating through a network of individuals rather than occupation of territory?  
Further, the concept of giving the enemy ‘aid and comfort’ is couched in archaic language. 
A more modern definition is desirable. The jurisdiction terminology is arcane and 
occasionally ambiguous. Historically, there has been confusion as to extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, though the position was finally clarified in Casement.33  
 
(c) Whether Scotland’s Enemies? 
I now consider whether Scotland could ever have separate enemies – or whether a Scottish 
Government could disassociate itself from the UK Government’s targeting of the UK’s 
enemies. A Scottish Parliament disapproving of a Government decision to send UK forces 
to war (in exercise of the royal prerogative and particularly after having secured Parliament 
approval, in accordance with the emerging constitutional convention) would be acting ultra 
vires on such an obviously reserved matter, having no legitimate constitutional role. 
Intriguing scenarios could be envisaged, e.g., in the eventuality of a future Scottish 
Government of anti-Zionist complexion making hostile declarations about the State of Israel, 
would this affect Scottish-domiciled dual British-Israeli citizens serving in the Israel 
Defence Forces (IDF)? 
The UK is a unitary, sovereign country (not a federation) and, under the devolution 
settlement, there remains only one sovereign power in the UK. That sovereign power is 
effectively the UK Government (the agent of the Crown). Its duty is to protect all of the 
countries or nations of the UK. With a Scottish offence, the treason would not be committed 
against Scotland – but against the UK – by breaching the duty of allegiance owed to the 
sovereign whose object (I suggest) can be locally expressed as the Crown-in-Scotland. It 
 
33 Casement had tried to persuade Irish prisoners of war in Germany to fight for the Irish Brigade against the 
British. He unsuccessfully argued that on a narrow interpretation of the 1351 Act, only acts committed within 
the realm were relevant – and that the words ‘or elsewhere’ could not cover acts of giving aid and comfort to 
the enemy in Germany, but the effect of those acts. The Court, by reading commas into the unpunctuated text, 
construed ‘in the realm or elsewhere’ to refer to where the acts were done and not where the enemy might be, 
it being immaterial where the assistance was given. It is by no means clear that the House of Lords correctly 
interpreted the 1351 Act in declaring treason to be capable of extra-territorial jurisdiction in Joyce (Michael 
Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law (2003), 219). 
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could not be committed separately against Scotland – or jointly and severally against 
Scotland and the UK as parallel entities – but simply and exclusively against the UK. You 
cannot extricate a separate treason against Scotland from treason against the UK. If you 
commit treason against Scotland, you commit treason against the UK because Scotland is 
part of the UK. While treasonable acts could be directed against the Scottish political 
institutions – thus appearing to conflate treason against the UK with treason against Scotland 
– the treason is still against the UK. If you levy war against Scotland, you levy war against 
the UK. Levying war against one of the constituent countries of the UK is a crime against 
the whole – because it threatens the cohesion and sovereignty of the UK. It imperils the UK 
as well as the individual member. The sovereign’s enemies are the UK’s enemies. Insofar as 
Scotland lacks the power to wage war and conduct foreign affairs independently – the natural 
prerequisites to creating ‘enemies’ under treason case law34 – with the conduct of the UK’s 
foreign affairs remaining a reserved matter,35 Scotland cannot have its own enemies. That 
could only occur under what is probably an untenable dual sovereignty model. In the 
prevailing devolved model, the Crown retains residuary and inviolable sovereignty.  
American federal experience is instructive. Constitutionally, American citizens owe 
allegiance to two sovereigns – the United States (at federal level) and their own state – and 
can thus potentially commit treason against either or both.36 Individual states cannot have 
external enemies. In People v. Lynch the State Court dismissed an indictment brought by the 
State of New York for treason by adhering to the State’s enemies during the War of 1812 
with the UK – because the acts charged did not amount to treason against the State on the 
basis that it was the United States, not the State, that had declared war against the UK. The 
accuseds’ breach of allegiance to the United States was not actionable at state level.37 It is 
moot whether treason against an individual state remains a valid or viable crime.38 McConkie 
concludes that in light of the historical record from the Constitutional Convention (where a 
1776 congressional resolution mandated each of the colonies to enact laws defining treason), 
the nature of dual sovereignty and federal criminal jurisdiction, states still have the power to 
 
34 J. Taylor McConkie, “State Treason: The History and Validity of Treason Against Individual States” (2013) 
101(2) KYLawJ 281, 282-283 
35 Scotland Act 1998, sch. 5, pt. 1, para. 7 
36 John V. Orth and Paul M. Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution (2013) 2nd ed., 86.  
37 People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 549 (NY Sup. Ct 1814) 
38 Carlton F.W. Larson, “The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem”, 
(2006) 154 UPALRev 863, 886 
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protect against subversive activities through state treason laws. The crime would not extend 
to adhering to a state’s enemies for the simple reason that states lack the power to wage war 
and engage in foreign diplomacy, the natural prerequisites to creating ‘enemies’ under 
treason case law.39 Similarly, there would be no such natural prerequisites creating Scottish 
‘enemies’ under any Scottish treason case law, even with a dual sovereignty model. 
 
(d) Peacetime Enemies: 
Normally, treason by aiding the enemy cannot be committed during peacetime. Properly, 
there must be an actual enemy for the traitor to aid. The Queen’s enemies are those states (or 
their subjects) which are in a state of hostility to this country – even if war has not been 
declared40 – and any foreigners who invade the country, whether or not their state is at war 
with the Queen (or British state).41 It might be thought that the definition of ‘enemies’ is to 
be strictly construed in the way in which it is narrowly understood in terms of international 
law and depends upon the existence of an actual state of war.42 But war is no longer generally 
commenced by formal declaration.43 There is a difference between international armed 
conflict and non-international armed conflict – or conflicts falling short of non-international 
conflict. That war was never declared against the Soviet Union was a sufficiently compelling 
legal reason why the treachery of Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May was never prosecuted as 
treason, despite their espionage activities allowing the USSR to catch up on critical nuclear 
research and redress the West’s only (weaponry) advantage.44 It is moot whether Jane Fonda, 
by her actions in posing in an NVA anti-aircraft battery in the infamous ‘Hanoi Jane’ photo 
shoot and making at least ten radio broadcasts from North Vietnam in 1972,45 could have 
been competently indicted for treason because absent American declaration of war, North 
Vietnam was arguably not a legal enemy of the US. The prevailing American view appears 
 
39 McConkie, “State Treason”, 282-283 
40 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.13; Hume, I, 529; Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), Vol. 11(1) (reissue 
1990), para. 80 
41 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.13; Halsbury’s Laws of England, para. 80 
42 The view taken in Kenny, para. 339; Law Com WP 72, para. 24 
43 Goldsmith, Citizenship, 80 
44 Adrian Weale, Patriot Traitors: Roger Casement, John Amery and the Real Meaning of Treason (2001), xvii 
45 The Vietnam War, ep. 9 (2017) Ken Burns and Lyn Novick, dirs.:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnFVFz9d6vU 
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to be that a formal declaration of war is not strictly necessary within the meaning of 
America’s Treason Clause.46 While the offence of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ 
can only be committed during time of war, it does not necessarily follow that the war must 
be attired with all customary trimmings, such as a formal declaration.47 
Enemy status is a question of fact for the jury to determine. It turns on the actual state and 
prevailing conditions between the UK and the ‘enemy’ state – and need not involve a state 
of open hostility.48 Nor is the cessation of hostilities determinative of matters.49 Whether and 
when a state of war exists with another state is a fact of state. The Courts take judicial notice 
of facts of state – and in the event of uncertainty would be expected to seek information from 
the Secretary of State.50 The Secretary of State’s certification would be deemed to be 
conclusive evidence that a state of war exists with a hostile state.51 
 
(e) Non-state Actors: 
While the concept of enemy might appear comprehensible, there is a problem of definition 
with non-state actors – a pertinent issue given the numbers of British Citizens who have 
served with or assisted IE groups which UK forces are fighting in non-international armed 
conflicts, and which have carried out terrorist attacks in the UK. The current definition fails 
to address the threat of foreign states or non-state actors attacking the UK in ways falling 
short of international armed conflict and with the agency of some British Citizens, who may 
provide support, financially or ideologically. This is about more than alignment with an 
irregular foreign army or paramilitary organisation – lest it be suggested that home-grown 
 
46 McConkie, “State Treason”, 330; Tom W. Bell, “Treason, Technology and Freedom of Expression” (2005) 
37 ArizStLJ 999, 1017-1019 
47 Paul Crane, “Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge? Reassessing Cramer v. United States and Its 
Significance” (2009) 36 FlaStULR 635; McConkie, “State Treason”, 330 
48 Hume, I, 529; Macdonald, 175 
49 In R. v. Bottrill, ex parte Kuechenmeister [1947] KB 41, the Court of Appeal held that even in 1946, Britain 
and Germany would remain in a state of war pending the supervention of any peace treaty – notwithstanding 
the cessation of hostilities – such that no enemy alien had the legal right to apply to a British (civil) court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  
50 Law Com WP 72, para. 24 
51 Kuechenmeister; Halsbury’s Laws of England, para. 106; Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, para. 19.3, n. 1; Law 
Com WP 72, para. 24 – though this authority is only permissive and not mandatory, insofar as it indicates how 
the necessary evidence might be given and does not prevent it being given in a different way.  
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Jihadists are no different from those 2,500 to 4,000 British volunteers who joined the 
Brigadas Internacionales during the Spanish Civil War. Neither Franco’s Spain nor the 
Republican faction were at war with the UK. Despite inconsistencies in British foreign 
policy and the Government’s previous flirtation with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, I will 
submit that there would be a metamorphosis to enemy status if, through its words and 
actions, that organisation becomes a self-proclaimed enemy of the British state – and I will 
address how that designation or proclamation might be competently made. I endorse 
Eichensehr’s analysis that the risk of dignifying a terrorist group as an enemy is outweighed 
by benefits – including increased societal cohesion, deterrence of other treasons, and 
retribution – providing the threat posed by the terrorist group the traitor supports is akin to 
that posed by an enemy state. This would turn upon the magnitude of the threat posed by 
terrorist groups following an objective evaluation.52 
 
(f) ‘Aid and Comfort’: 
The notion of ‘aid and comfort’ is archaic and might be recast in more contemporary and 
comprehensible terms. A besotted British Jihadi bride or ‘comfort woman’ might be a literal 
contemporary example, but is this what might be intended? There are issues of 
impreciseness53 and proportionality. Since ‘moral’ assistance suffices for this offence, it 
seems the assistance need not relate to the enemy war effort or be particularly substantial – 
a matter which should submit to some clarification. Giving aid and comfort to the 
sovereign’s enemies may be problematic if this infraction were used to target non-violent 
protest (against official UK Government foreign policy) or dissidence – and deemed to stifle 
the free expression of opinion – potentially breaching the Convention right to freedom of 
expression under art. 10, ECHR.  
 
(v) Disputing or Hindering the Succession: 
S. 3 of the (English) Treason Act 1702 (extended to Scotland by the Treason Act 1708) 
makes it treason to attempt by overt acts to hinder the (Protestant) succession as limited by 
the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Act of Settlement 1701. This legislation was deemed 
fundamental to the emergence of a Protestant constitutional monarchy – to ensure that no 
 
52 Kristen E. Eichensehr, “Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return 
in Democratic States” (2009) 42 VandJTransnatlL 1443 
53 Douglas A. Kash, “The United States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for Treason” (2008) 37 CapULRev 1, 22 
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Roman Catholic, or anyone married to a Roman Catholic, could hold the British Crown. 
Hindering the line of succession – to impede the rightful heir from becoming King or Queen 
– covers a wide range of activity, including anything from political assassination of the heir 
to simply attempting to declare them illegitimate – and even (technically) agitating for 
republicanism.  
There is no modern instance of prosecution for this form of treason.54 Alison described it as 
a subject of curiosity rather than use.55 It represents something of an historical legacy – 
directed to the fears of an earlier age when the existential threat to the British state was 
Roman Catholicism (illustrated by the text of the English Bill of Rights 1689). If not exactly 
anachronistic or obsolete, it is possibly incompatible with the notion of the modern UK as 
something of a secular or ‘agnostic’ nation where political power has long since shifted to 
the Government and elected Parliament. Insofar as this head of treason affirms a Protestant 
monarchy and faith, it might be deemed non-inclusive and discriminatory by some, or by 
many even. This provision might be rendered redundant if the anodyne Coronation Oath of 
a future monarch were as Defender of Faith – and not Defender of the Faith. Since I argue 
for a streamlined model – focusing on the core idea of non-disloyalty through betraying our 
country by aiding its enemies and the perpetration of material harm to national security – 
this infraction is unlikely to involve any breach of the duty of non-disloyalty and thus is 
superfluous. 
 
(vi)  Killing Judges: 
S. 11 of the 1708 Act which made it treason to kill any of the Lords of Session or Justiciary 
sitting in judgment in the exercise of their office is still technically in force. The 1351 Act 
deals with the killing of certain English judges in similar circumstances. The historical logic 
for this obscure head of treason is that the ‘Fount of Justice’ in the UK was the monarch – 
that the law courts are part of the Royal Court – with judges being the monarch’s 
representatives, dispensing justice on the monarch’s behalf. This head of treason evokes 
crimen laesae majestatis, one of the forms of Roman treason law – insofar as it was aimed 
at the protection of the authority of the sovereign and his principal officers.56 This would be 
an act subverting the accepted order of society – attacking the public order of the realm. 
 
54 Law Com WP 72, para. 25 
55 Alison, I, 614-615 
56 LRCC WP 49, 5 
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Even if this reasoning had subsisted, it was further invalidated by the abolition of leasing-
making (the Scots form of lèse-majesté, which had extended to the sovereign’s court).57  
McBain argued for its abolition given the absence of any precedent in the last 650 years.58 
He impugned its antiquity59 and the uncertain wording of ‘slaying’ (featuring in the Scottish 
extension under the 1708 Act). It could include accidental killing and does not directly 
connote murder60 (though Coke argued it could be regarded as wilful murder as the law 
implied malice61). Even if its meaning were obvious, because the wording is so archaic and 
obscure, a proper determination of the crime may not be possible on human rights grounds62 
– the law lacking the certainty as to be valid under art. 7, ECHR.63 It would be better covered 
by murder (aggravated by the victim’s absolute character) – as it would undoubtedly be 
charged.64 It is anomalous that Supreme Court Justices, Ministers of the Crown, Privy 
Councillors or Parliamentarians (save the Lord Chancellor, who no longer sits as a judge) 
are denied similar protection.65 Stephen dismissed the equivalent English provision in the 
1351 Act as an ‘antiquarian curiosity’ deserving no notice.66 
A spectacular attack on the Supreme Courts – such as the IRA’s 1973 Old Bailey bombing67 
– involving sabotage of CNI (harming national security), might fall under the more 
conventional ‘levying of war’ head, meeting the treasonable threshold under my proposed 
new modelling (if enemy-sponsored). 
 
 
 
 
57 Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s. 51 
58 McBain “Killing Judges”, 483 
59 Ibid., n. 209 
60 Ibid., 481 and 484 
61 Ibid., 481; Coke, Institutes Vol. III, 18 
62 McBain “Killing Judges”, n. 209 
63 R. v. Goldstein and Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63  
64 Law Com WP 72, paras. 25 and 49; McBain “Killing Judges”, 483-485 
65 Ibid., 484 
66 Stephen, General View, 114 
67 IRA Commander Gerry Adams admonished volunteers this operation could be a hanging offence, as it was 
treason (Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA: The Big Lad (2002), 125). 
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(vii) Counterfeiting Scots Seals: 
S. 11 of the 1708 Act makes it treason to counterfeit the Great Seal of Scotland,68 the mould 
used to create the wax seal attached to official documents to evidence Royal Assent.69 The 
Keeper of the Registers of Scotland retains custody and maintains the Register of the Great 
Seal (governing royal appointments, warrants and authentication of deeds70). The equivalent 
provision in England and Wales has long since been repealed.71  
It is difficult to envisage a contemporary practical incidence of how this might be 
successfully executed – particularly given the now extensive scope of (electronic) land 
registration of title. Since this uniquely Scottish head of treason does not involve perpetrating 
the kind of harm to national security under my proposed modelling, there is no principled 
case for the Scottish re-enactment of this provision. 
 
(viii) Misprision of Treason: 
Misprision of treason is a separate, allied offence – a rare common law offence – consisting 
of the ‘concealment or keeping secret of treason’72 or possibly a treasonable plot73 from the 
authorities. It was made an offence in Scotland under s. 1 of the 1708 Act. Though Goddard 
CJ considered misprision obsolete or as having fallen into desuetude in R. v. Aberg,74 it was 
specifically retained by the Criminal Law Act 1967.75 It is committed by a person knowing 
or having reasonable cause to believe that another has committed treason, but failing to 
disclose this information (or any material part of it) to the proper authority within a 
reasonable time.76 It includes failing to give information about projected treason.77 In 
 
68 As appointed by the Treaty of Union, art. XXIV 
69 Provision for the current seal is made in the Scotland Act 1998, s. 2(6). 
70 https://www.ros.gov.uk/our-registers/register-of-great-seal  
71 The provisions in the 1351 Act relating to counterfeiting the Great Seal (or Privy Seal) of Great Britain 
ceased to be treason under the Forgery Act 1861. 
72 Sykes v. DPP [1962] AC 528; Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, para. 19.4  
73 Ibid.; Kenny, para. 421 
74 R. v. Aberg [1948] 2 KB 173, 176  
75 S. 12(6) – see Hansard HL Deb. vol. 355 cols. 65-66, 3 December 1974 
76 Macdonald, 176: "This crime consists in knowing of treason, and failing to reveal it with all convenient 
speed to a Judge or Justice of Peace." 
77 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.23; Kenny, para. 421  
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contradistinction to the ‘aiding and abetting’ offence under s. 293 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995, it addresses situations involving accession after the fact – an 
unrecognisable doctrine in Scots law,78 perhaps incongruous if re-enacted in any Scottish 
treason law. 
Exceptionally for the criminal law in a common law system, this is a crime which can be 
committed by omission. The duty of disclosure sits uncomfortably with common law 
sensibilities – where there is no general duty or criminal liability for the failure to act, even 
in serious crimes such as murder.79 It might be regarded as excessive state interference with 
personal liberty – affirming the suspicion of political crimes engineered to protect the 
establishment.80 The actus reus is the failing, by anyone who has any information that might 
lead to the arrest of a traitor, to give that information to the authorities. In an age of 
instantaneous communication, the permissible latitude would be minimal. It is characterised 
in terms of an exceptional or affirmative duty to seek out and inform the relevant authorities 
– not simply a disclosure requirement when questioned by the police. While it can be 
committed by persons who owe no duty of allegiance to the British Crown, it is difficult to 
envisage extra-territorial reach for a crime committed by omission outwith the UK by a 
person having only a tenuous British connection.  
Compulsory disclosure of (contemplated) treasonable conduct (and the requirement of 
submission to questioning) might be regarded as a proportionate response to crimes striking 
at the core of the security and well-being of the nation and its citizenry – especially in time 
of war or national emergency. This is consistent with the principle of reciprocal obligations 
between state and citizen, including the duty of the British Citizen (and resident) not to be 
disloyal to the British state.81 While, invariably, this duty would be conceived in terms of a 
negative duty, the serious (wartime) risk to the whole British state is an exceptional 
circumstance (in contrast to combatting conventional criminality) which arguably justifies 
extending the duties of the citizen (or resident) and countenancing a specific, positive duty 
of disclosure.82 Wartime is precisely when the British state most needs the allegiance of its 
 
78 Macdonald, 8 
79 Paterson v. Lees, 1999 JC 159, per LJG (Rodger) at 161H 
80 LRCC WP 49, 38 
81 LRCC WP 49, 51 
82 Ibid., 38 
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people.83 It may thus at least be ECHR-compliant with the right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination, in terms of art. 6, ECHR, but does not seem to be 
consistent with the operation of only a negative duty.  
It appears to be a strict liability offence (in contrast to the disclosure offences under ss. 19 
and 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 where there is a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence) – and thus 
potentially harsh and unjust. In the absence of direct modern authority, it may be 
unacceptably vague, offending the principles of legality and legal certainty.84 But following 
the approach taken in Sykes v. DPP to the then subsisting offence of misprision of felony, it 
is ‘probable’ that the same general principles apply.85 The meaning of ‘misprision’ is 
perplexing to the layman.86 Its parameters are uncertain. Though not a legal duty of 
prevention, the duty to disclose all known material facts is not discharged by merely 
reporting the bare fact of commission.87 Lord Denning suggested that non-disclosure might 
sometimes be justified or excused on the ground of privilege – viz., legal professional 
privilege, medical confidentiality or clergy-penitent privilege88 – but the Law Commission 
thought it ‘very doubtful’ whether any relationship would be held to justify non-disclosure 
of so serious an offence.89  
  
III. ‘National Security Harm’ Principle: 
I propose a ‘national security harm’ principle as the principle around which the surviving 
heads of treason can be formed – that express provision be made in any new Scottish 
legislation that treasonable conduct necessarily involves prejudicing the security and defence 
of the UK – and that the surviving heads of treason be justified by this principle. This will 
address what exactly relevant treasonable conduct might be in the modern age – a principled 
 
83 Ibid., 56; R. v. Lynch. In Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948) the Circuit Court of Appeals 
said: "When war breaks out, a citizen's obligation of allegiance puts definite limits upon his freedom to act on 
his private judgment." 
84 The last reported case is R. v. Thistlewood (1820) 33 St Tr 681. 
85 Law Com WP 72, para. 41 
86 Sykes, 554-555 
87 Law Com WP 72, para. 41 
88 Sykes, 564 
89 Law Com WP 72, para. 42. Though it is suggested the intention to override rights such as LPP must be 
expressly stated in the statute or appear by necessary implication (R. v. Special Commr. & Anor, ex parte 
Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd. [2002] UKHL 21). 
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way of establishing modus – the facts and circumstances which might conventionally be 
expected to be narrated in any treason charge. It is intended to clearly link the harm to the 
offence and reflect proportionality considerations – pre-empting juries objecting to treason 
charges being proffered (with the prospect of a mandatory life sentence) where, though there 
may be a betrayal, there is ostensibly little harm. It is consistent with the approach that only 
a limited range of betraying acts should be criminalised as treason.  
The obvious starting point is to define what relevant harm might be for the purposes of a 
‘national security harm’ principle. I suggest that relevant harm is harm which materially 
compromises national security. It will involve acts of sabotage perpetrated against political 
institutions, CNI and key military installations – against the general safety of the state. With 
enemy agency in particular, a national security risk is created or compounded. If national 
security is so imperilled, then the materiality test would be met. For an act to constitute 
treason, it must be directed against state institutions with sensitive national defence 
implications or the core institutional resources the British state requires to protect itself (and 
by extension the British nation) or even to otherwise advance its interests by force; and 
scrupulously distinguished from what can be the subjective and amorphous issue of harming 
the national interest (which can be conflated with the Government’s interest). The 
perpetration of this kind of harm reaches the treasonable threshold because it involves 
conduct that is typically associated with the foreign enemy.90 
I argue that perpetration of this degree of harm will be treasonable if it involves collusion 
with the enemy in an enemy attack on the UK – and, by that, the perpetration of harm to 
national security. The contemporary difficulty is whether assistance or aid to an enemy 
falling short of traditional military operations and international armed conflict – non-
international armed conflict – might fall within its ambit. Such conduct may not strictly 
engage an attack on the UK. There are difficult issues of definition as to the micro-level at 
which this concept might be expected to operate. How much harm does an individual actor 
need to perpetrate (or attempt to achieve)? Must a specific attack be in contemplation? How 
much co-ordination with and direction by the enemy state or organisation must there be?  
The enemy-sponsored sabotage of national institutions located within Scotland – British 
political institutions, military, and CNI – will involve an enemy attack on the UK and, by 
that, the perpetration of harm to national security. I will consider the extent to which war 
 
90 Fletcher, “Case for Treason”, 195 
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might be levied against sub-national institutions – and what relevant harm in the specifically 
Scottish context might be in terms of Scottish political institutions and Scottish CNI.  
 
(i) Definition: 
Given the posited requirement for enemy agency, it is imperative to define what harm an 
enemy might be expected to perpetrate as to reach the treasonable threshold – and what 
exactly the modern enemy is. Insofar as relevant treasonable conduct may be constituted by 
aiding an enemy state or organisation in attacking the UK or engaging in combat with UK 
forces abroad, I submit that the relevancy of the treasonable conduct could be determined in 
terms of a ‘national security harm’ principle, loosely referable to the concept of self-defence 
in international law. This invocation of the criminal law could be regarded as a proportionate 
measure taken in exercise of the nation’s right to self-defence. National security refers to the 
security of a nation-state, not simply concerning its external security, but material aspects of 
its internal security – its political institutions, citizenry and economy, the maintenance of 
which are a fundamental duty of any government. It can be conceived as a manifestation of 
the exercise of the state’s duty of protection. Originally considered in terms of protection 
against military invasion or attack, national security can now be regarded as extending to the 
non-military sphere – including infrastructure security, economic, energy and cyber-
security. In addition to the actions of other nation-states, national security risks include 
violent actions committed by non-state actors. Governments rely on a range of measures, 
including the projection of political and diplomatic power, and economic power, as well as 
military power, to enforce national security.  
Sabotage or harm caused by enemy nation-states, non-state actors or organisations to the 
extent that national security, generically, is compromised, will amount to the perpetration of 
relevant harm. An enemy attack on the UK is an attack from which the UK state must defend 
itself and its people – and protect its national security. A relevant enemy (or treasonable) 
attack will be an operation which results in death or injury of persons, whether military, 
political office-holder or civilian; or destruction or damage to property comprising CNI, 
thereby compromising national security. Attacks must be on or against the UK. The ‘harm’ 
is important here because the offence of treason should focus on the ‘wrong’ of betraying 
one’s country by participating in attacks on it. This is a short-hand way of encapsulating the 
essence of the crime – the principle which the traitor is betraying. Unremarkably, attacks on 
UK forces, military bases, embassies, or diplomatic personnel will be an attack on the UK. 
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There may well be an inevitable inference that wartime activity directed towards sabotaging 
core military or security institutions with sensitive defence implications is treasonable – and 
a prima facie case that peacetime activity directed towards such institutions is treasonable. 
The peacetime disclosure of classified military information to enemy agents would be 
treasonable in a way that the reckless disclosure of embarrassing intelligence to the public 
might not be. Included may be acts of assistance or aid to an enemy falling short of traditional 
military operations and international armed conflict – specifically, non-international armed 
conflict. This would include terrorism or criminal violence directed at civilians within the 
UK, or on British Citizens abroad, precisely because of their British nationality – on the 
basis that though these may involve violations of UK sovereignty which are short of attacks 
on the UK, they can be characterised as attacks on the UK, in respect that they have been 
targeted to attack the UK. To contextualise, the UK is not just the Government of the UK as 
a country is not merely its government. This would include non-armed conflict such as 
propagandising and cyber-warfare, being actions threatening the economic well-being of the 
UK. Propagandising for the enemy as an instrument of psychological warfare to cause 
disunity (including by disseminating ‘fake news’) is hardly new.91 How international law 
and the law of war applies to cyber-warfare is unsettled and the definition of ‘cyber-attack’ 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is the kind of hostility that fits within this definition 
as compromising CNI.92 It is a characteristic of asymmetric warfare, capable of bringing 
down major infrastructure, causing direct economic harm and even indirectly killing people. 
It would be a concern that an ‘attack on the UK’ could be easily widened to mean any group 
of actors who threaten the national interest as defined by the Government. A cautionary note 
should be struck that the national interest is not necessarily synonymous with the interest of 
the prevailing Government – or even a temporary majority view of what that might be. 
Though they may frequently converge, these are not identical concepts. To reiterate, the 
‘national security harm’ principle (the treasonable threshold) should only be engaged by acts 
materially compromising national security. It is intended to exclude the potentiality for abuse 
of process by prosecuting dissidents, who might be ‘irritants’, but not traitors. This principle 
 
91 Gillars v. United States, 182 F 2d 962 (DC Cir 1950) 
92 J. Richard Broughton, “Constitutional Discourse and the Rhetoric of Treason” (2020) 47(2) 
HastingsConstLQ 303, 328-329 
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is posited as a fundamental means of satisfying the actus reus – and I propose to incorporate 
specific reference to it in any new Scottish offence.  
Support for this principle can be found in the Australian Criminal Code insofar as it qualifies 
assistance in terms of the intent to provide material assistance – viz., if the person intends 
that their conduct will materially assist the enemy to engage in war with the Commonwealth 
of Australia.93 It is the intent to provide material assistance – not the effectiveness or futility 
of its execution. It is unnecessary to show that the accused ultimately succeeded in delivering 
aid to the enemy – it suffices merely that they took overt action to attempt performance. This 
insistence on the (attempted) provision of tangible support has the advantage of excluding 
mere acts of dissidence and minor propagandising. It would be preferable it if could be 
clarified that ‘assistance’ relates to conduct such as funding, the provision of troops or 
armaments, intelligence, or other strategic support. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
proposed that an explanatory note be added to the provision to clarify the intended meaning 
of ‘materially’ to "make clear that mere rhetoric or expression of dissent are not sufficient."94 
Given the seriousness and penalties attached to the offence, it was considered crucial that 
the law achieved the highest degree of precision and thus certainty.95  
The (repealed) Treachery Act 1940 had enabled, for the duration of the war emergency, the 
prosecution for treachery of enemy spies and saboteurs (who might not be covered by the 
doctrine of local allegiance) and those adhering to the enemy abroad. S. 1 made it an offence 
with intent to help the enemy to do any act which was designed or likely to give assistance 
to the naval, military or air operations of the enemy, (and/or) to impede such operations of 
His Majesty’s forces, (and/or) to endanger life. The last words were inserted to make it quite 
clear that it extended to grievous cases of sabotage.96 While not expressly providing that the 
help, assistance or impeding be material, this might be reasonably inferred given the 
stipulation that the enemy be assisted and UK armed forces be impeded, especially if read 
as ejusdem generis with endangerment to life and given that no mention was made of wilful 
omissions.97 In R. v . Malik, a conviction under s. 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for 
 
93 Criminal Code Act 1995, s. 80.1AA 
94 ALRC, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, Report 104 (July 2006), para. 11.30 
95 The Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security endorsed this view – Review of 
Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (4 December 2006), Ch. 4.11 
96 Hansard HC Deb. vol. 361 col. 190, 22 May 1940 
97 D. Seaborne Davies, “The Treachery Act 1940” (1941) 4(3) MLR 217  
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glorification of terrorist activity was quashed because the trial judge failed to direct that 
material retrieved from the hard drive of the so-called ‘lyrical terrorist’ would only fall 
within that section if it was of a kind that was likely to provide practical assistance to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.98 By analogy, a practical utility test could 
be adopted. It should be appreciated that motivated individuals are invaluable weapons of 
war: "One man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorise thousands".99 A very 
well-organised minority can have a pernicious effect. 
New specific offences are not required to address the challenging manifestations of the crime 
of treason in the digital age (such as cyber-warfare and propagandising on the internet). The 
treasonable threshold will be met where there is relevant harm perpetrated (or attempted), in 
terms of breaching the ‘national security harm’ principle, where computer hacking or 
propagandising aids the military or intelligence operations of the enemy. 
Ascertaining what ‘material’ harm would be is, again, ultimately a question of fact for the 
jury to determine. Proof could be potentially problematic – particularly in the case of 
‘Espionage Treason’ – if establishing the relevant evidential matrix and the extent of harm 
inflicted might compromise an intelligence source (including signals intelligence) or cause 
reputational damage to the military or intelligence services. The fair trial risk posed by the 
prosecution’s possibly over-zealous reliance on national security considerations as a basis 
for non-disclosure of classified evidence bearing on issues of national security, is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say, the Court would be expected to regulate disclosure 
and certain remedies could be invoked to limit wider dissemination (including a closed court 
and reporting restrictions). 
 
(ii) Sub-national Institutions: 
It might be thought that only attacks perpetrated against national institutions are treasonable. 
The distinction between national and sub-national institutions might be regarded as 
analogous to the competence demarcation in the devolution settlement between reserved and 
devolved matters. It is inconceivable that defence and foreign policy would be devolved so 
long as Scotland remains part of the UK – or that the Scottish Government would control 
 
98 R. v. Malik [2008] EWCA Crim 1450 
99 Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 2nd ed. (2006), 12 – citing Chinese military philosopher Wu Ch’i. 
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core military or security infrastructure that would typically be the focus of treasonable attack. 
There might be a certain symmetry in treason law being referable to only those political 
institutions responsible for defence and foreign affairs – on the pretext of providing 
protection against external threats – thus precluding devolved institutions. It is axiomatic 
that only the British state can compel its citizens to take up arms and risk their lives, while 
the Scottish Government does not have that kind of authority or legitimacy.100 But given that 
the executive responsibility of the Scottish Government involves the partial discharge of the 
duty of protection ordinarily (and still principally) discharged by national government – with 
substantial discharge of powers which have been delegated or devolved to it by central 
government and thus critical to the operations of government within the UK – the allegiance 
owed by the protected person could be conceivably projected on these sub-national 
institutions as an aspect of their duty of allegiance to the Crown-in-Scotland. This accords 
with the notion of institutional allegiance – with loyalty owed to the constitutional system 
of the realm and concerned with threats to the democratic order. Nonetheless, you cannot 
levy war as such against the sub-national institutions. You can only levy war against the 
sovereign power, the sabotage of sub-national institutions being a local manifestation of that. 
To reiterate, if you sabotage Scotland’s sub-national institutions, you commit treason against 
the UK because Scotland is part of the UK. 
You need not particularly respect or admire these sub-national political institutions or be 
complacent about the protections enjoyed by them – and in circumstances in which there is 
a democratic relationship with both national and sub-national institutions. In any event it is 
the fact of collaborating with a foreign enemy to commit acts of sabotage against these 
political institutions – whether national or sub-national – which engages the duty of non-
betrayal. A modern Scottish Guy Fawkes could thus be implicated if he attempted to raze 
the Scottish Parliament to the ground while acting in concert with a foreign enemy. Localised 
harm can be as much a violation as that manifest at a national (UK) level. The point is that 
an attack on our sub-national institutions could materially harm our sense of national security 
in much the same way as an attack on our national institutions. Depending on the mechanism 
of attack, it could be even more traumatic.  
 
 
100 Marianna Valverde, Practices of Citizenship and Scales of Government (2010), 238 
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(iii) Sabotage of Critical National Infrastructure: 
I argue that relevant sabotage should extend to the sabotage of CNI – consistent with the 
operation of the ‘national security harm’ principle. CNI comprises assets vital to the 
functioning of society or the economy. The UK Government’s official definition of CNI 
is:101 "those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the 
country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK 
depends".102 In the Scottish context, the 2007 Glasgow Airport attack might be a 
paradigmatic example – aggravated by its perpetration on the busiest day of the year (the 
first day of the school summer holidays), showing that the attackers had aimed at committing 
murder on an indiscriminate and wholesale scale. Cyber-terrorism and the large-scale 
disruption of computer networks would be an obvious contemporary manifestation. Even if 
only a singular financial institution were targeted, there is a risk of cascading failure in the 
financial sector – given its interlinkages – such as to trigger a severe economic downturn – 
with consequences for the greater UK economy. It need not matter that a central government 
institution (such as the Bank of England) were not directly attacked. The consequences of 
undermining a UK clearing bank, with inevitable knock-on effects and the resultant shock 
to a dominant (financial) sector in the UK economy – to CNI – could still be sufficiently 
seismic in macro-economic terms as to amount to a contemporary form of levying war 
against the sovereign (in her realm). Admittedly, this would involve a wide re-definition and 
application of that concept – but it inevitably reflects London’s status as financial 
powerhouse. The disproportionate significance of the financial sector for the UK economy 
– and the Scottish economy – is such that this form of sabotage would be more keenly felt – 
in contrast to other economies where the emphasis might instead be on manufacturing or its 
agricultural sector. The attempted sabotage of a key Scottish financial institution – while not 
 
101 A ‘Criticality Scale’ categorises different degrees of severity of impact. See the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure’s website: 
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/#sthash.hc6FLSya.dpuf  
102 Arthur Thistlewood was unsuccessfully prosecuted for high treason in 1816, having organised a public 
meeting in pursuance of a plan to seize the Tower of London and the Bank of England (Alan Wharam, Treason: 
Famous English Treason Trials (2005), 166). As well as planning to assassinate the Cabinet, Thistlewood and 
those involved in the Cato Street Conspiracy of 1820 planned to attack and plunder the Bank of England (170). 
John Frost and his Chartist co-conspirators planned to spread political insurrection by stopping the Birmingham 
mail (R. v. Frost (1839); Wharam, Treason Trials, 194 and 209). 
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so significant a shock to the UK economy that it could not be effectively absorbed – would 
disproportionately damage the Scottish economy as to be regarded as a form of levying war 
against the sovereign in the Scottish territory of her realm. While the destabilisation of an 
identifiably (or even only notionally) Scottish financial institution might not be so significant 
as to be treasonable in a UK framework, it could be treasonable in the Scottish context – at 
least symbolically. This is perhaps a modern manifestation of how this form of treason might 
be committed – notwithstanding that there might be difficult issues of proof. 
 
(iv) Attacks on Sovereign: 
I now consider whether separate provision should otherwise be made in the law of treason 
for offences involving the sovereign. This new contractual model has implications for the 
core crime of compassing the (physical) death of the sovereign as a relevant head because it 
detracts from the notion of personal allegiance to the sovereign and of treason as an imperial 
or monarchical concept. Threats against the monarch no longer impact the security of the 
day-to-day operations of the state. This is scarcely a new development. The Treason Act 
1842 marked a departure from equating the monarch’s personal safety with the essential 
security of the state, rendering non-fatal attacks only high misdemeanours. As such, the 
safety of the Queen might be considered as not invoking a ‘national security harm’ principle, 
as to remain a relevant head. It might be thought that if no harm were perpetrated to national 
security (or were intended to be) the treasonable threshold would not be breached. But it 
might be considered inconceivable that there could still be a British and/or Scottish crime of 
treason which was not constituted by regicide, particularly with enemy complicity. Even if 
removal of this head were commended by the logic of the ‘national security harm’ principle, 
this might be considered too radical a departure.  
Further, any removal of that aspect of that actus reus which involves compassing or 
imagining (intending) the death or bodily harm of the sovereign (and dispensing with that 
prong of treason concerned with ‘disputing or hindering the (protestant) succession’) may 
be to diminish the role of the monarch as the Supreme Governor of the Church of England 
and Protector of the Faith – though it might be melodramatic speculation to suggest that this 
could lead to the disestablishment of the Church of England and the Church of Scotland as 
the state religion. This may not matter in the Scottish context for though the Church of 
Scotland may be the national or established church, it is not headed by the sovereign (nor 
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could it be, since a hierarchical structure is inconsistent with Presbyterian governance or 
sensibilities). This may be an unintended consequence, but this offence has fallen into 
desuetude in any event – and I argue for a modelling where treason offences can survive if 
the breach of the duty of non-disloyalty and the ‘national security harm’ principle are 
engaged. 
The object of the subject’s duty of allegiance is characterised not in terms of the personal, 
but the institutional or abstract entity or short-hand for the British state which is the Crown. 
This is the inescapable logic of institutional allegiance to a symbolic sovereign in a 
constitutional monarchy. Political assassination is one of the oldest tools of statecraft, a 
favoured tactic of weaker states seeking leverage against stronger powers.103 Given that the 
person of the monarch represents the British state, I argue that the act of regicide with the 
assistance of a foreign enemy should remain a treasonable offence – because, by its nature, 
this would be a destabilising act striking at the foundations of the British state and 
endangering national security, even if only temporarily and symbolically. This is still 
consistent with the new model and the ‘national security harm’ principle insofar as an 
enemy-sponsored attack on the person of the monarch is perceptibly an act that involves 
symbolically perpetrating harm to national security and the British people – and thus is an 
attack on the British state. This would be a shocking crime, a symbolic act warranting an 
equally symbolic response. Escalating the criminal law response to proffering treason 
charges recognises that this is, characteristically, an act of war. 
 
IV. Reconstructing Treason – Effect of Negative Duty of Allegiance, Contractual 
Model, and Enemy Assistance Requirement:  
I argue that insofar as the negative duty of allegiance (duty of non-betrayal) will be breached 
by allegiance to the sovereign’s foreign enemies, enemy involvement will be pivotal. It is 
necessary to consider whether the various forms of conduct specified in the existing law of 
treason would still be consistent with that modelling. The surviving offences will necessarily 
involve giving aid and comfort – or, more contemporarily, ‘assistance’ – to the enemy. 
 
103 Sun Tzu, Art of War (Lionel Giles, trans. 1910), Ch. XIII, 20; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532, N.H. 
Thomson, trans. 2005), Ch. XIX  
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The duty of non-betrayal will be breached when British Citizens help enemy states attack 
the UK, even if those attacks fall short of international armed conflict – and when British 
Citizens help enemy organisations aiming to carry out attacks on the UK – specifically, on 
its military, its (national and sub-national) political institutions and CNI. In each scenario 
the British Citizen betrays his compatriots by helping the sovereign’s enemies attack them 
and the country they share. The core of the offence is betraying one’s fellow citizens by 
helping an enemy state or organisation prepare for or carry out attacks on the UK – or helping 
an enemy state or organisation which the UK is fighting. Acting to help such an enemy state 
or organisation (materially) breaches the duty of loyalty (or non-betrayal).104  
 
(i) Surviving Core Offences: 
The logical conclusion of the preceding discussion is that the following three central 
elements of the actus reus of the crime of treason (or core offences) survive the adoption of 
this new contractual model, negative duty of allegiance and enemy assistance requirement, 
and are retained as relevant treasonable conduct:  
(1) Adhering to the sovereign’s enemies (within or outwith the realm) 
(2) Compassing (Planning) the death of the sovereign (with the assistance of the 
sovereign’s enemis 
(3) Levying war against the sovereign in the realm (‘Internal rebellion’) (with the 
assistance of the sovereign’s enemies) 
 
I argue that enemy involvement will be pivotal to all remaining heads of treason. The latter 
two surviving heads of treason should be recast as sub-categories of adhering to the 
sovereign’s enemies. They are only treasonable in circumstances involving adherence to a 
foreign enemy and the perpetration of harm (or the risk of harm) against national security, 
the practical consequence of which is to give assistance to the foreign enemy. To constitute 
treason such internal subversion must derive from a foreign power and entail identification 
with a foreign enemy. These central elements should only be regarded as treasonable if the 
‘national security harm’ principle were satisfied. But this does not mean that the ‘national 
 
104 Richard Ekins et al., Aiding the Enemy, How and why to restore the law of treason Policy Exchange (2018), 
35 
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security harm’ principle is an alternative means of satisfying the actus reus – because you 
might well perpetrate harm to national security without enemy adherence. 
 
(ii) Duties with Surviving Core Offences: 
On my account, the focus is on the commission of acts giving assistance to the sovereign’s 
enemies – implicit in which is breaching the duty of non-betrayal. The legal duty of 
allegiance not to be disloyal to the sovereign power (by betraying it to an enemy state or 
organisation) would be breached by the commission, with enemy assistance, of acts 
endangering (or materially harming) national security.  
 
V. Look of New Treason: 
(i) Actus Reus: 
The Treachery Act and the recently-revised Australian version of treason, as well as the New 
Zealand and Canadian Criminal Codes serve as useful templates for a new Scottish treason 
law.105 The Treachery Act is instructive for the purposes of defining a relatively modern 
actus reus, the Commons having been told, on the bill’s second reading, that acts containing 
its element of treachery, archetypically espionage and sabotage, were treason and nothing in 
s. 1 was not already an offence under the Treason Acts (allegiance aside).106 It was intended 
to provide a clear description of the offence. 
I suggest that the Scottish rather than the English (or English-derived) concepts of murder 
and assault be applied. This, after all, is to be a Scottish crime of treason. 
I propose that the actus reus of the core offences be recast in the following general terms:  
(1) Adhering to and materially assisting an enemy at war with the sovereign, whether 
or not the existence of a state of war has been declared 
(2) A narrower and simpler category of compassing the physical death of the 
sovereign will be posited – viz., murdering the sovereign, or attempting to murder 
the sovereign, or otherwise assaulting, imprisoning or restraining the sovereign 
 
105 Ibid., 6, 11, s. VII 
106 Hansard HC Deb. vol. 361 cols. 185-186, 22 May 1940 
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– and thus materially assist an enemy at war with the sovereign, whether or not 
the existence of a state of war has been declared 
(3) Levying war, or doing any act preparatory to levying war, against the sovereign 
– and thus materially assist an enemy at war with the sovereign, whether or not 
the existence of a state of war has been declared 
 
Adherence to the enemy can be conceived as the obverse or flipside of allegiance – manifest 
by failing to discharge the duty of allegiance. This finds expression in the giving of 
assistance to the enemy – the concept of ‘aid and comfort’ couched in more contemporary 
and comprehensible terms. 
It might be thought that armed resistance on political grounds to the public order of the realm, 
should continue as a stand-alone head of treason, without any qualification of enemy agency 
– and that revolution in a mature liberal democracy should be regarded as sufficiently serious 
as to be chargeable as treason, even in circumstances where no foreign intervention or 
jeopardising national security (from external threats) are involved. Recent events in 
Catalonia suggest that a coup d'état involving Scottish UDI is no longer an absurd 
hypothetical. Nonetheless, I propose that entirely domestic rebellion absent enemy 
adherence should be excluded – to allay concerns about abuse by political prosecutions. This 
is particularly so in cases of competing allegiance – archetypically Irish and now, for some, 
Scottish identity. Domestic insurrection (for which other remedies are available107) does not 
necessarily involve the specifically moral wrong of betrayal by aiding the UK’s enemies – 
which is precisely what a revived treason law is intended to tackle. The contemporary 
existential threat is IE terrorism perpetrated by British Jihadists adhering to enemy states and 
organisations, not perceived mischief-making by devolved politicians.  
  
 
 
 
107 Effective (civil) remedies short of counterproductive criminal sanctions, include surcharging, sequestrating 
and debarring usurpative devolved politicians from holding public office – see Ian MacKinnon, “The 
Westminster Scandal: Labour rebels paid high price: The Surcharge” Independent (14 January 1994): 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/the-westminster-scandal-labour-rebels-paid-high-price-the-
surcharges-1406773.html  
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(ii) ‘Adherence Treason’: 
‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ is the clearest candidate for survival. It encapsulates 
the core idea of betrayal of this country to its foreign enemies (more specifically, the Queen’s 
enemies) – by breaching the duty of allegiance, including the negative duty (or duty of non-
betrayal) – and by acting with a foreign enemy. The existence of an external enemy is pivotal 
insofar as only the concept of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ survives, with the other 
heads of treason being derivatives or sub-categories of it. All might be conceived as 
‘Adherence Treason’. 
 
(iii) Defining the Enemy: 
I propose that the revised offence would apply when the UK is engaged in international 
armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. The ‘enemy’ would continue to be 
defined to include any state which is only potentially an enemy, in the sense that the UK 
might at to some future date be at war with it.108 I commend Loane’s conclusion that "aiding 
the enemy could well be committed in an escalated ‘cold war’ situation"109 – as to preclude 
the possibility of an ‘enemy’ being a nation with whom foreign relations are only 
complicated at a moment in time. An enemy power should be distinguished from an 
unfriendly power. The two concepts are not synonymous. Of course, it might be politically 
inexpedient for the Crown to formally concede in open court that a de facto enemy state – 
or enemy non-state organisation, by dint of its connection to an unfriendly power – are de 
jure enemies. 
The modern enemy in armed conflict extends to the waging of war against nation-states by 
non-state organisations. As a matter of principle, if the UK deploys its military overseas to 
fight an enemy force, it owes it to its military personnel to prohibit other British Citizens 
from doing anything to assist that enemy.110 I suggest any new offence should expressly 
cover non-state enemy actors. This is consistent with the approach under Canadian treason 
law where the enemy is broadly defined as: "any armed force against whom the sovereign is 
 
108 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.43; R. v. Parrott (1913) 8 Cr App R 186, Phillimore J., 192 
109 Jabez W. Loane, “Treason and Aiding the Enemy” (1965) 30 MilLR 41, 62 
110 This logic was applied by the Australian Gibbs Committee (1991) in recommending the extension of 
Australian treason law – see the Australian PCJIS Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation 
(2006), Ch. 4.15. 
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engaged in hostilities, even if no state of war exists." 111 It need not matter if ISIS or any 
legacy regime were not a fully formed state and had no formal international recognition, if 
it were thus deemed to be an enemy of the UK. 
 
(iv) Proclamation: 
The Home Office List of Proscribed International Terrorist Groups, as proscribed by the 
Home Secretary under the Terrorism Act 2000, is an obvious ‘peacetime’ starting point for 
defining an enemy organisation.112 The authors of the Policy Exchange Paper go further and 
suggest proclamation – for the Secretary of State to simply proclaim that an organisation is 
engaged in attacking the UK113 – adopting the procedure countenanced under the Australian 
Code. The Australian Governor-General can, by Proclamation, declare a ‘party’ to be an 
enemy engaged in armed conflict involving the Commonwealth or the Australian Defence 
Force.114 This might be expected to be a higher tier of group than proscribed organisations 
under the Terrorism Act. Designation of enemies by this procedure (or statutory instrument) 
puts everyone legally on notice – consistent with requirements of legal certainty. Just as 
acting for the benefit of a proscribed group is deemed to be an act of terrorism, materially 
assisting a proclaimed group would be an act of treason. If the protected person aided a 
proclaimed group, then there would be a rebuttable presumption that they knew it was hostile 
to the UK.115 That the enemy organisation involved were certified to be a proclaimed enemy 
(or even proscribed group) might ordinarily be expected to suffice – but in a marginal case, 
the act of proclamation could be impugned and corroborative parole evidence from senior 
officials might be appropriate. Proclamation (or proscription) need not be a prerequisite in 
 
111 Criminal Code, s. 46(1)(c) 
112 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 3 and sch. 2 – the current list is available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/849493/20
191101_Proscription__SG_.pdf 
113 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 37 
114 The National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 amended 
the Criminal Code, creating a new offence of materially assisting a party to engage in armed conflict involving 
the Commonwealth or the ADF, provided that the enemy is declared by Proclamation to be an enemy engaged 
in armed conflict involving the Commonwealth or the ADF. It dispensed with the requirement that a country 
or organisation be engaged in armed hostilities against the Commonwealth, it being treason to assist a party 
that is engaged in armed conflict involving Australia. 
115 Hall, “Changing Treason” 
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fast-moving dynamic situations. Where a new enemy organisation has not been specifically 
proclaimed (or proscribed) – such that people are not technically on notice – the ‘national 
security harm’ principle might be invoked in that legislative vacuum.  
The IRTL was concerned about the complications involved in the Policy Exchange’s 
proposed proclamation of enemy groups. Insofar as the Law of Armed Conflict and 
International Humanitarian Law are based principally around conflict between states, there 
is a natural reluctance to accord members of armed groups the same status as soldiers or 
combatants of a foreign state – particularly if required to treat them as Prisoners of War, 
rather than criminals. A policy of proclamation risks conferring a special status or cachet. 
He cited Baroness Williams’ admonition in a Lords’ debate:116 
"prosecuting terrorists for treason would risk giving their actions a credibility … to 
seeing them as martyrs … glamour and political status that they do not deserve. It 
would indicate that we recognised terrorists as being in some formal sense at war with 
the state, rather than merely regarding them as dangerous criminals." 
 
It might be preferable to avoid ‘state trials’ for treason by pitting the Government against an 
‘official’ rebellion. The enemy organisation might savour the opportunity to say that true 
allegiance is owed to them, not the UK. It is an already an offence to be a member of 
proscribed terrorist groups such as ISIS117 and there is a risk of dignifying them (or 
legitimising them as states, when they are not so recognised) – raising their morally-culpable 
adherents from criminals to heroes for their cause if you give them the political recognition 
and status they crave. By not treating them like any other criminal organisation and instead 
resorting to proclamation and the consequential imprimatur libel of treason, you confer ‘a 
badge of honour’ on those craving their misdeeds be treated as ideological rather than 
criminal. It would seal their secular martyrdom status – a recruiting tool for new followers. 
It would allow a volatile, but generally containable domestic problem, to exponentially grow. 
Standing the attraction of high-profile martyrdom, it is doubtful if proclamation would 
genuinely achieve any kind of deterrent effect. The IRTL considered these objections were 
insufficiently answered to justify a new treason offence.118 
 
116 Hansard HL Deb. vol. 793 col. 1382, 31 October 2018 
117 Terrorism Act 2000, s. 11 and sch. 2: 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2  
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I suspect, however, that rather than glorifying their actions, the likelihood is that members 
of proclaimed groups being prosecuted for treason would deny or minimalise their 
involvement at trial. Unremarkably, this is what people charged with serious criminal 
offences tend to do. Paradigmatically, though Adebolajo and Adebowale had told passers-
by that they had killed Lee Rigby to avenge the killing of Muslims by British Armed Forces, 
they still pleaded not guilty and attempted to minimise their involvement at their 2013 
trial.119 The psychology of solemn criminal trial proceedings is that most accused accede to 
legal advice to be circumspect and not say things that needlessly alienate those sitting in 
judgment of them.  
The IRTL cautioned that there is no duty on the Government to de-proscribe a group no 
longer involved if it has long ceased to be concerned in terrorism – and that while an 
application process exists, de-proscription is an imperfect mechanism.120 Proclamation 
would be similarly fraught – and there should be a duty on the UK Government to conduct 
regular review. Then again, if a dormant organisation were again to be involved in attacking 
the UK, QED. Consistent with the principle that Scotland cannot have its own enemies, the 
power of proclamation could not be transferred to the Scottish Ministers, remaining a 
reserved matter. 
 
(v) Material Assistance: 
Giving aid and comfort to the sovereign’s enemies will involve undermining our national 
security and thus perpetrating harm to national security and/or the British people.  
I propose that the offence be more simply defined in terms of helping or assisting the enemy. 
The actor need not require in fact to help a hostile state or organisation – or be directly co-
ordinated by them – but merely act with the intention of materially helping a hostile state or 
organisation to the detriment of the UK. Criminal liability for treason does not (and should 
not) turn on whether efforts to help the enemy are ultimately effective – or distant and 
speculative.121 Steps would require to be taken in furtherance of an actual treasonable 
conspiracy – as opposed to conduct simply confirming a deep emotional identification with 
 
119 R. v. Adebolajo and Anor [2014] EWCA Crim 2779 
120 Hall, “Changing Treason” 
121 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, S. VII 
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the country’s enemies. Helping to prepare an attack would involve being an active or 
contributory member of a group, as an accomplice of an enemy state or organisation, plotting 
to undermine or harm the integrity of national security. The compromising of national 
security can arise in myriad ways – pledging allegiance, intelligence-gathering, financial 
support, propagandising, cyber-attacks, recruitment and killing or maiming British Citizens. 
This might characteristically involve membership of a clandestine cell system – in contrast 
to lone wolf terrorism. Such a wide and extendable definition of treason could be 
problematic. The severity of sentence might reflect how advanced preparations have been 
for a specific attack – a factor in assessing culpability. 
 
VI. Redefining for Scottish Context: 
I now consider how these reformulated, surviving core offences might be more specifically 
formulated for the Scottish context. 
 
(i) Enemy Attacks on Scotland: 
This head of treason will involve the (attempted) perpetration of harm to UK and Scottish 
political institutions; UK military; UK and Scottish CNI physically located within Scotland; 
and attacks on civilians within Scotland. 
 
(ii) Relevant Harm to Scotland: 
The Scottish political institutions now seem entrenched. Their abolition is presently 
politically inconceivable – and might be regarded as the negation of Scotland’s democratic 
will. I argue that the foreign-sponsored sabotage or destruction of the physical manifestations 
of these political institutions – specifically, the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government 
buildings – would amount to treasonable conduct. 
 
(iii) Levying War Against Scottish Political Institutions: 
The Scottish political institutions are entities which are sufficiently national in scope – the 
local manifestation of UK sovereign authority, discharging the Crown’s duty of protection. 
They represent public authority in Scotland. In many significant respects they are the leading 
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public authority in Scotland. They can be regarded as an integral part of the existing 
constitutional order (or greater British political community) as to warrant special recognition 
and protection in terms of the operation of any treason law. The appropriateness of protecting 
Scottish political institutions commends a new Scottish object in the crime of treason – that 
it be treasonable conduct to use political violence for the purpose of attempting to overthrow 
Scotland’s political institutions.  
The Canadian federal example is instructive – insofar as treason involving using force or 
violence to overthrow the government extends to the use of force or violence for the purpose 
of overthrowing the constitutional government of Canada or any provincial government (or 
legislative body).122 Equally apposite to the evolving Anglo-Scottish dynamic is the 
Australian federal and state experience. Australian citizens owe allegiance to their sovereign 
at the federal and state level. While at federal level it is treasonable conduct to levy war or 
do any act preparatory to levying war against the Commonwealth of Australia,123 s. 12 of 
the Crimes Act 1900 (New South Wales) extends the offence of levying war (derived from 
s. 3 of the Treason Felony Act 1848) to putting any force or constraint upon the Parliament 
of the State of New South Wales. Levying war covers the constraining of the Parliament of 
the State of South Australia.124 Absent laws against treason in Western Australia, Northern 
Territory and Queensland, separate provincial provision seems to be optional for Australian 
states.125 Most American states have treason provisions in their own constitutions or have 
statutes mirroring the US Constitution.  
The (constructive) levying of war against the sovereign in her realm (under the extant law) 
– to the extent it involves "usurping the public authority of the land" and attacking the 
existing constitutional order or the political community – could be construed as covering the 
 
122 Criminal Code, s. 46(2)(a) – the Canadian Law Reform Commission proposed a legislative scheme in which 
the aspect of treason involving using force or violence to overthrow the government would extend to the use 
of force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional government of Canada or a province – 
or to extort or prevent a decision or measure of a federal or provincial legislative, executive or judicial organ 
of State (LRCC WP 49, Ch. 6). 
123 Criminal Code Act, s. 80.1 
124 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 7. In 1977, a law reform committee in South Australia 
considered that a state law of treason was unnecessary – since it was adequately covered at Commonwealth 
level. 
125 The equivalent legislation for the State of Victoria only speaks of levying war against the Commonwealth 
of Australia – Crimes Act 1958, s. 9A. 
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use of political violence for the purpose of overthrowing constitutional government in 
Scotland – including the (devolved) Scottish Government or putting any force or constraint 
upon the Scottish Parliament – on the reasoning that the devolved Parliament (and 
Government) might no longer be characterised as merely local political institutions, but 
institutions which are sufficiently national in scope. 
It might be construed as providing for the protection of the other devolved Governments – 
but since these are political institutions which do not have the same degree of executive and 
legislative competence, this might be a more marginal argument. Because these Scottish 
political institutions are not firmly enshrined – and could conceivably be dissolved by Act 
of the UK Parliament – then even violent political agitation for their removal would hardly 
have a treasonable aspect. Non-violent political agitation can hardly have a criminal aspect 
in a free society which respects our ancient liberties and Convention values. 
Given that the political assassination of the Prime Minister and most Ministers of the Crown 
(the protection afforded the downgraded Lord Chancellor being an historical anomaly) 
would not be prosecutable under the current head of compassing the death of the sovereign, 
it would be anomalous if the First Minister for Scotland or their cabinet were afforded special 
protection. Nonetheless, such acts could be prosecutable, on an appropriate factual matrix, 
as an aspect of levying war against the sovereign in her realm.  
 
VII. Conclusion: 
This chapter has been about establishing how allegiance might be betrayed under this new 
modelling. I propose a narrowing-down exercise, by which the crime of treason is stripped 
down to its essential elements – specifically, breaching the duty of non-betrayal, by assisting 
the enemy, and doing so in material ways. I suggest that the following three heads of the 
actus reus of the crime survive with appropriate qualification – ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s 
Enemies’; Compassing the death of the sovereign (with the assistance of the sovereign’s 
enemies); and ‘Levying War Treason’ (again, with the assistance of the sovereign’s 
enemies). The latter two heads will be recast as sub-categories of ‘Adhering to the 
Sovereign’s Enemies’ – insofar as they can only be committed in circumstances involving 
adherence to a foreign enemy. All treasons will thus amount to what I describe in shorthand 
as ‘Adherence Treason’ or be derivatives of it. There will be no place for purely domestic 
insurrection (or ‘Seditious Treason’). The focus on this form of treason is in recognition that 
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it is expected to occupy a significant share of the energy and resources of our security 
services in forthcoming years.126 Meanwhile, I propose – without controversy – to otherwise 
prune the remainder of the ‘motley lot’ of offences (as the Law Commission described them 
in 2008).127  
The negative duty of allegiance will be scarcely consistent with the continuing existence of 
the allied offence of misprision of treason (concealment) or the commission of treason by 
omission. Consistent with general narrowing-down – and the incongruity of accession after 
the fact in the Scottish context – I submit that misprision of treason (and compounding 
treason: the corruption in deciding not to prosecute treason) should not be retained as part of 
any new Scottish offence. 
I propose a ‘national security harm’ principle as the guiding principle or model around which 
the reconstituted heads of treason are reconstructed. Analogous to the concept of self-
defence in international law, invoking treason law might be regarded as a proportionate 
measure taken in exercise of the nation’s right to self-defence. This principle will underlie 
each new provision. For any treasonable narrative to be relevant and internally consistent it 
should be consistent with this principle. 
A working framework for a Scottish offence emerges. Relevant harm will involve 
(attempted) harm to the sovereign, Scottish political institutions, UK military installations 
and personnel in Scotland, and Scottish CNI. The crime of treason would be extended to 
include attacks on the British people in Scotland – definable by reference to anti-terrorist 
legislation. The ‘materiality’ qualification and the insistence that (attempted) damage to 
property involves CNI, alleviates the risk of over-breadth. For the narrative of any charge 
under the new Scottish treason law to be relevant, the alleged acts must be consistent with 
these principles.  
The relevant offence elements of treason would now be that the accused:  
(1) had a duty of allegiance 
(2) breached that duty of allegiance 
 
126 Dominic Kennedy “Security orders for ex-jihadists are ‘so expensive that many roam free” Times (21 
February 2019): 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/security-orders-for-ex-jihadists-are-so-expensive-that-many-roam-free-
vpq6mw9rr 
127 Law Commission, Tenth Programme of Law Reform (Law Com No 311, 2008), para. 2.27 
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(3) did so in a material way, by the commission of relevant treasonable conduct 
 
In Chapter 4 I will address what might be the mens rea appropriate to the specific forms of 
conduct which should comprise these surviving three core offences in their recalibrated, 
Scottish form. I will consider in Chapter 5 the extent to which this ‘national security harm’ 
principle might test a ‘Public Interest Defence’ – as an overriding consideration in the 
conduct of any balancing exercise on the possible justification for espionage disclosures. 
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I. Introduction: 
I now consider treason’s mens rea – intention, according to Hurst, being very much "at the 
heart" of treason.1  
In Chapter 2 I set out the broad idea of ‘Adherence Treason’ – of enemy involvement being 
pivotal to all remaining heads of treason – and that the heads of treason involving 
‘Compassing and Imagining the Sovereign’s Death’ and ‘Levying War Treason’ be recast 
as sub-categories of ‘Adherence Treason’. Then in Chapter 3 I argued that if adopted, this 
would require that we reframe the actus reus in terms of a ‘national security harm’ principle 
and coordination with a foreign enemy. The principal question to be asked in this chapter is 
what mens rea requirement would be appropriate to the contractual duty-based allegiance 
model that I have developed in previous chapters.  
I have already discussed the wrongfulness of treason in Chapter 2 and have argued, as a 
generality, that its wrongfulness can be encapsulated in the fundamental idea that betraying 
your country to a foreign enemy is morally blameworthy. This chapter will not be about 
considering the wrongfulness of treason in that respect but will be about otherwise 
identifying that discrete wrongfulness – in the sense of the mental state – which would make 
for a relevant mens rea. I will thus be primarily engaging with the issue of legal guilt, while 
conscious that it tracks to some extent the subtly different concept of moral guilt.  
In the first (post-introduction) section I will historically survey and attempt to outline the 
contours of what are believed to be the existing mentes reae of the posited surviving three 
core offences identified in Chapter 3. Predictably, there are definitional difficulties with 
‘current’ treason’s mens rea – though I will detail how its mens rea is at least ascertainable. 
In the second section I will engage with the criticisms that might be made of it: again, the 
lack of clarity and absence of precise definition; the issue of whether recklessness is or 
should be part of the existing mens rea; and the confusion arising in circumstances of mixed 
motives. Then I will confirm in the third section which parts of it might be retained – arguing 
that treasonous intent can be generally understood as requiring the intent to betray the UK. 
In the fourth section I will determine what might be the appropriate emergent mens rea for 
these surviving treasons and also the proposed new treason offence of attacking the British 
people, under a contractual based duty model. I will explain how a new Scottish offence 
 
1 James Willard Hurst, The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays (1971), 15; Hurst, “Treason 
in the United States” (1945) 58 HarvLR 226, 395 
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might afford helpful clarification, providing in the fifth section for a precise reconstruction 
of the mens rea of treason – commending the subtle refinement of the concept of treasonous 
intention, from the intent to betray the UK, to the intent to betray the UK by aiding its 
enemies, or the intent to betray the UK to its enemies. The narrow duty not to aid our 
country’s enemies in their attacks should be made clear. I will also consider the options for 
specifically Scottish refinement of the mens rea for what will be a Scottish crime of treason.  
  
II. Mens Rea of Surviving Heads of ‘Current’ Treason: 
I first address the way in which mens rea as a concept, has evolved substantially in treason 
law – proposing to trace historical interpretations of its intent and attempting to define what 
the requirement for mens rea has meant at different times.  
Problematically, neither the Treason Act 1351 (still the chief basis for our treason law) nor 
subsequent legislation contain familiar common law mens rea terminology to explicitly 
confirm the nature of its mens rea element – classically, words such as ‘intentionally’, 
‘knowingly’ or ‘wilfully’, or language referable to the concept of ‘specific intent’, such as 
‘with intent to …’.2 But there was no doubt it was always a crime that had to be committed 
intentionally – in the sense of not being done by accident3 – even if specific mens rea 
concepts were not specified in its definition. It is not that the medieval Parliament purposely 
left out a mental element as now understood. Nor was this somehow their subjective 
intention. It was just this concept had not yet been developed. Provision was made in the 
1351 statute for the esoteric mental concepts of ‘compassing’ and ‘imagining’ under that 
head of treason of compassing and imagining the king’s death. Debate had been about the 
meaning of intention both generally and specifically in relation to these concepts. It is 
important to consider how treason’s mens rea can be considered as part of the broader history 
of mens rea in the criminal law, as it was not until the early seventeenth century that judges 
started defining crimes in terms of what is now conventional common law mens rea.4 
 
2 J. Richard Broughton, “The Snowden Affair and the Limits of American Treason” (2015) 3 LMULawReview 
5, 15 
3 Graham S. McBain “High Treason: Killing the Sovereign or Her Judges” (2009) 20(3) KLJ 457, nn. 4 and 
47 
4 Broughton, “Snowden”, 15 – referencing Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 5th ed. (2010), 253, where it is 
noted since about 1600 judges defined crimes as comprising some ‘bad’ or guilty state of mind, thus 
establishing conventional common law mens rea. 
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Nonetheless, it is virtually impossible to seriously conceive treason as a strict liability 
offence – it never having been understood as such in Anglo-American treason law.5 Hume 
speaks of "treasonable purpose" or imagination against the life of the King in compassing 
and imagining the king’s death.6 Early American treason case law refers to ‘treasonous 
intention’ or even ‘treasonable purpose’.7 The ‘modern’ view of the general mens rea 
necessary for treason finds expression – under reference to the formulation of the charge in 
the indictment in Joyce v. DPP – in the concept of "traitorous contrivance (conspiracy) and 
intention".8 But there is limited elucidation of the precise culpable mental state which the 
prosecution requires to prove to establish treason.  
 
(i) Proof of Intention by Overt Act: 
Invariably, criminal responsibility depends on the performance of overt acts. The point about 
treason is it must be demonstrated by some overt or open act – this being a term more 
particularly deployed in treason law. The 1351 Act provided that for the purposes of 
‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’, the accused must "thereof be provably attainted of 
open deed" – the Courts applying this requirement to all forms of treason (save misprision 
of treason). The significance of the overt act is it allows the inference of treasonable intent. 
An overt act is "any act manifesting the criminal intention, and tending towards the 
accomplishment of the criminal object".9 Properly, treasonous thoughts are not (should not 
be) enough to lead to a conviction. Alison confirmed that "hidden design, to come within the 
treason law, must be manifested by overt acts, which must be made out by proper 
evidence".10 The purpose of the overt act element is to ensure "that mere mental attitudes or 
expressions should not be treason".11  
 
5 Broughton, “Snowden”, 25 
6 Hume, Commentaries, I, 514 
7 Broughton, “Snowden”, 15 – citing United States v. Hoxie, 26 F Cas 397, 399 (CCD Vt 1808) (No. 15, 407); 
United States v. Pryor, 27 F Cas 628, 630 (CCD Pa 1814) (No. 16,096) 
8 [1946] AC 347 
9 R. v. Thistlewood (1820) 33 St Tr 681, 684 – quoted in Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 18th ed. (J. Cecil 
Turner, ed., 2013), para. 403; and Gordon, Criminal Law, 4th ed. Vol. II (2016), para. 43.05 
10 Alison, I, 597 
11 Cramer v. United States, 325 US 1 (1945), 28 
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Foster confirmed the importance of the overt act in evidencing treasonable intent:12 
"Overt acts undoubtedly do discover the man’s intentions; but, I conceive, they are not 
to be considered merely as evidence, but as the means made use of to effectuate the 
purposes of the heart. […] and though, in the case of the King, overt acts of less 
malignity, and having a more remote tendency to his destruction, are, with great 
propriety, deemed treasonable; yet still they are considered as means to affectuate, not 
barely as evidence of the treasonable purpose."  
 
While Foster says treason is constituted by the overt act, Abbott CJ in R. v. Thistlewood 
reasoned that treason is constituted by the intention, evidenced by the overt act – an 
important difference in emphasis:13 
"The crime is made to consist in the compassing, imagination, or intention (which are 
all words of the same import) to perpetrate the acts, and not in the actual perpetration 
of them. But it is further required, by the ancient Statute, that the party accused of high 
Treason shall be thereof proveably attainted of open deed. […] The law has thus wisely 
provided […] that […] the intention shall constitute the crime; but the law has at the 
same time with equal wisdom provided (because the safety of individuals requires it), 
that the intention shall be manifested by some act tending towards the accomplishment 
of the criminal object." 
 
The prosecution must demonstrate that the accused moved from the realm of thought, plan, 
or opinions into the world of action. The overt act is thus vital to proving intent. Lord 
Reading’s charge to the jury in R. v. Casement14 accords with this understanding: "Overt acts 
are such acts as manifest a criminal intention and tend towards the accomplishment of the 
criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is manifested and the means by which 
it is intended to be fulfilled."15 The acts might ordinarily be perfectly innocuous and lawful, 
but in certain circumstances allow for the inference or legal conclusion that a sinister, hostile 
(treasonable) intent exists. These may well be otherwise unlawful acts, but still devoid of 
treasonable intent. It can thus be seen that the importance of the overt (external) act 
requirement is to provide protection against persecution for thought or belief, or peaceful 
political activity.16 
 
12 Michael Foster, Crown Law, 3rd ed., (1792), 203 
13 Thistlewood, 684 
14 R. v. Casement [1917] 1 KB 98  
15 Though not cited in the case report this passage was reproduced in Cramer, 6-7. 
16 James Willard Hurst, “English Sources of the American Law of Treason” (1945) WisLRev 315, 355 
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The disloyalty is not merely a matter of the heart. It needs to be incorporated in action 
threatening the security of the state – treason in conduct as well as treason in the heart. 
Disloyalty of attitude must ultimately become disloyalty in action – hence the overt act 
requirement. Disloyal intentions and feelings do not make a relevant case of treason.17 
Wrongful harm is necessarily more than feeling or expressing disloyalty.  
Overt act and intent are separate and distinct elements of the crime and may involve different 
modes of proof.18 This notion of the overt act as the manifestation and means to 
demonstrably effect (and prove) treasonable intent should be distinguished from Fletcher’s 
use of the narrower, more specific concept of ‘manifest intent (or criminality)’ – whereby an 
act may be so obviously criminal that its intent can be assumed on the face of it, with any 
objective observer clearly recognising it so, irrespective of any knowledge of the actor’s 
mental state.19 It is to be contrasted with acts of ‘subjective intent (or criminality)’ – where 
acts are merely analysed as evidence of intent, consciously intended and experienced by the 
perpetrator in a highly individualised way. The overt act does not necessarily manifest intent 
and need not be openly manifest treason. It can be a composite thing, made up of several 
circumstances, passing through various stages. 
 
(ii) Specific Mens Rea: 
I now consider how mens rea has evolved in respect of each of the ‘surviving’ heads of 
treason. There does not seem to be a uniform standard of mens rea across the various heads 
of treason – albeit it is thought, unremarkably, most of the offending conduct would have to 
be committed intentionally.20  
 
(a) Compassing or Imagining the Death of the Sovereign: 
The essence of this form of treason is in the intention – the treason not being in the killing 
of the sovereign, but in compassing or imagining (endeavouring or plotting) their death.21 
The relevance of matters being at only the attempt or conspiracy stage is an historical 
 
17 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193, 197 and 201 
18 Haupt v. United States, 330 US 631 (1947), 645, Justice Douglas, concurring Opinion (after having dissented 
in Cramer) 
19 George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), 115-116 
20 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 49, Crimes Against the State (1986), 28 
21 Alastair Brown, “Offences against the State” (2005), para. 535 (in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia) 
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consequence of the absence of any developed general law of attempt (or conspiracy) at the 
time of the early law of treason. To kill the King was regarded as a matter of such gravity 
that even the intent or attempt to do so was itself treason. While general principles of 
inchoate liability would subsequently emerge – applying to nearly all offences – the 1351 
Act had already specifically acknowledged this inchoate form of the offence such that there 
was little purpose in discarding it. Nor would there be any compelling reason for a mere 
attempt to be treated any less seriously – given the ultimate penalty which until recently, 
would follow. The regicides of Charles I were indicted not on charges of murdering the King 
(as this would create difficulties for convicting those who had not sat as judges) but 
compassing the King’s death – meaning no more than doing or saying something to conduce 
to it.22 His actual killing (judicial execution) was one of the overt acts evidencing the 
compassing.23 But in the Popish Plot trials of 1678-1680 and Russell’s Case the only alleged 
crime was talk, perhaps idle chat. Lord William Russell had unsuccessfully argued that the 
conversations for which he was prosecuted amounted at their highest to only misprision, not 
treason – and that the prosecution were relying on notions of ‘constructive treason’ to 
overcome the requirement of the substantive law that there be two eyewitnesses to an overt 
act of treason.24  
The notorious legal doctrine of ‘constructive treason’ was developed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – allowing treason to be imputed to a person by a course of conduct 
even if none of their individual actions amounted to treason. A dubious constructive 
(creative) interpretation was applied to the 1351 Act to extrapolate the meaning of the 
original words, dictated more by political demands than recognised principles of judicial 
interpretation.25 Facilitated by the vague language of ‘compassing or imagining’, judicial 
activism extended the statutory definition of treason – broadening its ambit by ‘constructing’ 
new treasons. ‘Constructive treason’ has been described as "anything whatever which, under 
any circumstances, may possibly have a tendency, however remote, to expose the King to 
personal danger or to forcible deprivation of part of the authority incidental to his office."26 
 
22 R. v. Twenty-nine Regicides (1660) 5 St Tr 947; Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief (2005), 291, Ch. 
17 n. 6; McBain “Killing Judges”, 466; Hume, I, 514 n. 1 
23 Ibid.; Alan Wharam, “Treason in Rhodesia” (1967) 25(2) CLJ 189, 195 
24 Lois G. Schwoerer, “William, Lord Russell: The Making of a Martyr, 1683-1983” (1985) 24(1) JBS 41, 53 
25 McBain “Killing Judges”, 471-472 
26 Alfred H. Knight, The Life of the Law: The People and Cases that Have Shaped Our Society, from King 
Alfred to Rodney King (1998), 142 
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The accused did not have to participate in or even be present when the ‘treasonous’ action 
occurred. This loosely applied treason law was infamously exploited as a political 
instrument to persecute opponents. Blackstone emphasised the desirability of a restrictive 
interpretation of treason, condemning ‘constructive treason’ and ‘new-fangled treasons’ 
which imperilled the liberty of the people.27 Knight analysed the doctrine thus:28 
"The word “constructive” is one of the law’s most useful frauds. It implies substance 
where none exists. There can be constructive contracts, constructive trusts, 
constructive fraud, constructive intent, constructive possession, and constructive 
anything else the law chooses to baptize as such. “Constructive” in this sense means 
“treated as.” ... Constructive treason wasn’t “real” treason but a vaguely defined, less 
potent category of conduct that the court deciding the particular case felt should be 
“treated as” treason. It was the perfect instrument of oppression, being virtually 
whatever the authorities wanted it to be." 
 
After a series of devastating miscarriages of justice occurring in treason trials across the 
decade from 1678 through to the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, the Treason Trials Act 
1696 introduced due process reforms immediately changing the complexion of treason trials 
– from conciliar hearings aimed at eliminating the government’s enemies to actual trials 
seeking to establish guilt or innocence.29 In 1689, when precursor legislation to the 1696 Act 
was being debated, Richard Hampden impugned the Russell conviction: "This thing of 
constructive Treason was set on foot in King Charles II’s time. If there were not overt Acts, 
yet it was construed to be Treason".30 Colonel Thomas Tipping admonished Parliament: "I 
have been always against making words Treason; for passion, or a man in drink, or a mistake 
of a word, may put our lives into our servants’ hands".31 The subordination and deference of 
the subject to the Crown had retreated during the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, the 
demarcation between loyal opposition and treason would continue to be problematic in the 
 
27 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. IV. 6th ed (1775), 75, 83, 85, 86 – cited in 
Cramer, 71 
28 Knight, Life, 142 
29 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (2007), Ch. 2 
30 Ibid., 85; Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of Commission from the Year 1667 to the Year 1694 (1769), 
Vol. 9, 207 
31 Langbein, Trial, 85; Grey, Debates, 206 
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legal characterisation of an accused’s knowledge, conduct and intent – and hazardous when 
a hostile bench determined such a malleable legal standard.32 
Barrell, in his seminal literary work, Imagining the King’s Death, analysed the changing 
meaning of the concept of ‘compassing’ and particularly ‘imagination’ in the context of the 
controversial 1794 Treason Trials.33 These trials were intended by the Pitt Government to 
suppress the British ‘Radical’ movement – in the belief they were intent on overthrowing 
the British constitution and establishing a French-style republic. The charges were brought 
under the head of compassing or imagining the king’s death. The kinds of ‘imagining’ for 
which the accused were implicated were varied – from overt acts indicating the intention to 
assassinate the king’s person to treasonous conspiracy to overthrow the constitution. The 
radicals’ rhetoric had never materialised into armed rebellion, the reality being most were 
scarcely interested in killing the king. Barrell suggested the repertoire of the more artisanal 
elements of the republican movement amounted to only ‘fantasies’ of regicide – wish-
fulfilment at its highest. Prosecutors were unable to prove either a conspiracy to raise a 
Jacobin army with French support – or to incite rebellion with the intent to kill the king’s 
person – such that they could not establish the requisite overt act to conventionally convict 
under this head of treason.34 The establishment appreciated that but still embarked on a 
modernisation narrative around effectively creating a new form of treason. The significance 
prosecutors attributed to the verb ‘to imagine’ came to be inflated. Barrell explains how the 
phrase ‘to imagine the death of our Lord the King’ was brought into hermeneutic equivalence 
with the prevailing idiomatic sense of ‘imagine’ – that is, the mere act of imagining.35 It 
seems this provision was not satisfactorily adapted from its original Norman French – not 
having hitherto been closely scrutinised.36 The difficulty was the flexibility of the term 
‘imagine’. At issue was whether it had its original narrow meaning of ‘intend’ or ‘design’ – 
or whether it could be construed more broadly, to even encapsulate merely thinking about 
the king’s death. Indeed, if the Government wrongly believed that an individual was 
‘imagining the king’s death’ might it not be guilty of precisely the same crime? Barrell 
 
32 Langbein, Trial, 99 
33 John Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793-1796 (2000) 
34 Lisa Steffen, “Review: Barrell, Imagining” (2001) 116(466) EHR 495 
35 Danny Hayward, “Review: Barrell, Imagining” (2013) 21(1) HistMater 196 
36 The language of enactment, thus the governing language in the event of uncertainty (McBain “Killing 
Judges”, 461) 
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observes that as 1794 progressed, the Government developed increasingly innovative legal 
arguments to address this problem of ‘Modern Treason’ – a treason not aimed at replacing 
the reigning king (‘Dynastic Treason’ or ‘good old aristocratic, regicidal English treason’37) 
– but destroying monarchy itself (‘Republican Treason’ or French ‘Democratic Treason’).38 
They conflated the king’s person and his authority – disguising it by the juridical extension 
of the word ‘imagine’, provoking much contemporary satirical derision.39 The plotting of a 
convention was a clear act of imagining the king’s death. The mere suggestion of any act – 
however spontaneous and involuntary – which ‘might’ lead to the king’s death, was treason. 
In the Edinburgh trials of Robert Watt and David Downie it was argued that their forming a 
British Convention and raising arms to petition Parliament might lead to the destruction of 
the king’s person. It was moot whether a tenuous plot to seize Edinburgh Castle truly 
endangered the royal person. The recurring issue in this and ensuing trials was who was 
imagining or intending the king’s death, and who was simply fantasising about it. Much was 
predicated on the disingenuous and tendentious ‘Coronation Oath’ argument – that since the 
king had taken an oath to defend the constitution, he would necessarily expose himself to 
the risk of death in defending such radical attempts at constitutional reform. Any attempt to 
pressurise Parliament to change the constitution must necessarily provoke the king to resist 
in person and by force of arms. However modest a reform in contemplation, it would be as 
good as a priori true as entailing or imagining the king’s death.40 Barrell impugns these 
convoluted arguments in terms of prosecutors attempting to prove "figurative treason against 
a figurative king".41 Lawyers quibbled about the distinction between the fantasy of merely 
imagining and the deadly intention of genuinely imagining the king’s death.42 The overt act 
would comprise the treason itself – without regard to the intention of the accused – on the 
ground that if the overt act were proved that would be conclusive evidence of the accused’s 
intention that the king should die. This theory of ‘constructive treason’ may have been 
contrary to the literal or express terms of the 1351 Act but in the 1794 Treason trials of 
Thomas Hardy and John Horne Tooke, this modern treason – which the prosecution argued 
 
37 Barrell, Imagining, 283 
38 Ibid., 129 
39 Hayward, “Review”, 200 
40 Barrell, Imagining, 278-279; Carlton F.W. Larson, “Review: Barrell, Imagining” (2003) 21 LawHistRev 
411; Hayward, “Review”, 201 
41 Barrell, Imagining, 230  
42 Steffen, “Review” 
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to be found in the "force of clubs, committees and conventions" – was confirmed by the jury 
directions, albeit defence counsel Thomas Erskine criticised such constructive, fantastic 
treason and the defendants were ultimately acquitted.43 It was unnecessary for matters to 
have reached an advanced stage – such as an actual attempt on the sovereign’s life – proof 
of the existence of a plot to kill the sovereign (conspiracy) sufficing.44 Fundamentally "the 
compassing is considered as the treason" – the so-called mental interpretation. By the 
Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act 1795 which extended the definition of treason – this 
figurative treason was ‘literalized’ – it being treason to "within the realm or without compass, 
imagine, invent, devise or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm tending to death 
or destruction, maim or wounding, imprisonment of restrain, of the person of … the King". 
Any act of restraint on the person of the king became treasonable. What may have previously 
been merely overt acts of compassing or imagining the king’s death – potential evidence of 
treasonous intentions – were transubstantiated into per se acts of treason.45 There was no 
longer any distinction between levying war against the king’s person and his authority. 
Conspiring against the government in general was now an overt act to prove treason – thus 
avoiding any debate about fantasising and imagining the king’s death.46 The democratic 
movement was forced underground. This provision in the 1795 Act was finally repealed by 
the Treason Felony Act 1848.  
Lord Carlton’s dictum in R. v. Sheanes confirmed how mere acts of subversion of the 
constitution could amount to compassing and imagining the king’s death:47 
"Forming conspiracies to usurp by force and in defiance of the authority of Parliament, 
the government of the kingdom, to destroy the monarchy … holding consultations or 
entering into agreement, or advising, soliciting or persuading others for any such 
purposes, or assenting to such purposes … the moment the power of the government 
is usurped, the king is in effect deposed; he is bound by the duty of his situation to 
resist such attempts, even at the peril of his life, and several acts which I have 
mentioned whereby his life may be endangered, have been deemed under the sound 
construction of the statutes, and upon principles of substantial political justice overt 
acts of compassing his death." 
 
43 Alan Wharam, Treason: Famous English Treason Trials (1995), xiv; Wharam, The Treason Trials, 1794 
(1992) 
44 Thistlewood; Brown, “Offences against State”, para. 535 
45 Hayward, “Review”, 202-203 
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Halsbury’s Laws of England describes compassing the sovereign’s death:48 
"wilfully and deliberately to do or attempt anything whereby the sovereign’s life may 
be endangered or to conspire, combine, confederate or agree to carry that purpose or 
to assent to any overtures for that purpose or to meet with others to kill the sovereign 
though no agreement is then come to. It is therefore an overt act of treason of 
compassing the death of the sovereign to enter into measures for deposing Her, or to 
agree with Foreigners to invade Her Dominions with force or to go into a foreign 
country to that end or to levy or conspire to levy war against Her."  
 
The use of the words ‘wilfully and deliberately’ connotes a general mens rea requirement – 
and, in this context, the specific intent to ‘compass’ the King’s death. Properly, some overt 
act is still required for commission.49 The overt act might be found in the forming of a plot 
or it might even comprise the actual killing of the sovereign itself – because, strictly, the 
offence lies in the compassing or imagining the death and not necessarily in the killing of 
the sovereign itself – that ‘merely’ being a further overt act by which the compassing of his 
death would be consummated (though naturally a severe aggravation).50 
It might be thought any person intent on assassinating the sovereign would automatically be 
an enemy of the British state – and that such a hostile act could only but be treasonous. 
Consider the intriguing hypothetical regicide involving mariticide or uxoricide – the 
archetypal crime passionnel committed by a jealous consort – assuming the errant spouse’s 
motive were not usurpation of the throne (historically ‘Dynastic Treason’). The overt act of 
killing the sovereign in that scenario would not technically involve a breach of allegiance – 
because the family dynamic precipitating such an act, exists independently of the 
conventional ‘sovereign-subject’ relationship governing the remaining population. Their 
attack on the sovereign would not have been committed because of the sovereign’s status or 
connected to the performance of her public duties – the reason for the special protection 
afforded her. It would not be a political assassination. If the only overt act were their killing 
of the sovereign, there might well be an issue of evidential sufficiency so far as a compassing 
charge would be concerned because compassing does not strictly comprise the killing. This 
 
48 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 11 (1), para. 81 
49 R. v. Thistlewood (1820) 33 St Tr 681 (the Cato Street Conspiracy); Law Commission, Codification of the 
Criminal Law, Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Law Com No 72, 1977), para. 15 
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would otherwise amount to murder or culpable homicide, aggravated by the absolute 
character of the sovereign victim. If their killing were committed without the requisite 
treasonable intent, it would be plain murder (or culpable homicide).51 The treason would not 
be consummated. Regardless of the dynamic in their own personal relationship, it is believed 
the junior royal protagonist must remain the subject of the sovereign – for the ‘sovereign-
subject’ relationship cannot admit to exceptions. This discrete hypothetical scenario 
underlines regicide need not inevitably and automatically amount to treason – and that intent 
(or motive) is still pivotal.52 Properly, there must be a political intent (or motive) – perhaps 
captured by the idea of ‘compassing’. 
 
(b) ‘Levying War Treason’: 
With the ‘Levying War’ component of treason, what requires to be proved is the intent to 
forcibly overcome the general laws and the government of this country. It has similarly been 
the subject of wide judicial interpretation. Again, there is the historical transubstantiation of 
the king’s corporeal body into the abstract. Hawkins encapsulated this notion of the king 
being provoked to resist in person and by force of arms:53 
"Those who make an insurrection in order to redress a public grievance … and of their 
own authority attempt with force to redress it, are said to levy war against the King, 
although they have no direct design against his person, in as much as they incidentally 
invade his prerogative." 
 
Under older broad doctrines of ‘constructive treason’, intent by group force to prevent or 
overcome enforcement of a statute or order, to obtain a group benefit contrary to law, was 
treason. Hume stated: "That no ill is intended to the person of the King, is not material".54 In 
the treason of constructive levying of war, the common purpose doctrine would impute 
criminal liability to even fringe participants in political insurrection – though in reality only 
prime movers would be prosecuted on the most serious charge. In the trial of Lord George 
Gordon, the Court held the prosecution was entitled to put in evidence anything to show the 
 
51 Law Com WP 72, para. 62 
52 The relevant intent under s. 2 of the Treason Act 1842 (which provided for non-lethal assaults on the 
sovereign) was the intent to break the public peace or to injure or alarm the sovereign. 
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mob had a general intent, by terror and violence, to force a repeal of the law – though that 
did not affect the accused until he was shown to be privy to it.55 Kenny spoke of the relevant 
intent in terms of a large body of men assembling and intending to debar the government 
from the free exercise of its lawful powers, being ready to resist with violence any 
opposition, with the ‘general’ (as opposed to private) character of their object distinguishing 
it from mere riot.56 
The mens rea for this prong of treason might now be regarded as the hostile intent to 
endanger or threaten the safety and security of the British state by violent group resistance. 
Hostile intent will include intent to overthrow or coerce the Government by organised force 
(group force), even though there is no direct proof of an aim to wholly subvert the 
Government. 
 
(c) ‘Being Adherent to the Sovereign’s Enemies in the Realm, Giving Them Aid and 
Comfort in the Realm, or Elsewhere’: 
The mental element requirement seems to weigh heavier in the treason of ‘Adhering to the 
Sovereign’s Enemies’. Applying the ‘Plain Meaning Rule’ (or ‘Literal Rule’) of Statutory 
Interpretation – and relying on the ordinary meaning of words57 – the Court could readily 
discern that a disloyal state of mind accompanies this head of treason. Unsurprisingly, there 
is no definition section in the 1351 statute – and, absent contrary definition within the statute, 
words such as "adherent to" and "giving … Aid and Comfort" must be afforded their plain, 
ordinary, and literal meaning. "Adherence" is defined as: "Attachment to a person, party, or 
cause; steadfast support; loyalty, allegiance."58 Insofar as "adherent to" (or "adherence") 
should be construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning, this definition 
recognises there must be a connection between the adherent and the enemy to whom their 
adherence is given, whereby the adherent intends to give them ‘Aid and Comfort’. "Giving 
… (them) Aid and Comfort" completes or evidences that relationship. Logically, you cannot 
adhere to the enemy by anything less than a conscious object to do so. This is also consistent 
with the ‘Purposive Approach’ to statutory interpretation – whereby words are interpreted 
 
55 Lord George Gordon’s case (1781); Wharam, Famous English Treason Trials, 107 
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not only in their ordinary sense, but by reference to their content and purpose. The intent 
element might be defined as alliance with the enemy – while giving them ‘Aid and Comfort’ 
comprises the conduct requirement.59 
There is specific provision for the mens rea of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ in the 
Institutional Writings and criminal texts. Macdonald makes the relevance of intention clear, 
referencing R. v. Ahlers:60 "The intention and purpose of the accused in doing the overt acts 
(of adherence) complained of are material."61 There is further recognition of the operation 
of mens rea in Gordon’s Criminal Law: "It appears that in some circumstances it is a defence 
to a charge of adherence that the accused did not act with the intention of giving aid to the 
Queen’s enemies."62 Cubie explains: "For a conviction under this heading, there must be 
proof of an ‘evil’ intention to give aid and comfort to the enemy".63 
Indeed, the typical act of treason is adherence to and the provision of aid to a foreign enemy. 
It requires the intent to render the enemy ‘Aid and Comfort’ or tangible support. An act of 
aid and comfort absent intent to betray would not be treason – nor would be intent to betray 
without an overt act of aid and comfort.  
The issue of intention in Joyce, as far as enemy adherence was concerned, was whether Joyce 
adhered to the King’s enemies with intent to assist them. The charge was couched in the 
following terms:64  
"being then … a person owing allegiance to our Lord the King, and whilst on the said 
several days an open and public war was being prosecuted and carried on by the 
German Realm and its subjects against our Lord the King and his subjects, then and 
on the said several day traitorously contriving and intending to aid and assist the said 
enemies of our Lord the King against our Lord the King and his subjects did 
traitorously adhere to and aid and comfort the said enemies … by broadcasting to the 
subjects of our Lord the King propaganda on behalf of the said enemies of our Lord 
the King". 
 
 
59 Suzanne Kelly Babb, “Fear and Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National 
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It was for the jury to determine whether at the relevant dates Joyce adhered to the King’s 
enemies with intent to assist them. We thus have the concept of "traitorous contrivance 
(conspiracy) and intention" – manifest by the intention to assist the enemy. Any intentional 
act which furthers the enemy’s hostile designs or weakens the UK, gives aid and comfort to, 
and ‘adheres to’ the enemy.  
In the Boer War case of R. v. Lynch the intent to assist the enemy was the recurring theme 
in the charges – the accused being charged with overt acts of treason committed with intent 
to join the enemy, inciting others to assist the enemy and commanding an armed body of 
men with intent to co-operate with the military forces of the enemy.65 Giving aid to the 
enemy might be any act which is designed to assist the enemy positively, by giving them 
help of any kind – or negatively, by obstructing the UK’s military forces arraigned against 
them. 
The analysis of intent in the Law Commission’s 1977 Working Paper on modernising the 
law of offences against the state, was that the head of treason of adhering to the sovereign’s 
enemies required knowledge by the perpetrator of the fact that help was being given to the 
enemy – or that they had no substantial doubt that it would result from their conduct.66 This 
is also consistent with the condition in Australian treason law that the person intends that 
their conduct will materially assist the enemy to engage in war with the Commonwealth.67 
It has been suggested that it is a relevant defence to a charge of ‘adherence (to the Queen’s 
enemies)’ that the accused did not act with the intention of giving aid to them.68 Properly, 
this should be conceptualised as an absence of the relevant mens rea by the absence of 
treasonous intent, rather than a substantive defence as such. There must be proof of intention 
to give ‘Aid and Comfort’ to the enemy69 – and it is still incumbent on the Crown to 
discharge the (legal or persuasive) burden of proving this was the accused’s intent.  
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III. Problematic ‘Current’ Mens Rea: 
I now consider the criticisms which might be made of the mens rea element in the proposed 
surviving heads of ‘current’ treason. 
 
(i) Clarity: 
Properly, all definitions of crimes should specify a mental element – and a person cannot be 
found criminally liable unless they meet the mens rea criteria for the crime concerned.70 The 
main issue with the mens rea of treason is not so much that it is couched in archaic language 
(the recurring general complaint in treason law) – rather it is the apparent absence of 
definition. There is little clarity in domestic precedent that might meaningfully explain the 
precise culpable mental state which the prosecution requires to prove to establish treason. 
The Law Commission confirmed that the recognition in Ahlers of motive as a relevant factor 
in deciding criminal liability was unsatisfactory and confusing71 – at variance with 
Casement72 – and its recommendation that intention be proved on a subjective basis remains 
unresolved.73 The mental element was not in issue in Joyce. The issue has received scant 
academic attention in this country – the immediate post-war focus following Joyce from 
Lauterpacht and Williams being elsewhere, then dissipating. Nonetheless, the mens rea of 
what might be regarded as Anglo-American treason has been substantively considered by 
the American Supreme Court and American academics.74 But while the American Supreme 
Court has established the ‘intent to betray’ doctrine, its derivation remains unclear.75 
Treason’s mens rea, like treason law generally, remains underdeveloped and incomplete. 
Because of the rarity of modern treason prosecutions, there has been little opportunity for 
issues such as the definition of mens rea to be rigorously tested. Predictably, the Scottish 
Jury Manual provides no model form of direction or guidance as to the mens rea requirement 
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for treason.76 It is axiomatic that difficulties in definition of the mental element of the crime 
will result in difficulties of proof. 
Nonetheless, we can derive from precedent the concept of treasonous intent. To reiterate, 
Joyce at least provides for the concept of ‘traitorous contrivance and intention’ – though this 
wording seems ‘clunky’. Further, notwithstanding the lack of clarity in statute law, the mens 
rea of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ could be reasonably inferred from the 
phraseology of the 1351 Act – for to ‘be adherent’ necessarily embraces the mental element 
of intentional betrayal.77 But there remains an issue with archaic language that requires to be 
addressed. 
 
(ii) Illiberalism of Imagining: 
The vague, imprecise words of ‘compassing’ or ‘imagining’ the king’s death have 
historically allowed for wide judicial discretion – with crude or expansive legal definitions 
having had unfortunate consequences. According to Fletcher, the "core of the crime" is not 
"external actions" – but rather "internal attitudes", specifically the "mental actions of 
compassing or lusting in one's heart."78 Fletcher impugned the mental action of compassing 
as the core of the crime as violating Mill’s harm principle79 – and shifting the gravamen of 
the crime from external action to "internal attitudes" – as one of the principal anti-liberal 
features of treason law. The emphasis on "internal attitudes" as opposed to external conduct 
is associated with the criminal theory of authoritarian regimes. It evokes the Nazi concept of 
Gesinnungsstrafrecht ("criminal law based on attitudes") – another German word without 
English equivalent, meaning criminal law orientated towards punishing attitudes or belief 
systems, rather than the act itself.80 It has sinister connotations of Orwellian thoughtcrime – 
criminalising the holding of politically unacceptable thoughts, not just actions or even 
speech. It defies Ulpian’s maxim: "Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur" ("No one is punished 
for merely thinking of a crime").81 The troubling notion persists that this offence – with its 
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wide mens rea, as established by unfortunate historical precedent – could still be exploited 
to squelch dissident ideas, even if it is now thought, as McBain asserts, that today 
compassing only covers murdering (or attempting or conspiring to murder) the sovereign, 
his wife or heir.82 While Archbold previously stated "the doctrine of constructive treason is 
discouraged, if not exploded",83 it would be preferable if it were clearer that it is not a 
criminal wrong to have strong ideological objections to the UK state and its policies. I 
naturally want to disavow this suggestion – and retain as a relevant head of treason the 
enemy-sponsored (attempted) political assassination of the sovereign – it being appropriate 
to continue to recognise it as an aggravated or special form of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s 
Enemies’. This would involve defining a mens rea element, specifically tailored to this 
particular aspect of this part of the crime.  
 
(iii) Whether Recklessness: 
The position is uncertain as to whether recklessness might suffice for the mens rea of 
‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ – particularly in ‘whistleblowing’ ‘Espionage 
Treason’.84 Little guidance can be derived from ‘modern’ domestic or Commonwealth case 
law.  
It could be plausibly argued that given the 1351 statute stipulates simply that you ‘be 
adherent to’ the enemy when you give them ‘Aid and Comfort’, this might allow for 
something less than an intent to betray the UK. It need not matter whether you intend 
specifically to betray the UK or simply seek a firm connection to the enemy or their ideology. 
Nor would it matter whether you give ‘Aid and Comfort’ (or assistance) knowingly (in 
respect that you are fully conscious that you are aiding an enemy of the UK) – or recklessly 
(in the sense you would be subjectively at fault for deliberately embarking on a course of 
conduct involving a substantial risk of giving the enemy ‘Aid and Comfort’). So long as you 
continue to be connected to the enemy, you are, by definition, adhering to the enemy and 
committing treason. This is not strict liability as such – in respect that there will still be a 
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substantial mens rea accompanying the relevant overt act – though it might be at variance 
with the notion of treason as a specific intent crime, requiring the specific intent to betray.85  
It might be thought that because treason was seen as so serious, it had to be committed 
intentionally and not recklessly. To countenance recklessness as a possible mens rea for 
‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’ would thus engage a broader definition than is 
conventionally understood but it can be seen how it might apply. There might be a subtle but 
not insignificant distinction between the intent to sabotage the UK’s military and intelligence 
operations (where aiding the enemy’s military or intelligence operations is intended to occur 
only as collateral damage) and the wilful intent to aid the military or intelligence operations 
of an enemy state or organisation. The latter may not be inevitably inferred from the intent 
to sabotage the UK’s military or intelligence operations (particularly in peacetime) – but 
recklessness as to the consequences of one’s actions could be. The following refinement of 
mens rea in ‘Espionage Treason’ could apply in that latter scenario – viz., knowingly, or 
recklessly aiding the military or intelligence operations of an enemy state or organisation by 
knowingly sabotaging the UK’s military and intelligence operations. This would involve 
alternatives for mens rea of knowledge and recklessness. 
Standard mens rea requirements for most offences will include intention and recklessness. 
Invariably, mens rea may consist in intention, or knowledge, in recklessness or in negligence 
– forming a descending order. A requirement of negligence is satisfied by the presence of 
recklessness or knowledge – and recklessness by presence of intention or knowledge – but 
not vice versa.86 While conscious that recklessness has also been a complicated issue in mens 
rea discourse – notably, the scope of so-called Caldwell recklessness (that the test of 
recklessness should be objective)87 – and the appropriateness of honest unreasonable belief 
in consent in rape cases (subjective mens rea)88 – I do not propose to extend the mens rea of 
any new treason law to recklessness or reckless disregard on the basis that in cases of mere 
negligence there is no relevant intent. For this most serious offence, only the highest form 
of mens rea is appropriate. A more expansive mens rea is scarcely desirable in prosecuting 
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the ultimate crime (and at that an unavoidably political crime) which carries considerable 
sanctions and stigma. After all, recklessness and negligence typically do not suffice for 
higher categories of crime such as murder. Further, the likelihood is that ordinary 
recklessness or negligence may still be consistent with the operation of error defences.  
Consistent with this guiding principle that only the highest form of mens rea is appropriate, 
I do not suggest the mens rea be extended to wicked recklessness, the highest form of 
recklessness, notwithstanding that it is still consistent with the most reprehensible forms of 
mens rea – meeting the Scottish mens rea threshold for the special crime that is murder. 
Murder is the only crime where the mens rea includes wicked recklessness (and there are 
other common law crimes which require intent) – and it is unlikely that the Courts would 
read in a requirement of it, given this is a statutory crime in which Parliament can specify 
the mens rea and standing its discrete and special technical meaning.  
Properly, treason’s mens rea should reflect the two correlating but subtly distinct aspects of 
the moral wrong of treason which are the intent to betray country and the intent to betray 
country to an enemy state or organisation. The intent to betray would appear to be a corollary 
of adherence to the enemy.89 Reckless intelligence disclosures, in the context of ‘Espionage 
Treason’ might involve deliberate betrayal of country but not necessarily that second aspect 
of the moral wrong which is betrayal of country to the enemy. Treason would only arise if 
there were proven knowledge that the accused has been intent on aiding an enemy’s military 
or intelligence operations. It might be prudent to proceed on the basis that whistleblowing is 
non-treasonable because it is typically unaccompanied by the intention to aid the enemy. I 
will consider whistleblowing as a relevant justification defence to ‘Espionage Treason’ in 
Chapter 5. 
Proving a wilful mens rea might be problematic in whistleblowing ‘Espionage Treason’ – 
particularly absent proof of direct coordination with the enemy. Consider the court-martial 
of US Army Private Manning, who passed classified material to WikiLeaks, the notorious 
whistleblower website. In 2013 Manning was convicted of various espionage and military 
offences, the most serious of which was aiding the enemy (by knowingly giving out 
intelligence through indirect means). A defence preliminary motion to dismiss this charge – 
on the basis that the prosecution required to show Manning knew that the enemy would be 
able to access information on the WikiLeaks site – was repelled. The US Government argued 
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WikiLeaks was not a legitimate journalistic enterprise. The military judge ultimately 
acquitted Manning of aiding the enemy90 – the absence of enemy coordination being relevant 
in circumstances in which Manning seems to have acted impulsively with no intent to 
betray.91 
Ponder the following hypothetical where someone seeks to spy for a foreign state, the 
‘enemy’ spymaster instructing them: "Dispense with dead-drops and all the James Bond 
gimmicks – just post the information on your blog which we will read, and you will be a 
whistleblower, not a traitor."92 The information is disclosed to the whole wide world – not a 
specific enemy as such (with which the UK is at war) – thus apparently precluding the 
operation of treason. But in this scenario, there would still have been treasonous intent – the 
deliberate intent to betray the UK to an enemy. This conduct might appear to be superficially 
reckless, but the true intent would be treasonous – though there might be difficult issues of 
proof because of resort to a disingenuous scheme in its execution. Faked innocence can 
craftily camouflage corruption and evil: 
"A Truth that’s told with bad intent 
Beats all the Lies you can invent."93 
 
In any event, the law is open and unsettled as to whether mere recklessness might suffice for 
the mens rea of ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’. 
 
(iv) Mixed Motives Confusion: 
Insofar as motive will be relevant in some way to proof of intent, there is a problem with 
how to deal with motive and the extent to which the intent requirement should be a subjective 
enquiry. The decision in Ahlers to introduce motive as a relevant factor in determining 
 
90 United States v. PFC Bradley E. Manning, 30 July 2013: 
https://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/032912-dismiss-ch1.pdf 
https://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/appeal-053118.pdf 
91 This seems to have been the basis for the outgoing President Obama’s commutation of Manning’s sentence 
– Ed Pilkington et al., “Chelsea Manning's prison sentence commuted by Barack Obama” Guardian (17 January 
2017): 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/17/chelsea-manning-sentence-commuted-barack-obama 
92 Paraphrasing Matthews (see above)  
93 William Blake, Auguries of Innocence (1803) 
136 
 
 
 
criminal liability in treason was the subject of some criticism.94 The conviction of Nicolaus 
Ahlers, the German Consul in Sunderland, a naturalised British subject – for following the 
orders of the German Consul General in London and assisting German nationals of military 
age to return home immediately after the declaration of war (on 4 August 1914), with a view 
to enlisting – was quashed on appeal. This was on the basis that the trial judge had not 
directed the jury that they had to consider whether Ahlers’ acts were done by him with the 
intention of assisting the King’s enemies – or whether Ahlers had acted without any evil 
intention in the belief that it was his duty to assist German nationals to return to Germany. 
He had misdirected them in instructing them that it was no defence to show that Ahlers had 
acted as he believed he was lawfully entitled to do. Ahlers had believed that there was a rule 
of international law giving departing enemy subjects some margin of time to return home – 
an objectively reasonable belief in circumstances in which that there had been an Order in 
Council allowing German subjects to depart without permits from approved ports up until 
11 August 1914. Somewhat incredibly, Ahlers had suggested he did not know that war had 
been declared. Properly, it should have been left to the jury to decide whether he had acted 
with the intention of assisting ("aiding and comforting") the King’s enemies – or in the belief 
that he was only discharging his duties as Consul.95 This case is understood to have 
introduced the concept of motive as a relevant factor in determining criminal liability in 
treason – alleviating the severity of what was thought to be the unassailable principle 
ignorantia juris non excusat.96 
Per Lord Reading:97 
"It cannot be doubted that his intention and purpose in doing the acts were material to 
the issue before the jury. Unless the jury were satisfied that his intention and purpose 
in acting as he did were evil … and that he was intending to aid and comfort the King’s 
enemies and did these acts with that object, they could not find him guilty of the act 
charged" 
 
  
But in Casement the ‘motive’ argument was rejected by Reading CJ. The defence had 
claimed that Casement’s motive in seeking to recruit Irish prisoners of war (other British 
subjects) to join a German-equipped Irish Brigade, was to assist the Irish cause – not 
 
94 Kenny, “Intention and Purpose”  
95 R. v. Purdy (1946) 10 JCL 182 
96 Law Com WP 72, para. 27 
97 625 
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Germany. It was not Casement’s professed intention to use this Brigade to wage Germany’s 
war against England – and the defence argued that to convict, the jury needed to be satisfied 
that it was his intention to use it for the purpose of fighting Germany’s war against England. 
An unimpressed Lord Reading directed the jury that a man’s intentions were to be gathered 
from his deeds – and that he was presumed to intend the natural consequences of those deeds 
– though it was for the jury to ultimately determine whether Casement’s intention had been 
to assist the enemy.98 While this instruction notionally allowed for the rebuttal of the 
presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of their acts, it left little ‘elbow-
room’ for the jury to give any weight to motive as a factor which could override the accused’s 
intention, as decerned from their acts.99  
The case of Steane – involving a prosecution under reg. 2A of the Defence General 
Regulations 1939 – correlated to the commission of treason, the accused having been 
charged with broadcasting for the German Broadcasting Service with intent to assist the 
enemy.100 Ordinarily, merely the intent to broadcast would have sufficed for this offence – 
but the wording additionally required a specific intent to assist the enemy. Steane maintained 
that he had acted under pressure of severe personal violence and threats to his family – and 
with the purpose of saving his family from internment in a concentration camp. His 
conviction was quashed on appeal, it being held that in these circumstances an inevitable 
inference could not be drawn that he had intended the natural consequences of his acts – 
namely assistance of the enemy simply from the fact of his commission of them. As it was, 
there was scope for the possibility of more than one view as to his intent – and the 
prosecution required to discharge the burden of proving the specific intent implicit in this 
statutory offence. There could be no presumption that merely doing the action implied his 
intent to help the enemy. There was no intent to assist the enemy where Steane had been 
forced and threatened into doing so. Goddard CJ referred to duress as a possible defence but 
did not need to consider it, quashing conviction on the basis of misdirection – that the threats 
to which the accused had been subjected were not sufficiently put to the jury. Significantly, 
there had been no evidence that Steane’s broadcasts had assisted the enemy or harmed the 
 
98 129 
99 Law Com WP 72, para. 28; George H. Knott, Trial of Roger Casement, Notable British Trials (1917), 160, 
184-185; Omer Elagab, “Fighting with the Enemy: The Case of Three British Muslims in Afghanistan” (2006) 
10(4) IJHR 373, 376-377 
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UK. Steane does seem to have been wrongly decided.101 Williams argued that subject to the 
defence of duress, Steane should have been convicted either on the basis that he acted 
voluntarily, knowing that what he was doing was assisting the enemy – or that he caused a 
result foreseen as certain.102 Put simply, what the enemy asked him to do was to assist them. 
As that is what he did – deliberately so – his motive was irrelevant, his proper defence being 
duress. While his predominant intent was to save his family, in respect his act was described 
as "assisting the enemy by broadcasting", he acted intentionally and purposely.103 This is a 
somewhat restrictive concept of the intention to assist the enemy – insisting that the accused 
must act to facilitate the enemy’s purposes – rather than merely despite the realisation that 
their actions, though undertaken for a different purpose, will have the effect of objectively 
facilitating the enemy’s aims. The decision does seem to be a restriction of liability for policy 
reasons.104  
Further, by analogy, the House of Lords held in Chandler v. DPP that to find someone liable 
under the Official Secrets Act 1911, it was necessary in the first instance to determine what 
was the accused’s immediate purpose – as distinct from their ultimate purpose or motive – 
and then determine whether that purpose was prejudicial to what the Crown, in its exercise 
of the Royal Prerogative, considered to be in the safety and interests of the state.105 Modern 
sensibilities might commend that the Government should not be the final arbiter in 
determining the safety and interests of the state – the national interest not necessarily being 
synonymous with the interests of the prevailing Government.  
This approach had been based on the Court accepting Ahlers’ contention that he had believed 
his acts were lawful – and, in trying to mitigate the severity of the rule that ignorance of the 
law was no defence, introducing the concept of motive. But this has led to confusion 
emerging in this area of the law – and if treason law were to be reformed, some qualification 
might be required – to reconcile the apparently competing approaches of Ahlers, Casement 
and s. 8 of the (English) Criminal Justice Act 1967 (which provides that a jury shall not be 
bound to infer whether an accused intended or foresaw a result of actions by reason only of 
its being a natural and probable consequence, but shall decide by reference to all the 
 
101 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 7.19; Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, para. 19.3 n. 6 
102 Glanville Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (1965), para. 21 et seq. 
103 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 7.19 
104 Antje Pedain “Intention and the Terrorist Example” [2003] Crim LR 579, n. 19 
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evidence). It might be thought that surely if there were the slightest intent to help the enemy, 
the element of intention would be satisfied, regardless of the perpetrator’s motive.106 That 
an accused might have acted with mixed purposes – such as seeking financial gain by trading 
in contraband with the enemy – would not negate the existence of the requisite treasonous 
intent, if one of their purposes (or an obvious consequence of their intended and deliberate 
actions) were to render performance useful to the enemy. Ordinarily, they would be deemed 
to be responsible for intending the foreseeable consequences of their conduct, even if they 
did not mean to bring about that outcome – following Casement.  
Defining treasonous intent may be one thing, but how do you deal with it in circumstances 
in which, though the accused’s actions are admitted, there is no direct evidence? With no 
admission and possibly a positive denial, it may be open to argue a notionally non-treasonous 
motive – that though what they did might look treasonous, their motive was otherwise pure 
and good. This is perhaps not strictly a problem of definition of intention as such – of 
substantive law – but a matter of the quantum of proof. It is an inevitable evidential difficulty, 
causing obvious problems in jury instruction, requiring to be pre-empted.107  
The remedy might be found in World War II-era American propagandist cases which shifted 
the gravamen of the crime to the accused’s actions rather than their "internal attitudes". In 
Chandler v. United States108 and Best v. United States109 the accused had contended that 
notwithstanding that they had intended to aid the German war effort and harm American 
morale, they otherwise had the special motive of rendering such aid because it would be 
better for Americans to stop world domination by Jewish Communism. They argued that 
they had acted out of patriotism and in the nation’s best interests – that they had no intent to 
betray the United States – and that their propaganda urging the United States to stay out of 
the war and later to surrender was an attempt to aid the United States. The First Circuit 
rejected the argument that this motive somehow negated their intent to betray, because each 
accused had the purpose of aiding the enemy.110 But despite the Court’s reasoning, it was 
not that their motive was irrelevant. They did have a treasonous motive – they were 
motivated directly by the desire to see Germany prevail (and the USA defeated). It was just 
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that this motive was mixed with another attenuated or incidental motive.111 The courts 
focused on the accused traitors’ actions and from them presumed the intent element was 
satisfied. In doing so, they put the focus of the treason trial and appellate review on the 
actions themselves rather than on "internal attitudes".112 Similarly, in Haupt v. United States 
the US Supreme Court affirmed a treason conviction where the accused had given his son 
shelter, transportation and employment in the United States – while knowing that he was on 
a sabotage mission. These acts were held as amounting to giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy.113 Haupt possessed the requisite treasonous intent to betray – because he knew of his 
son’s role and his aid to his son was thus not merely done as an exercise in paternal care, but 
with the purpose of assisting him in executing the German sabotage effort.114 Accordingly, 
in cases involving multiple potential purposes, or a purpose mixed with motive, treason 
remains a relevant charge provided one of the purposes is the intent to betray.115 
 
IV. Retaining ‘Current’ Mens Rea: 
I now consider whether there are parts of the existing mens rea of treason which might be 
retained for these three surviving core offences insofar as they address the ‘attitude’ of 
treason – the mindset of a traitor. 
The definitional starting point is the concept of ‘traitorous contrivance and intention’, as 
manifest by the intention to assist the enemy.116 The US Supreme Court’s decision in Cramer 
is of some assistance in providing a modern explication of the mens rea of treason – 
interpreting adherence to the enemy as an intent to betray the country – thus establishing the 
‘intent to betray’ doctrine.117 The Court (in a 5-4 majority judgment) recognised that the 
overt act need not manifest treasonous intent118 – but that the overt act must specifically give 
 
111 Broughton, “Snowden”, 22-23 
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aid and comfort to the enemy.119 Cramer, a German-born naturalised American citizen, had 
wartime dealings with two German saboteurs, but argued that he did not have any treasonous 
intent and that his overt acts did not manifest treason. In consequence of that association, he 
was convicted of treason. The Court based treason’s mens rea on the Constitutional textual 
requirement of ‘adherence’ to the enemy. Adherence to the enemy is the disloyal state of 
mind which the prosecution must prove.120 Justice Jackson underlined the importance of 
such adherence:121  
" … the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy and 
rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favour the 
enemy and harbour sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country’s policy or 
interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid or comfort to the enemy, there is no 
treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions which do aid and comfort the 
enemy – making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, 
profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things 
which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength – but if there is no adherence to 
the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason."  
 
The Court recognised that "… questions of intent in a treason case are even more 
complicated than in most criminal cases because of the peculiarity of the two different 
elements which together make the offense."122 Treasonous intent cannot be shown through 
overt acts which are merely negligent or undesigned.123 Properly, "to make treason the 
defendant must not only intend the act, but he must intend to betray his country by means of 
the act."124 Treasonous intent could be inferred from conduct (including the relevant overt 
act itself), and one is deemed to intend the natural consequences of their actions.125 In the 
circumstances of Cramer, the overt acts which the prosecution alleged, were relatively trivial 
and did not of themselves demonstrate treasonous intent.126 Simply meeting with enemy 
spies did not amount to treason. Cramer had to actively help the German cause for it to 
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constitute treason. The Court was not prepared to affirm a treason conviction merely from 
an alleged treasonous intent arising from meetings by the accused with the enemy saboteurs 
– holding that those acts did not have the effect of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. To 
conclude otherwise would "carry us back to constructive treasons."127 
This doctrine was repeated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In Kawakita v. United 
States Justice Douglas (delivering the Opinion of the Court affirming the treason conviction) 
explained that treason requires both giving aid and comfort to the enemy (actus reus) and 
treasonable intent (mens rea). He defined treasonable (or traitorous) intent thus:128  
"One may think disloyal thoughts and have his heart on the side of the enemy. Yet if 
he commits no act giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he is not guilty of treason. He 
may on the other hand commit acts which do give aid and comfort to the enemy and 
yet not be guilty of treason, as for example when he acts impulsively with no intent to 
betray." 
 
He explained how it might be inferred:129 
"Intent to betray must be inferred from conduct. It may be inferred from the overt acts 
themselves … from the defendant's own statements of his attitudes toward the war 
effort … and from his own professions of loyalty to (the enemy nation)." 
 
Properly, the prosecution must prove that the (overt) act of aid and comfort to the enemy 
was performed with the intention of betraying the country. This approach of interpreting 
adherence to the enemy as an intent to betray the country was adopted in the (2006) framing 
of the United States’ first treason indictment since World War II. A federal grand jury 
indicted California-born Adam Yahiye Gadahn for treason for aiding an enemy of the United 
States – following his appearances in Al-Qaeda propaganda videos, in which he had 
celebrated the 9-11 Attacks and encouraged Al-Qaeda to use its capability to attack the USA 
again. Gadahn appeared to have acted in concert with and at the direction of Al-Qaeda 
leaders. The indictment alleged that Gadahn, an American citizen: "knowingly adhered to 
an enemy of the United States, namely, al-Qaeda, and gave al-Qaeda aid and comfort … 
 
127 Ibid., 40. It might have been thought (following the minority Opinion) that Cramer’s established 
involvement in money laundering for enemy agents would have provided an evidential basis for the relevant 
treasonable intent – scarcely a carry-back to constructive treason. 
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with intent to betray the United States."130 Gadahn was killed – in Pakistan, by a drone strike 
during a counter-terrorism operation in 2015 – before he could be captured and tried131 – so 
the competency and relevancy of the treason charge were never properly tested in court. It 
is moot how much weight be afforded to this American preliminary procedure, given the 
apparent ease with which prosecutors can secure grand jury indictments.132 Nonetheless, the 
formulation of the charge is demonstrative of the broad American approach to previously 
interpreting ‘Aid and Comfort’ in the wave of World War II propagandist cases – affirming 
that if an accused intentionally gives aid and comfort to the enemy, this satisfies the ‘intent 
to betray’ requirement.  
Hurst suggested that "the natural consequences formula" can be reconciled with the ‘specific 
intent’ requirement when contextualised by what the accused knew.133 He described the 
treasonous state of mind generally as an intent to "benefit the enemy’s war effort and to harm 
that of that of the United States."134 Significantly, the defendants in Haupt and Kawakita 
"were shown to have declared their animus against the United States war effort and their 
desire that the enemy prevail." 135 Broughton suggests Cramer leaves some ambiguity in 
treason’s mens rea, jumping between what appears to be a requirement of a more demanding 
specific intent approach and of also inferring intent from the natural consequences of one’s 
actions. A requirement of specific intent would be consistent not only with the meaning of 
‘adhere’ in the Constitutional text, and with the desire to maintain a narrow definition of 
treason.136 Its significance is confirming that treason requires, in addition to an overt act of 
aid and comfort to an enemy, proof of a distinctive mens rea element, viz., intent to betray.137 
Vasanthakumar observes the Court did not specify whether treason requires specific or 
general intent, or whether motive is relevant to the question of intent. Repeated exhortations 
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that treason requires an intention to betray seem to suggest treason requires specific intent – 
that the accused must not only intend to provide aid and comfort to the enemy but must 
intend to provide aid and comfort to the enemy in order to betray.138 
Israeli treason law is also instructive in underlining the essential idea of intent to assist the 
enemy against the homeland: "If a person with intent to assist an enemy in war against Israel 
commits an act calculated to do so, he is liable to the death penalty or to life 
imprisonment."139 
I propose to subtly refine the concept of treasonous intention from the intent to betray the 
UK to the intent to betray the UK by aiding its enemies – or the intent to betray the UK to 
its enemies. Nothing less suffices. Again, this qualification reflects the central idea of 
‘Adherence Treason’ and the imperative to maintain a narrow definition.  
We could always approach treasonous intent on the basis of whether a reasonable person 
would, in all the circumstances of the case, consider it to be treasonous. But given the 
notorious historical difficulties of definition – and the current environment of promiscuous 
treason rhetoric ("treason talk")140 creating the impression that treason is broader than the 
legal reality141 – precise judicial instruction would be required – and that would necessarily 
be ascribable to a fuller definition in any new legislation. 
Insofar as I have set out a conceptual framework of ‘Adherence Treason’ – enemy 
involvement being pivotal, reframing the actus reus in terms of a ‘national security harm’ 
principle and enemy coordination – I propose the relevant focus for the mens rea requirement 
would be on the actor’s intent to breach their negative duty of allegiance (or duty of non-
betrayal) in conjunction (‘art and part’) with the foreign enemy. The relevant treasonous 
intent is engaged by betrayal (breaching the negative duty of allegiance) to a foreign enemy. 
This might be encapsulated in the following notions: the intent to betray – predicated as it is 
on the intellectual or emotional attachment to the enemy, including the harbouring of 
sympathies or beliefs involving disloyalty to the UK – and the manifestation of that intent in 
an act which assists the enemy. This is to be a conjunctive and not a disjunctive test.  
 
138 Ashwini Vasanthakumar, “Treason, Expatriation and 'So-Called' Americans: Recovering the Role of 
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The duty is to be conceptualised in narrow terms – not to betray one’s country by aiding its 
enemies in their attacks – rather than any broad duty to love one’s country (which would 
otherwise engage a positive duty). The emphasis will be on intentional treasonous action – 
to breach the (negative) duty of allegiance in this way – as evidenced by (more specifically, 
inferred from) a relevant overt act. This is not about the breach of a moral duty, but about 
the intentional breach of a more narrowly defined legal duty (that is itself a corollary of the 
British state discharging its duty of protection).  
Suffice to say, the treasonous intent would have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt – 
though it might typically be expected that there would be a case for an accused to answer 
from evidence of proven overt acts alone and the inferences which could inevitably be drawn 
from them as to the existence of treasonous intent. The intent to betray could be proved in 
the same way as intent for any other crime – whereby mens rea is a state of mind, to be 
inferred or deduced from what has been proved to have been said or done.142  
 
V. Relevant Intent with New Modelling: 
I now address what would be the relevant intent under this duty-based contractual model – 
and what would be the mens rea appropriate to each of the specific forms of conduct 
identified in Chapter 3 which should comprise the surviving three core offences.  
If we are proceeding on the basis of a contractual model – and thus envisaging the offence 
of treason in terms of the breach of a contractual duty (of allegiance) – then it might be 
thought that any breach of that duty involving the commission of threshold conduct would 
be pivotal – such that ‘treasonable’ intent could refer to or be inferred from the merely 
reckless or negligent actions of the protected person (in giving assistance, as I remodelled 
‘aid and comfort’ in Chapter 3, to the sovereign’s enemies). Logically, symmetrically, 
breach of the duty could be triggered through lesser forms of mens rea than intention – 
specifically, recklessness and negligence. But while the breach of the duty could arise 
through ‘mere’ recklessness or negligence, I propose that we should conceive it in terms of 
a material or even a fundamental breach of duty which requires an element of deliberateness. 
Given a material or fundamental breach of contractual duty of allegiance is posited, the 
threshold should be a deliberate and intentional breach of this duty (by giving assistance to 
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the sovereign’s enemies in these ways) – with the requisite intent being to provide the enemy 
with material assistance. Deliberate and fundamental breach can always be inferred from the 
overt character of the treasonable act.  
Treason is the breach of the duty of allegiance and of the faithful support which the protected 
person owes to the sovereign (protecting) power. The ‘wrong’ of treason consists in the 
formation of a treasonous intent in violation of one’s (negative) duty of allegiance to the 
sovereign power (or nation). The traitor is guilty of defying the law which legitimately 
prohibits the formation of such intention. Treason ultimately requires the action and intent 
to violate that obligation. The key consideration is whether the protected person undertook 
the apparently treasonable action with the intention of carrying out or furthering treason – 
with the overt act manifesting and demonstrably proving (inferring) the necessary criminal 
(treasonable) intent (as well as furthering the accomplishment of the crime). The essence of 
the recast Scottish crime of treason will be the hostile intent to endanger or threaten the 
safety and security of the British state.  
This could be simply defined in terms of a specific intent to betray the UK. But this does not 
mean characterising it as a ‘specific intent’ crime – for that would be quite different. Further, 
‘specific intent’ is not a concept recognised as such in Scots law. 
In general terms, treasonous intent could be defined (for the purposes of the revised, 
surviving core offences) as intentionally breaching (or betraying) one’s duty of allegiance to 
the sovereign power by assisting the sovereign’s enemies, including doing so by compassing 
the death of the sovereign or by levying war against the sovereign in her realm. However, 
this will not be an exercise in simply defining a general treasonous intent to apply globally 
to these remaining heads of treason, given the statement from Gordon’s Criminal Law that 
mens rea might be considered separately not merely with reference to each crime, but with 
reference to each element of them.143 It involves defining the intent to do one of the specified 
acti rei. 
Betrayal can be envisaged in terms of the breaking or violation of this presumptive contract 
or relationship of trust. The general mens rea of the crime of treason will be the hostile intent 
to endanger or threaten the safety and security of the British state by knowingly giving help 
to the enemy. There will be two aspects to this – intention to harm (in terms of the ‘national 
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security harm’ principle) – and knowledge that this would assist the enemy. This can be 
regarded as a conjunctive test – with both elements requiring to be proved for the relevant 
treasonable intent to be established. This is consistent with the approach adopted by the 
charge formulated in Casement that certain overt acts were committed: "with intent to solicit, 
incite, and persuade the … British subjects, being Irishmen, to forsake their duty and 
allegiance to the King and to aid and assist his enemies in the prosecution of the said war 
against the King and his subjects."144  
I submit that the relevant mens rea for each of the three surviving limbs of treason be 
couched in the following terms:  
• With ‘Adhering to the Sovereign’s Enemies’, the relevant mens rea will be the hostile 
intent to betray the UK (the sovereign) and breach one’s negative duty of allegiance 
(duty of non-betrayal), by knowingly adhering to an enemy of the UK to assist an 
enemy at war with the UK. In short, the relevant intent will be to betray the UK by 
helping its enemies – or the intent to betray the UK to its enemies.  
• With compassing the death of the sovereign (attempted murder, assault or restraint 
of the sovereign), the relevant mens rea will be the hostile intent to betray the UK 
and breach one’s negative duty of allegiance, by knowingly adhering to an enemy of 
the UK to assist an enemy at war with the UK, by killing or deliberately assaulting 
or restraining the sovereign. To summarise, the intent will be to betray the UK to its 
enemies by attacking the sovereign. 
• With ‘Levying War Treason’ (insurrection), the relevant mens rea will be the hostile 
intent to betray the UK and breach one’s negative duty of allegiance, by knowingly 
adhering to an enemy of the UK to assist an enemy at war with the UK, by levying 
war against the sovereign in her realm. In short, the intent will be to betray the UK 
to its enemies by levying war (or ‘internal rebellion’). 
 
With the new posited offence of committing terrorism against the British people, the relevant 
mens rea will be the hostile intent to betray the UK and breach one’s negative duty of 
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allegiance, by knowingly adhering to an enemy of the UK to assist an enemy at war with the 
UK, by attacking the general safety of the British state.  
Properly, the offender’s motive is irrelevant to their criminal responsibility – unless it is 
consistent with there being a relevant (justification or excuse) defence. I submit that motive 
as a factor establishing the crime of treason cannot override intention as inferred from 
conduct.145 Treason will be established if the prosecution can prove that the accused had the 
specific intent to betray the UK by aiding its enemies (or the specific intent to betray the UK 
to its enemies) – regardless of whether there was a dual intent or ulterior motive. Having 
reviewed the somewhat inconsistent ‘modern’ treason case law on this thorny issue of mixed 
motives – as discussed in the twentieth century precedent of Ahlers, Casement and Steane – 
I suggest that "American Mid-century Modern" case law might offer the best solution – by 
underlining the irrelevance of mixing motive with another attenuated or incidental motive.  
Firstly, if an accused has the specific intention to bring about this result – which this law 
seeks to prevent, their motive is irrelevant. Their reason or motivation might be religious or 
ideological conviction, hatred of the UK, or greed – but none of these motives will be 
relevant to the issue of whether they have intentionally and deliberately committed treason 
or not. It need not matter why one intends to aid a hostile state or organisation against the 
UK. A noble motive could provide scope, of course, for a justification defence – a matter 
which I will explore in Chapter 5 – but it will not negate mens rea. The betrayal could, of 
course, be aggravated because of certain motivations – in assessing culpability for sentencing 
purposes. 
 
VI. Mens Rea in New Scottish Treason: 
The absence of specific modern definition of the mens rea element of the crime of treason 
provides something of a blank canvas. I propose that the mens rea of the proposed Scottish 
crime of treason be couched in terms of "acting in breach of the duty of allegiance with intent 
to betray the sovereign and materially assist any enemy state or organisation at war with the 
United Kingdom." 
Since it will be referred to as a crime of intent, in such phrase, the degree of mens rea will 
be that required for the central element of the crime.146 I suggest the offence be formulated 
 
145 Elagab, “Fighting”, 377 
146 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 7.11 
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in terms of "acting with intent". To "act with intent" requires a more positive mental state 
than "acting intentionally" – since "intentionally" doing present actions may simply mean 
no more than those actions are done voluntarily.147 It is not just about acting intentionally – 
but acting intentionally with the intent to bring out some further outcome. It connotes 
treachery and the moral wrong of betrayal. The use of the word ‘intent’ precludes the 
possibility of lessor forms of mens rea such as recklessness or negligence. It connotes the 
knowledge element. As an intent to betray the sovereign and material assistance are required, 
the additional incorporation of ‘wilfully’ in the definition would be quite superfluous. 
A useful reference point for defining the relevant intent in any new treason offence is the 
(repealed) Treachery Act 1940. It will be appreciated that its treachery offence was not 
contingent on the existence of a duty of allegiance. Despite its title, its focus was on the 
prosecution of German saboteurs – it being doubtful whether they were captured by treason 
laws. Nonetheless, the Act was comparatively modern legislation which made the following 
familiar express provisions for intent: "with intent to help the enemy" – and the doing of any 
act: "which is designed or likely to give assistance to the naval, military or air operations of 
the enemy". The mens rea required under the Act was clear and simple – "with intent to help 
the enemy". No act done without that intent came within the offence of treachery.148 The 
Policy Exchange Paper, in suggesting a framework for a new treason offence founded on 
this precedent and similarly defined intent in terms of "intent to aid" states or organisations 
with whom the UK is engaged in armed conflict.149  
It is axiomatic that treasonous intent requires the element of betrayal. I suggest that the 
betrayal – by breach of the duty of the allegiance – is expressly stated. The stark reminder 
in the wording of the offence is that the offender is a protected person – that they enjoy the 
protection of the Crown – to the extent that they owe the Crown a duty (of allegiance) – 
which they have materially breached and betrayed – thus evoking something of the moral 
wrong of betrayal. In the dry world of statutory drafting, this is not anodyne language. It 
reiterates the focal meaning of the term in lay usage and understanding. This is a morally 
adequate solution to the argument that the mens rea of treason as it is currently understood, 
 
147 Ibid., para. 7.13 n. 39; R. Buxton, "Some Simple Thoughts on Intention" [1988] Crim LR 484, 490 
148 D. Seaborne Davies, “The Treachery Act, 1940” (1941) 4 MLR 217, 219 
149 Richard Ekins et al., Aiding the Enemy, How and why to restore the law of treason Policy Exchange (2018), 
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fails to capture the moral wrong of betrayal. It fulfils what should be the ‘fair labelling’ 
function of the criminal law – consistent with moral disapprobation. 
I propose a conjunctive test – that there must be intent to both betray the country and to assist 
an enemy state or organisation at war with the UK. This makes it clear that the offender must 
intend to betray their country by means of the act of enemy assistance.150  
The language of aid, assistance and adherence might be thought to be interchangeable. But 
the Australian Criminal Code is instructive in qualifying assistance in terms of the intent to 
provide material assistance. The Code only expressly provides for intent in relation to 
‘Adherence Treason’ – if the person intends that their conduct will materially assist the 
enemy to engage in war with the Commonwealth of Australia.151 The requirement that the 
intent be to provide material assistance might be considered an unnecessary impediment – 
because what might be regarded as significant is the fact of treasonous intent and not the 
effectiveness or futility of its execution. If ‘new’ treason were conceptualised in terms of 
‘accomplice liability’ – involving coordination with an enemy principal, the content of the 
aid provided by the adherent accessory need not be significant – assuming it emboldens the 
enemy or amounts to mere psychological encouragement.152 The requirement for the intent 
to provide material assistance is consistent with the ‘national security harm’ principle. It 
reflects that treason should be envisaged as the maximum legal response to conduct which 
is sufficiently serious as to harm our national security and political institutions.153 It is 
unnecessary to show that the accused ultimately succeeded in delivering aid to the enemy. It 
suffices merely that they took overt action to attempt performance. This insistence on the 
(attempted) provision of tangible support has the advantage of excluding mere acts of 
dissidence and minor propagandising (‘constructive treasons’). Treason is a special crime 
which should only be prosecuted exceptionally. Further, it need not matter whether material 
assistance is ultimately provided but that it is the actor’s intent that their conduct will 
materially assist the enemy.  
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Discrete Mens Rea Issues: 
Knowledge of Enemy Status: 
It would also have to be proven that the protected person had the requisite knowledge that 
the enemy state or organisation was at war with the UK. Proof of an accused’s knowledge 
of an enemy’s status might be fraught in circumstances of only undeclared war or shooting 
hostilities – a feature of modern warfare. I suggest provisions (in Chapter 3) by which the 
protected person will be deemed to be on de jure notice.  
 
Knowledge of Protected Person Status: 
The intent to betray includes the accused’s awareness that they owe allegiance.154 What of 
the mens rea of a home-grown Jihadist who is in the process of obtaining a ‘declaration of 
renunciation’ on the discrete issue of whether they genuinely know that they continue to be 
a protected person? This might be contingent on to what extent their renunciation application 
has a reasonable basis and is likely to succeed. I suggest that a person remains a British 
Citizen pending the determination of their renunciation application and the issuing 
of a ‘declaration of renunciation’ – and, if applicable, their new citizenship were acquired 
and not renounced (or revoked) within a subsequent 6-month period. The submission of a 
renunciation application can only be regarded as an incomplete act. Even then, the issuing 
of the ‘declaration of renunciation’ does not exhaust the process – for until the successful 
applicant has subsequently acquired their new citizenship, they remain a British Citizen – 
and criminally liable for the crime of treason.155 They will not be left in a state of 
limbo. Perhaps those contemplating a ‘Jihadi gap year’ might be best advised to wait until 
their application to renounce British Citizenship has been determined – a ‘declaration of 
renunciation’ issued – their new citizenship application successfully determined – and a 
period of 6 months expire lest their new status be imperilled in any way during that time-
frame (when the default setting is British Citizenship).  
 
 
 
 
154 Broughton, “Rhetoric”, n. 171; Vasanthakumar, “Allegiance”, 208; Kawakita, 722 
155 Obtaining enemy naturalisation after the commencement of war is itself an act of treason (Lynch). 
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VII. Conclusion: 
The critical thing about treason is its intent. Treason is at the heart of treason, but treason is 
more than having treason in one’s heart. Treasonous intention can generally be understood 
as not only the intent to commit the specific act – but requiring the additional intent to betray 
the UK by aiding its enemies.  
I have provided a draft formulation for the mens rea element of any new Scottish crime of 
treason which underlines that the breach of the duty of the allegiance is morally blameworthy 
– by alluding to the violation of the contractual relationship between the protected person 
and the sovereign power. Treason requires proof of an essential and distinctive mens rea 
element – the intent to betray. I suggest the mens rea of any new Scottish crime of treason 
be defined in terms of the intent to betray the UK by aiding its enemies – or the intent to 
betray the UK to its enemies. I propose a conjunctive test – that there must be intent to both 
betray the country and assist an enemy state or organisation at war with the UK. Both aspects 
must apply to meet the threshold for treasonable mens rea. Treason’s mens rea should reflect 
the two correlating but subtly distinct aspects of the moral wrong of treason which are the 
intent to betray country – and the intent to betray country to an enemy state or 
organisation.156 These are plainly issues for a jury to decide. The accused’s mens rea in 
respect of each aspect would naturally require to be corroborated under Scottish adjective 
law. Admittedly, this might render Scottish treason more difficult to prove – but that 
difficulty safeguards against the risk of politically vindictive prosecutions or the punishment 
of those who simply harbour disloyal grudges.157 This does not render proof impossible. This 
is hardly a bar to conviction – because it will not excuse what might be otherwise egregious 
criminal conduct. It is simply to insist that if treason law were to be resuscitated, it requires 
confluence of a sufficiently guilty act and guilty mind devoted to betraying the UK to a 
foreign enemy.  
On one view, a treasonous result should not be regarded as intended unless it were proven 
to be the actor’s purpose, i.e., unless they acted to bring about that result. This is consistent 
with the ordinary meaning of the word. Meanwhile, simply defining mens rea will not make 
it clear that there might otherwise be scope for the operation of certain specific defences to 
‘new’ treason.  
 
156 Broughton, “Snowden”, 26 
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The relevant offence elements of treason, now including intentional elements, would be that 
the accused:  
(1) had a duty of allegiance 
(2) breached that duty of allegiance 
(3) did so in a material way, by the commission of relevant treasonable conduct 
(4) did so with the intent to betray the UK by aiding its enemies (or the intent to betray 
the UK to its enemies) 
 
I am conscious this makes for a more convoluted offence – but, more importantly, for a 
deliberately narrow ‘intent’ offence. It should always be remembered that the charge of 
treason is a ‘dangerous’ charge – so it is important to curb the Government’s power to bring 
it – preventing the possibility of it being extended to offences of minor importance. This 
need not unduly disadvantage the Crown in convicting saboteurs because treasonous conduct 
is invariably criminalised under alternative statutory offences which do not have the 
evidential safeguards and limitations that would (and should) accompany treason itself.158 
Though the relationship of defences to mens rea may sometimes be close and direct – to the 
extent that general defences occasionally overlap with negating mens rea – I will approach 
matters in Chapter 5 on the basis of what separate defences might be available under this 
emerging model. 
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I. Introduction: 
Having addressed in Chapter 4 the mens rea that would be appropriate to the duty-based 
allegiance model, I now consider the proper limits of that model and the conditions under 
which protected persons should not be criminally responsible for conduct falling within 
those limits. The principal question to be asked in this chapter is what type of defences 
should be available where there has been a material and intentional breach of this duty of 
allegiance.  
This chapter will be in five main parts. In the first (post-introduction) section, I will attempt 
to ascertain what are believed to be the existing general (non-procedural) defences to the 
posited surviving three core offences identified in Chapter 3 – viz., ‘Compassing Treason’, 
‘Levying War Treason’ and ‘Adhering to the Enemy’.1 In the second section, I will identify 
the issues arising with the otherwise standard defences operating in what is understood to be 
‘modern’ treason law: in particular, the lack of certainty as to the availability of the general 
common law defences of necessity and coercion. I will engage with the criticisms which 
might be made of the ostensible defences to ‘current’ treason. Then in the third part I will 
make the general case for what should survive and be suitably bolstered. I will argue that 
there should be express statutory recognition for the partial operation of the general common 
law defences of necessity and coercion. In the fourth part I will consider whether the 
exceptional character of the crime of treason also commends provision for new specific 
statutory defences which have contemporary resonance. I will discuss what justification or 
(reasonable) excuse defences might or should be available under the suggested new Scottish 
framework. A potential justification defence will be a ‘Public Interest Defence’. The 
experience of common law countries who have renewed their treason laws is instructive and 
I will also address the potentiality for an offence-specific ‘Humanitarian Defence’ as a 
justification defence for those found ensconced in enemy territory insofar as provision was 
made following a modern reappraisal of Australian treason law. Contemporary cases raise 
issues of ‘Justified Government Whistleblowing’ as a possible justification defence in 
‘Espionage Treason’. In the fifth part I will address the consequences of and any objections 
which there might be to these enhanced defences and new defences. I will consider the 
options for a specifically Scottish refinement of the defences. 
 
1 S. 5 of the Treason Act 1695 still sets a 3-year limitation period on prosecution for treasonable acts committed 
within the UK unless the treason consists of "designing, endeavouring or attempting any assassination on the 
body of the King" (s. 6). 
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II. Defences to ‘Current’ Treason: 
(i) Justification Defences: 
Many academics, in distinguishing between types of criminal defence, do so most readily 
between justifications and excuses. Justified actors deny wrongdoing – they may concede 
criminal wrongdoing but deny that it was the wrong thing to do. Excused actors do not deny 
the wrongfulness of their actions, arguing that there are grounds on which they should not 
be blamed for them. While justification defences are available to most crimes, there appears 
to be only limited scope for their application in treason. But there could be circumstances in 
which an accused maintains that they were not wrong and only committed treason because 
they were serving a higher good, defying a corrupt or unjustified regime. If someone 
genuinely wants to act against the UK because they believe that it is the right and necessary 
thing to do – and regards aiding its enemies as acceptable collateral damage – with any 
wavering objection already overcome by their firm belief in the acceptability of that action 
– that would not negate mens rea. It would still be consistent with what is posited in terms 
of treason’s exacting mens rea – viz., the specific intent to betray the UK by aiding its 
enemies or the specific intent to betray the UK to its enemies. But a justification defence 
might still be available, reflecting a difficult choice between two competing evils. 
 
(a) Necessity: 
Exceptionally, necessity makes it permissible to commit a crime to prevent a greater harm. 
The actor is confronted with a choice between two courses of action and is required to choose 
by reference to the relative values the law attaches to the two courses and their results. The 
essential feature is a conflict of values and the actor must, in making the choice, consider 
these relative values.2 They do not have a duty to choose the course that will realise the 
greater value. They are (in the absence, exceptionally, of a special duty to act) entitled simply 
not to act and will not incur any liability for an omission.  
While relative values may change from time to time, this appears to be no way to justify 
treason. An accused’s reasonably held belief that they were ‘driven’ or compelled to perform 
certain kinds of treasonable acts – with the professed intent to avoid a greater harm still, in 
the national interest – in circumstances where they subjectively consider that their form of 
 
2 Gordon, Criminal Law, 4th ed. Vol. I (2019), para. 13.02 
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protest (included acts of sabotage) has been ‘necessary’ to prevail upon the Government to 
modify its allegedly harmful foreign policies could be creatively argued to amount to a 
defence of necessity (or, in England, ‘duress of circumstances’). The accused’s defence 
would be: "I did it because I had no alternative."3 
This might also be loosely conceptualised in terms of self-defence (of others) or a 
‘Reasonable Excuse Defence’. This approach could apparently justify certain notionally 
treasonable activities which, have been motivated by the protected person’s good or even 
noble intentions – involving a subjectively broader or longer-term view of the national 
interest. It is moot whether such a defence so expressed would survive contact with legal 
reality, as I will survey in the next section. 
 
(b) Necessity and ‘International Law Defence’: 
While there is no specific ‘International Law Defence’, the Government’s breach of 
international law could conceivably be invoked as an aspect of a ‘Reasonable Excuse 
Defence’ or a necessity defence. In R. v. Ahlers the accused thought that there was a rule of 
international law which gave a margin of time to enemy subjects to return home.4 That such 
a belief might have been reasonable was substantiated by an Order in Council which allowed 
German subjects to depart without permits from certain approved ports up to 11 August 
1914. It was ultimately not left to the jury to decide whether he was actuated by the intention, 
and had the purpose, of aiding and comforting the King's enemies, and his appeal against 
conviction was allowed on that ground.  
In an extraordinary sheriff court case Ellen Moxley, Angie Zelter and Ulla Roder were 
prosecuted on charges of maliciously damaging an unmanned barge involved in the carrying 
of Trident missiles at HMNB Clyde (Faslane). They maintained that causing the damage had 
been justified since the deployment of Trident was in breach of customary international law 
and therefore in breach of Scottish law. At the behest of the defence, Sheriff Gimblett 
instructed the jury that the accuseds’ actions could be justified because they had been seeking 
to prevent the use of ‘illegal’ nuclear weapons – by their purporting to follow a 1996 advisory 
 
3 Ibid., para. 13.01 
4 [1915] 1 KB 616 
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opinion of the International Court of Justice to the effect that they were illegal.5 The jury 
acquitted. The Crown proceeded by way of a Lord Advocate’s Reference – and the Appeal 
Court established that: (1) in a Scottish criminal trial, evidence could not be led as to the 
content of customary international law, but rather a direction should be given by the judge; 
(2) the conduct of the Government had not been illegal because the peacetime deployment 
of Trident as a deterrent was not a threat – and there was no rule of customary international 
law justifying the commission of a crime to prevent the commission of another crime even 
in circumstances of armed conflict and actual threat; (3) the accuseds’ belief that the 
deployment of Trident was in breach of customary international law did not provide a 
defence of justification to the charge of malicious damage; and (4) save for the defence of 
necessity, it was not a defence to a criminal charge that the relevant actions had been taken 
to hinder the commission of an offence by another person.6 Though the defence of necessity 
could be employed where the malicious damage was remote from the threat to people or 
property, it was only available where the perceived threat was immediate and there was no 
alternative to a criminal act to avert the threat.7 It was not available where the actions of the 
Government had not been shown to be unlawful.  
It might be thought that it is unlikely that the imminence requirement could be satisfied – or 
that the conduct could have had a reasonable (or even the remotest) prospect of removing 
the danger – as to substantiate a necessity defence. Nonetheless, a necessity defence was 
pled by Katherine Gun, a GCHQ translator and member of the security and intelligence 
services, who was charged in November 2003 with contravening s. 1 of the Official Secrets 
Act (OSA) 1989, for disclosing intelligence information to the media in February 2003 
relating to illegal activities by the US Government in its agitating for the March 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Her disclosure concerned illegal surveillance of UN Security Council 
delegates to obtain leverage to coerce their support. In issue was the then undisclosed and 
 
5 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons – Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 [1996] ICJ 2 – though 
the judgment of the International Court of Justice was more ambiguous than the defence suggested, the ICJ 
observing:  
"in view of the current state of international law and of the elements of fact at its disposal, [it] cannot conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake".  
 
6 Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2000), 2001 SCCR 296 
7 Moss v. Howdle, 1997 JC 123 
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what subsequently transpired to be the evolving advice of the Attorney General, Lord 
Goldsmith, on the war’s legality. The prosecution was strategically discontinued in February 
2004, the Crown offering no evidence. The case had become a cause célèbre with the 
defence expected to argue that Gun’s actions in trying to stop an illegal act – specifically 
intending to prevent unnecessary loss of life in an illegal war of aggression – trumped her 
obligations under the OSA.8 The asserted breach of international law was material – not 
speculative because it corresponded to the Attorney General’s original advice – and arguably 
met the immediacy requirement in circumstances where the outbreak of war, leading to 
catastrophic loss of life, was imminent.9 Gun’s actions appear historically vindicated given 
that the Chilcot Report found that in the run up to the conflict, diplomatic options to avoid 
WMD proliferation had not been exhausted and military action was therefore not a last 
resort.10 It was not within the inquiry’s remit to assess the legality of military intervention, 
but it did impugn the legal advisory process: "The circumstances in which it was ultimately 
decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory."11 
Accordingly, it is submitted that while there is no specific ‘International Law Defence’, an 
accused could invoke a necessity defence to putatively treasonable conduct where the actions 
of the Government are arguably unlawful under international law and providing the 
imminence requirement is satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Marcia and Thomas Mitchell, The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War (2008); Official Secrets (2019), Gavin Hood, 
dir.; “GCHQ translator cleared over leak” BBC (26 February 2004): 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3485072.stm 
9 All estimates of Iraq War casualties are disputed. The tally of British military casualties from 2003-2009 was 
179. Sir John Chilcot believed that at least 150,000 Iraqis were killed during the invasion and subsequent 
instability, but that the true figure was probably much higher – Ian Cobain, “UK must do more to assess civilian 
war casualties in future, says Chilcot” Guardian (8 July 2008): 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/08/uk-must-do-more-assess-civilian-casualties-wars-chilcot 
10 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary (2016), para. 20 
11 Ibid., para. 432 
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(ii) Excuse Defences: 
Excused actors deny either responsibility or culpability. They might concede that their 
conduct was wrongful (criminally and possibly morally) but seek to avoid attribution of 
responsibility for it. Classically, coercion is an excuse defence.12 
 
(a) Coercion: 
If the accused acts under coercion by the enemy, he will not have voluntarily adhered to the 
enemy cause.13 It might be thought that someone who is forced to assist the enemy by reason 
of coercion (or duress) – even if they have done so quite deliberately and intentionally – 
should not be guilty of treason for this would scarcely be a free and voluntary act. Given 
‘Adherence Treason’ involves the idea of psychological adherence to the enemy, it could 
hardly be a psychological finding that those acting under coercion adhered to the enemy.14 
The defence of coercion (or duress in England) is not obviously available to a charge of 
treason – even in circumstances where there may be certainty that a person of reasonable 
firmness would have given way.15 Someone who is forced to commit treasonous acts by 
coercion would still appear to be guilty of treason. It was suggested that the defence of duress 
did not extend to some forms of treason in the Law Commission’s 1977 Working Paper on 
criminal defences.16 They proposed in their 1977 Working Paper on modernising the law of 
offences against the state that it should apply.17 In R. v. Hasan Lord Bingham, delivering the 
Opinion of the Court, confirmed that the defence of duress was unavailable to some forms 
of treason,18 albeit countenancing its availability for other forms.  
 
12 R. v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, per Lord Bingham – the defence of duress "excuses what would otherwise be 
criminal conduct" rather than justifies it (para. 18). 
13 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193, 207-208  
14 Ibid., 207 
15 R. v. Steane [1947] KB 997 
16 Law Commission, Criminal Law Report on Defences of General Application (Law Com No 83, 1977), para. 
2.2 
17 Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law, Treason, Sedition and Allied Offences (Law Com No 
72, 1977), para. 56 
18 Para. 21 
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In R. v. Purdy Oliver J directed the jury that on a charge of treason based on assisting the 
enemy with German propaganda while a prisoner of war, fear of death would be a relevant 
defence.19 Though in R. v. Steane Goddard CJ was of the view that duress was not available 
on a treason charge (before otherwise quashing conviction), coercive circumstances were 
deemed sufficient to disprove a charge of doing acts likely to assist the enemy with intent to 
assist the enemy (in contravention of reg. 2A of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939). 
Macdonald confirms: "Compulsion is a good defence against a charge of adherence to the 
king’s enemies, but not fear of injury to, or loss of property."20 Further, Macdonald infers 
that there would be limited scope for a compulsion defence to a charge of treason in non-
homicide or non-injury situations.21 Though apparently contradicting Steane, Goddard CJ 
only referred to duress as a possible defence, holding it unnecessary to consider it because 
of the particular conditions prevailing where the accused was under enemy control. 
Meanwhile, Steane is cited in relation to the brief discussion confirming the availability of a 
compulsion defence in certain restricted circumstances in Gordon’s Criminal Law.22  
The House of Lords recognised the availability of duress on certain charges of treason in 
DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch but precluded its availability to treason involving the 
death of the sovereign.23 Then again, the main ruling in Lynch was reversed in R. v. Howe.24 
The (2018) Crown Prosecution Service Legal Guidance states that duress is a defence at 
common law to all crimes except murder, attempted murder and treason involving the death 
of the sovereign,25 citing R. v. Gotts.26 Archbold confirms that coercion will not be available 
as a defence to a charge of treason involving the death of the sovereign but will be for other 
categories of treason.27 The Policy Exchange Paper reiterates that it is unclear whether duress 
 
19 (1946) 10 JCL 182 
20 Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th ed. (1948), 174; Gordon, Criminal 
Law, para. 43.21 – citing R. v. MacGrowther (1746) 18 St Tr 391; Cf. Purdy; Steane 
21 Macdonald, 171 – citing Hume, Commentaries, I, 520: where there is historical acknowledgement that acts 
of outward warfare for a usurper against a deposed, true king should be held as done under compulsion of the 
usurper. This passage is significant in recognising compulsion as a relevant and operable defence in certain 
circumstances.  
22 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 43.21 
23 [1975] AC 653, 681; Abbot v. R. [1976] 3 WLR 462, 470F 
24 [1987] AC 417 
25 https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/defences-duress-and-necessity 
26 [1992] 2 AC 412 
27 Archbold: Criminal Practice and Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2020, para. 17-104 
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may or may not be a defence to treason – depending on whether the treason alleged would 
constitute murder or whether it was ‘Levying War Treason’ or ‘Adhering to the Enemy’.28 
As a general proposition, the Court will not countenance a defence of coercion where the 
harm done by the accused is greater than the Court’s perception of the harm threatened to 
them – engaging a proportionality test. The holding in Howe was that the jury should 
consider whether the accused acted as they did because they honestly believed that their life 
was in immediate danger (a subjective test) – and whether a reasonable person of ordinary 
courage, sharing the accused’s characteristics, would have responded in the same way to the 
threats (an objective test). Where the choice is between the threat of death or serious injury 
and betraying their country, should a reasonable man reflect that they are choosing the lesser 
of two evils? As a matter of public policy, in a case where lives are at stake, it would almost 
inevitably hold that the lives of innocent British Citizens (including British servicemen) are 
more valuable than the accused’s own life. Howe affirmed the higher duty of protecting 
freedom and lives against the rising tide of violence and international terrorism.  
The Court in Thomson v. HM Advocate accepted that Hume’s account of coercion related to 
the situation of a well-regulated society where everyone was assumed to have ready access 
to protection from the forces of law and order, and where that assumption could be made to 
justify the strict conditions which limited the defence's ready exercise. Where that 
assumption could not be made, the Court considered that a case-by-case approach would 
have to be adopted where the usual strict criteria would have to be relaxed in accordance 
with realities.29  
Coercion is thus not a global defence to a charge of treason – and a hierarchy seems to be 
involved. It is likely to be excluded where death or serious injury arises, particularly in the 
terrorist context. 
 
Prisoners of War: 
A recognised practical example of its operation would be Prisoners of War who have worked 
and given assistance to the enemy war effort. POWs can be compelled to work though they 
have the legal right (and military duty) not to undertake work which has a military character 
 
28 Richard Ekins et al., Aiding the Enemy, How and why to restore the law of treason Policy Exchange (2018), 
9 
29 Thomson v. HM Advocate, 1983 SCCR 368, per LJC Wheatley, 382 
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or purpose.30 The coercion must be continuous – throughout the period of the treason – and 
the plea will not be available where there has been a failure to take the opportunity to 
escape.31 Modern coercion case law suggests that disclosure to the authorities on regaining 
their freedom would only be relevant to the assessment of the credibility of the accused – 
and not an essential requirement.32 There was some acknowledgement of the predicament of 
POWs assisting the enemy by the Law Commission – because they are compelled to work 
in terms of international convention. Properly, there should be a requirement not only of help 
to the enemy but that there should be no lawful excuse for giving the help. The Law 
Commission recommended that the defence should be available in such circumstances as a 
defence to treason.33 This reflects allowance being made for the degree of physical and 
mental endurance which can be reasonably expected from POWs. It should be remembered 
that despite the perception created by cosy post-war cinematic depictions, POWs may be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and suffering from starvation and 
malnutrition. These hardships would have been widespread toward the end of the Second 
World War as the Red Cross parcel system broke down with long-term POWs starting to die 
from malnutrition.34 After a lengthy period of incarceration, they may become increasingly 
vulnerable to inducements and pressurisation. Depending on context and severity, these are 
factors which may be potentially exculpatory or at least reduce culpability. This defence 
could conceivably have traction with a repatriated POW, who has been ‘turned’, or more 
particularly ‘brain-washed’ by the enemy35 – albeit that scenario might be technically more 
consistent with the more obscure defence of compulsion (rather than coercion), where the 
subject would have been deprived of the power to form the intention of doing the act which 
constituted or caused the crime.36  
 
30 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva (1949), arts. 49, 50 and 78 
31 Steane; Alastair Brown, “Offences against the State” (2005), para. 542 (in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia) 
32 Thomson 
33 Law Com WP 72, para. 56  
34 Adrian Weale, Patriot Traitors: Roger Casement, John Amery and the Real Meaning of Treason (2001), 
173; Rebecca West, The New Meaning of Treason (1964), 83  
35 See Homeland, Howard Gordon and Alex Gansa, Seasons 1-3 (2011-2013) – based on the Israeli production 
Prisoners of War, Gideon Raff, dir. (2010-2012); and, more fantastically, The Manchurian Candidate (1962) 
John Frankenheimer, dir. – based on Richard Condon’s novel (1959) 
36 Gerald H. Gordon, “Criminal responsibility in Scots law” (1960) PHD thesis, University of Glasgow, 49: 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2753/1/1960gordonphd.pdf 
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Meanwhile, compulsion by threats (of immediate death or bodily harm) continues to be 
unavailable as a defence under the Canadian Criminal Code to the commission of the offence 
of (high) treason.37 Notably the treason prosecution of Australian Major Charles Cousens 
was discontinued after he had pleaded at the committal proceedings that he had acted under 
duress, the captured radio broadcaster having been apparently compelled to broadcast 
propaganda for the Japanese or face execution.38 Chapman encapsulated his dilemma thus: 
"Just how much could the nation expect from volunteer soldiers who had given up their 
careers to fight for the Empire and, having lived through the hazards of battle, had fallen into 
the hands of a cruel enemy?"39  
Claims of duress were unsuccessfully pled in D’Aquino v. United States40 and Gillars v. 
United States,41 both World War II-era cases involving American nationals recruited as Axis 
propagandists. Iva Toguri D’Aquino, the daughter of Japanese immigrants, became 
synonymous with the name ‘Tokyo Rose’ (even though its usage predated her broadcasts). 
In 1940 she went to Japan to help care for to care for an elderly relative. As war loomed, she 
sought a passport from the US Counsel, but since this was not processed by the time of the 
Pearl Harbour attack, she was unable to leave. She claimed that the Japanese authorities 
forced her into the role and that she merely broadcast light musical entertainment while 
smuggling cigarettes and food to Allied POWs. She argued that however correct the jury 
instruction might be in an ordinary case involving a person accused of crime committed in 
their own country claiming to have been coerced by an individual, the trial court’s instruction 
(almost identical to that approved in Gillars) was in error – particularly in its requirement of 
apprehension of immediate and impending death or bodily harm – where the accused person 
was in an enemy country, unable to obtain protection from their home country and where 
the compulsion is on the part of the enemy government itself. The Ninth Circuit held while 
that might apply to a person impressed into military service of the enemy, the circumstances 
did not commend departure from the ordinary rules. There was no rule which would permit 
 
37 Criminal Code, s. 17 
38 Ex Parte Cousens; Re Blackett (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 145. Though Cousens was committed for trial, the New 
South Wales Attorney-General discontinued the prosecution on 6 November 1946 – see Ivan Chapman 
“Cousens, Charles Hughes (1903-1964)” Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 13 (MUP) (1993): 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/cousens-charles-hughes-9842 
39 Ivan Chapman, Tokyo Calling: The Charles Cousens Case (1990) 
40 D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir 1951) 
41 Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (DC Cir 1950) 
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a person under the protection of an enemy to claim immunity from prosecution for treason 
merely by setting up a claim of mental fear of possible future action on the part of the enemy. 
The citizen must manifest a determination to resist commands and orders until such time as 
they are faced with the alternative of immediate injury or death. Properly, the person 
claiming the defence of coercion and duress must be a person whose resistance has brought 
them to the last ditch.42 But there was simply no evidence of any determined refusal on 
D’Aquino’s part which might have provoked coercion – or induced immediate and actual 
danger to her.43 This was a controversial case and she eventually received a full and 
unconditional Presidential Pardon from the retiring President Ford in 1977.44 
 
Marital Coercion: 
The now-abolished English defence of marital coercion was never an operable defence to a 
charge of treason.45 It involved the rebuttable presumption that a wife who committed an 
offence in the presence of her husband did so under coercion. If it appeared that a wife had 
been acting as an equal partner, she might have expected to be excused capital punishment 
(women having been denied equal privileges with men on the benefit of clergy until 1691).46 
In Scotland, a wife’s plea of subjection was relevant only as regards mitigation of 
punishment.47 This defence had formerly existed in the US, though the presumption did not 
arise in a heinous offence such as treason (or murder). It was unsuccessfully deployed in the 
treason prosecution of Mildred Gillars (‘Axis Sally’).48 The long-since risible historical 
 
42 359 
43 360 
44 David Bird, “Ford Pardons ‘Tokyo Rose’ in One of Last Official Acts as President” NYT (20 January 1977): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/01/20/archives/ford-pardons-tokyo-rose-in-one-of-last-official-acts-as-
president.html 
45 Criminal Justice Act 1925, s. 47 (which had abolished the presumption and, in its place, incorporated the 
original common law defence) was repealed by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s. 
177. 
46 Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. I (1736), 44-45; William Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, Vol. IV. 6th ed (1775), 28-29; Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: 
Criminalization and Civil Order (2016), 174 
47 J.L.J. Edwards, “Coercion, Compulsion and Criminal Responsibility” (1951) 14 MLR 297, 312 
48 S. 2.09(3) of the American Law Institute’s influential template Model Penal Code (1962) (republished with 
revised Commentary in 1984) recommended abolition, albeit it is not legally binding.  
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justification was that wives were seen as obedient to their husbands, compliant, control being 
exercised through physical chastisement, not being economically independent, not having 
legal personality or autonomy49 – the so-called ‘melancholy doctrine’.50 But treason, like 
murder, was so heinous, it was supposed a married woman would revolt against even her 
husband’s authority, than be guilty of them51 – "the husband, having broken through the 
most sacred tie of social community by rebellion against the State, has no right to that 
obedience from his wife, which he himself, as a subject, has forgotten to pay."52 This 
exclusion precludes so-called Jihadi Brides arguing that they have been subject to this form 
of coercion in anything but modern Western conditions – to do otherwise would be to deny 
them agency53 – but the prevailing religious and ideological culture might instead be the 
overriding factors in establishing a legally relevant defence of coercion. Domestic 
pressurisation remains a potentially mitigating factor.54  
 
Terrorism Grooming and Online Radicalisation: 
In circumstances where a minor has been groomed and become entangled in a terrorist 
organisation, their systematic corruption could be inventively argued as an aspect of a 
coercion defence. Where children shy of the age of majority have been inculcated with 
radical ideas – whether through parental influence, the agency of the parents’ choice of 
spiritual mentors or social media – then it might be thought that such groomed and coerced 
children should be able to avail themselves of a coercion defence for ‘underage’ offending. 
 
49 Gerald McCoy, “Uxorial Privileges in Substantive Criminal Law: A Comparative Law Enquiry” (2007) PHD 
thesis, University of Canterbury, 23: 
https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10092/3674/thesis_fulltext.pdf?sequence=1 
50 R. v. Peel, The Times 8, 15 March 1922 
51 McCoy, “Uxorial Privileges”, 78, 229 n. 311, 408 n. 33 
52 Blackstone, IV, 29 
53 Ester E.J. Strømmen, “Jihadi Brides or Female Foreign Fighters? Women in Da’esh – from Recruitment to 
Sentencing” (2017) GPS Policy Brief 1 
54 This kind of pressure was claimed by 21-year-old Hana Khan, convicted of funding terrorism, and sentenced 
to 21 months’ imprisonment (suspended for 2 years), following trial at the Central Criminal Court in 2015. She 
had not been radicalised but had given £1,000 to her British Jihadist boyfriend in Syria on the misguided notion 
they would marry. He instead used it to fund terrorism – see “Hana Khan sentenced for helping to fund 
terrorism” BBC (27 March 2015): 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32090088 
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It could be argued that this is a form of ‘grooming’ which excuses criminal responsibility. 
Though the role of online grooming is recognised in the commission of sexual offences,55 
the law in other areas falls woefully behind this new kind of grooming. Edwards suggests 
the English duress defence might now have to be developed for adolescents and vulnerable 
adults in recognition of these exceptional new offences and circumstances of terrorism 
grooming – in much the same way as family law recognises psychological duress and 
coercion for the purposes of marriage. This is particularly important given the abolition of 
the once wider defence of marital coercion which had recognised a broad range of women’s 
experience, including cultural pressures.56 If she were ever prosecuted, this formulation of 
coercion defence might be conceivably available to Shamina Begum for the pre-adulthood 
phase (time latitude) of her offending, when she left the UK aged 15 to join the Islamic State 
in Syria.57 An accused’s account of such alleged indoctrination might be expected to be 
suitably corroborated by psychological evidence. This, inevitably, would be a factually 
complex defence and may only be regarded as mitigation.58 There would be scope for slavery 
or trafficking victims invoking the statutory defence available under s. 45 of the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 (extending to England and Wales only), treason not being an excluded 
offence.59 
 
(b) ‘Superior Orders Defence’: 
Scots law does not conclusively rule out the defence of obeying superior orders.60 It is 
recognised as a valid defence, provided the order is not obviously unlawful or (less certainly) 
 
55 Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005, s. 1 
56 Susan Edwards, “Protecting Schoolgirls from Terrorism Grooming” (2015) IntFamLaw 3.236  
57 Hanna Yusuf and Steve Swann, “Shamima Begum: Lawyer says teen was 'groomed'” BBC (31 May 2019): 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48444604 
58 In R. v. Boular [2019] EWCA Crim 798, the Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal of teenager SB in 
relation to a life sentence imposed following conviction for offences of preparing acts of terrorism under s. 5 
of the Terrorism Act 2006. Sentence was reduced on the basis that the sentencer had given insufficient weight 
to the particularly potent cumulative effect of the two factors of youth (SB being 15 to 17 years old during the 
indictment period); and grooming (radicalisation through the malign influence of her mother and mother’s 
friends). 
59 Sch. 4 
60 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006), para. 6.01 
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is known to be unlawful.61 In contrast, the common law of England does not recognise a 
general defence of superior orders (or of Crown or executive fiat).62 Given that substantive 
treason law is governed by the law of England,63 it appears to be impliedly precluded in any 
Scottish prosecution, in defiance of Scottish common law. 
Since treason is necessarily a crime at only a national level – and the impugned order would 
be emanating from a superior at the level of national law – in circumstances in which refusal 
could result in punishment at the national level – compliance with that order would appear 
to be excusable at the national level, even if there may be no relief from punishment at the 
international level for an order which is manifestly illegal.64 Gordon suggested that the basis 
for the defence was ‘probably’ public policy and that would explain why an order may be 
lawful according to the municipal law of a particular country, and yet be unlawful according 
to international law65 – and that it may also extend to actings in pursuance of an illegal order, 
for it is necessary for the proper functioning of the armed forces that its members be 
disciplined and obedient – theirs not to reason why. Considered from the perspective of the 
individual soldier, it is unfair to train them in automatic obedience, and then penalise them 
for acting in the way the state itself has trained them to act.66 Obedience to the orders of a 
superior officer is a fundamental aspect of military discipline, without which the functioning 
of military operations would be impaired.67 Further, the actor is arguably not acting 
independently. What is involved is not coercion or compulsion, but the right or duty of a 
soldier to carry out their orders without incurring liability under the criminal law.68 This 
might apply to enlisted men ordered to collaborate with the enemy, a fictional example being 
those under the command of Alec Guinness’ misguided or demented Colonel Nicholson.69  
 
61 Ibid., para. 6.11; Hume, I, 54; HM Advocate v. Hamilton and Parker (1861) 4 Irv 58, 72; William Ingles 
(1810) Burnett 79, 80  
62 Archbold, para. 17-123; Lewis v. Dickson [1976] RTR 431, DC; Howe, per Lord Hailsham, 427; Yip Chiu-
Cheung v. R. [1995] 1 AC 111, PC 
63 Treason Act 1708 
64 Nuremberg Principle IV; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), art. 33 
65 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 13.30 
66 Ibid., para. 13.31 
67 Chalmers and Leverick, Defences, para. 6.03; Hilaire McCoubrey, “From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring 
the Defence of Superior Orders” (2001) 50 ICLQ 386, 391 
68 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 13.30 
69 The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) David Lean, dir.; Pierre Boulle, The Bridge over the River Kwai (1952) 
169 
 
 
 
Reported Scottish cases on ‘superior orders’ are few and far between and the two cases 
invariably cited – HM Advocate v Sheppard70 and HM Advocate v Macpherson71 – do not 
deal directly with the defence.72 Obeying superior non-military, wartime, diplomatic orders 
was not specifically pled as a defence in Ahlers though the conviction was otherwise 
quashed on appeal. Absence of recent domestic case law means the Courts would probably 
take account of case law from other jurisdictions and in the international context.73 In other 
common law jurisdictions, this defence has been ruled out entirely or the ‘manifest illegality’ 
test has been adopted.74 A superior orders defence was pled in the South African treason 
case of S v. Banda and Others – held after an abortive military coup in Bophuthatswana – 
and the Court drew a distinction between unlawful orders and ‘manifestly and palpably 
illegal’ orders.75 No reasonable soldier would know a ‘manifestly and palpably illegal’ order 
to be otherwise – nullifying the duty to obey.  
  
III. Problematic ‘Current’ Defences – Lack of Legal Certainty: 
I now identify the problems in the operation of these general defences to the crime of treason 
and the extent to which they are only potentially available to certain forms of treason. As 
treason law has not developed to keep pace with the new forms of treason which feature 
more prominently from the second half of the twentieth century – principally, ‘Espionage 
Treason’ or propagandising for the enemy – equally, neither have the defences that might be 
potentially available to them. As treason law must evolve to reflect advancements in 
technology and communications, so must the defences to it. 
 
 
 
 
70 1941 JC 67 
71 Edinburgh High Court, 18 Sep. 1940, unrepd. 
72 Chalmers and Leverick, Defences, para. 6.10 
73 Ibid., para. 6.11 – the High Court of Australia did not recognise it as a general defence at common law (A v. 
Hayden (No. 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532), though it features in the Western Australia Criminal Code, s. 31 (having 
been modelled into a defence of ‘lawful authority’) – and as a limited defence in Queensland. 
74 R. v. Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701 
75 1990 (3) SA 466, per Friedman J., 496 
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(i) Justification Defences:  
(a) Necessity: 
The availability of a necessity defence is uncertain. While the Law Commission engaged 
with and recommended that duress should be available in certain circumstances as a defence 
to treason in its 1977 Working Papers on Treason and Defences, it did not engage with the 
defence of necessity. Nor did the Policy Exchange Paper do so. While there is cursory 
consideration of a compulsion defence in the Treason section in Gordon’s Criminal Law, 
there is no such engagement with necessity. If it does apply, it may do so only creatively. If 
a reasonable or lawful excuse defence could be derived from the holding in Ahlers 
acknowledging the reasonableness of the accused’s belief, a necessity defence could 
possibly be countenanced, conceptualised in terms of there being a reasonable excuse for its 
operation.  
Necessity defences also involve a high evidential threshold. With modern communication 
tools it will be difficult to justify any failure to disclose, even while ensconced in enemy 
territory – though again, that may not be fatal. 
 
(ii) Excuse Defences:  
(a) Coercion: 
The Law Commission underlined the lack of legal certainty – specifically consistency – as 
to the availability of duress as a defence to a charge of treason:76 
"It has long been accepted that duress is a defence to at least some conduct which 
amounts to treason. It is, however, difficult to differentiate between treasonable 
conduct which should have the defence and that which should not. Hale suggested that 
duress should be a defence to treason only in time of war or public insurrection but not 
in peacetime, on the basis that a person who falls into enemy or rebel hands cannot 
resort to the law for protection. This does not seem to us to be a valid basis of 
distinction, and indeed treasonable conduct covers such a wide range that it would be 
unsatisfactory to break it down into categories to determine in which cases duress 
should be a defence and in which it should not. Nor do we think that this is necessary. 
The test of duress which we recommend requires the nature of the conduct, and, of 
course, its consequences, to be weighed against the degree of pressure brought to bear. 
This means that so long as duress is not excluded as a defence there will be sufficient 
flexibility to allow the jury to accept duress as a defence in appropriate cases, and 
 
76 Law Com WP 83, para. 2.45 
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reject it in those which are not appropriate. Accordingly we recommend that duress 
should be a defence available on a charge of treason." 
 
These recommendations, of course, were never enacted and gained no subsequent traction. 
The fact that recommendations were made highlights the ambiguity of the position. The 
Policy Exchange Paper endorsed New Zealand legislation which does not permit duress to 
be a defence to treason.77 
A difficulty in the operation of any coercion defence involving the grooming of minors is 
that 16-year-olds are now deemed to have almost as much autonomy as other adults. The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (to which the UK is a state 
party and signatory) defines a child as any human being under the age of 18 (unless the age 
of majority is attained earlier under national legislation). Age may be a mitigating factor, but 
never a complete defence. Raising the age of criminal responsibility specifically for the 
crime of treason is not a solution though as childhood corruption might still lead to a 
continuing offence being committed past any new threshold age. However, a general defence 
of coercion could still have traction in young adulthood if there has been continuing abuse 
or its effects subsisted well into adulthood. 
  
(b) ‘Superior Orders Defence’: 
The position as to the availability of a ‘Superior Orders Defence’ in the military or law 
enforcement context to a charge of treason in Scotland is also uncertain. Further, the limits 
of the defence are by no means clear.78 Assuming its availability, it is uncertain whether the 
determination of the order’s manifest illegality is a question of law or if there is scope for 
subjectivity on the part of the actor. The defence is not mentioned in the (unofficial) Draft 
Criminal Code for Scotland.79 The defence does seem to have been completely ruled out in 
English law by the House of Lords80 and the Privy Council81 – albeit by obiter comments. 
The general post-war assumption had been that the plea of superior orders was no longer a 
 
77 Policy Exchange, Aiding the Enemy, 36 
78 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 13.31 
79 Chalmers and Leverick, Defences, para. 6.08, n. 50 
80 R. v. Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482, 498 
81 Yi Chiu-Cheung v. The Queen [1995] AC 111, per Lord Griffiths, 118 
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relevant defence to charges involving war crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes against 
peace. A plea of superior orders in response to charges founded upon violations of the 
international laws of armed conflict has since 1945 been treated as a plea in mitigation of 
sentence rather than as a substantive defence,82 having been tainted by its connotations with 
the so-called ‘Nuremberg’ defence.83 But art. 33 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court has controversially ‘restored’ superior orders as a defence where a crime has 
been committed pursuant to the order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or 
civilian. A person who is bound to obey a superior is under a legal duty to refuse to carry 
out an order received from that superior to do some act or make some omission – though 
only if the order were manifestly illegal. McCoubrey argues that this plea could still be a 
part of a defence of duress or mistake of fact or law – or be considered as a circumstance for 
mitigation of punishment.84 Rather than establishing a new and stricter doctrine, the Charter 
of the IMT at Nuremberg had correctly applied pre-existing doctrine in extreme and unusual 
circumstances, but was mistakenly taken to have developed a new approach which was then 
applied with a potentially distorting effect for the generality of circumstances. The Rome 
Statute has merely recognised the essential doctrine of superior orders as it had existed prior 
to 1945 and which, properly understood, should not have been thought essentially to have 
been changed even in 1945.85  
There is little support for the proposition that superior orders should always act as a complete 
defence. Most commentators support an intermediary position whereby superior orders 
could provide a defence in certain limited circumstances,86 but the law would require to be 
clarified, not only in its application to treason.  
Its availability in the non-military context – including even law enforcement – is also 
uncertain. It has tended to arise in the context only of the master-servant relationship.87 
 
82 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945), art. 8 
83 The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law 1st ed. (2010) (Kevin Jon Heller and Markus Dubber, eds.), 75 
84 McCoubrey, “Rome”, 386 
85 Ibid. 
86 Chalmers and Leverick, Defences, para. 6.05; J.L. Bakker, “The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: 
the Mens Rea Requirement” (1989) 17 AmJCrimL 55; I.D. Brownlee, “Superior Orders: Time for a New 
Realism” (1989) Crim LR 396, 410; Geoffrey Creighton, “Superior Orders and Command Responsibility in 
Canadian Criminal Law” (1980) 38 UTorontoFacLRev 1, 16-17; P. Eden “Criminal Liability and the Defence 
of Superior Orders” (1991) 108 SALJ 640, 646 
87 Calder v Robertson (1878) 4 Couper 131; Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 13.35 
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Gordon’s Criminal Law suggests that the only category of importance at the present day is 
that of soldier.88  
 
IV. Enhanced Defences: 
In accordance with the prevailing trend, I submit that there should finally be express statutory 
recognition for the partial operation of the general common law defences of necessity and 
coercion.  
 
(i) Justification Defences: 
(a) Necessity: 
I argued in Chapter 2 that the duty of allegiance is not a one-sided, servile relationship. There 
is or should be a certain symmetry involved. The protected person is entitled to resist a 
usurpative state which is acting ultra vires; to curb its excesses, even when or especially 
when it is purportedly acting in national self-defence in discharging its correlating duty of 
protection. If the state were waging war illegally, then even violent resistance to such a 
military campaign might not have a treasonable aspect to it. Resisting tyranny may not 
amount to betrayal and can even be justified. It may even be a moral duty. I concluded that 
the duty of allegiance is not one of blind allegiance and that there might be suitable scope 
for bolstering existing justification defences or even creating new justification defences, 
ensuring greater balance in the contractual relationship between the sovereign power and the 
people (or protected persons). Given the availability of the defence of necessity or a less 
exacting defence of reasonable excuse are uncertain under existing treason law, I recommend 
formal recognition of a necessity defence – also new variants of it – as a way of policing this 
relationship and providing some semblance of equilibrium. 
This is consistent with the Draft Scottish Criminal Code89 which would apply necessity (as 
broadly defined) to all crimes – though this defence would be applicable to the taking of 
human life "only if that is done to save human life".90 Treason was not included in the Code 
for reasons of legislative competence and its drafters are unlikely to have had treason in 
 
88 Ibid., para. 13.30; Chalmers and Leverick, Defences, para. 6.16 
89 While based on existing Scots law, the Draft Code was never intended as an exact restatement. 
90 Clauses 24(3); Gordon, Criminal Law, 3rd ed. Suppl. (2005), para. 13.22 
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contemplation when they proposed the extension of the defence of coercion (although that 
would not stop general defences applying). Nonetheless, it is an obvious reference point and 
inspiration. This is a significant area in which Scottish treason might be differentiated from 
the ‘current’ British treason law and any revised British model. It is not suggested as an 
exercise in Scottish exceptionalism – but as an aspect of the modelling of this offence in 
which Scottish treason would be expected to be different, thus justifying separate creation. 
 
(ii) Excuse Defences: 
(a) Coercion: 
It is axiomatic that if the protected person were unable to discharge their (negative) duty of 
allegiance because their capacity has been overridden by coercion (or duress), they should 
be able to avail themselves of this defence. Having constructed a new treason offence where 
the treasons will be ‘Adherence Treason’ or derivatives of it – with contemporary treason 
involving the likelihood of its commission in enemy territory where there can be no resort 
to a relevant (UK) authority – this potentially invokes coercion as a relevant defence or 
excuse.91 Again, the Draft Scottish Criminal Code would apply coercion (as broadly defined) 
to all crimes – save this defence would be applicable to the taking of human life "only if that 
is done to save human life".92 This approach is also consistent with the logic of the Law 
Commission that if the defence were to be allowed at all, it should apply to all offences.93 
On this model coercion would surely continue to be excluded as a defence to a charge of 
‘Adherence Treason’ or ‘Levying War Treason’ in circumstances in which the offender has 
been implicated directly in the killing of British Citizens. This limitation is understandable 
given that the procedure and the rules of evidence in proceedings for treason (and misprision 
of treason) equate to murder proceedings – and standing that coercion is, notoriously, one of 
the hardest defences to make out with duress invariably not being a relevant defence to a 
charge of murder (or even attempted murder).94  
 
 
 
91 Steane 
92 Clauses 24(3) and 29(3); Gordon, Criminal Law, 3rd ed. Suppl., para. 13.22 
93 Law Com WP 83, paras. 2.44-2.46 
94 Howe; Collins v. HM Advocate, 1991 SCCR 898 
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(b) ‘Superior Orders Defence’: 
Though it might be controversial, there could be discrete circumstances where a ‘Superior 
Orders Defence’ might have validity – and given it remains a relevant defence in Scots 
common law and the public policy grounds underpinning it – I suggest provision be made 
on grounds of legal certainty. 
I propose its operation be extended from the military to the diplomatic context as civil 
servants are also acting as instruments of the British state – it being inequitable for the state 
to punish them for acting in accordance with the commands of their bureaucratic or elected 
chiefs. It might be appropriate they be afforded this ‘protection’ given the treasonous rhetoric 
surrounding the conduct of Brexit negotiations.95 This could be regarded as the complement 
to the posited ‘Justified Government Whistleblowing’ defence.  
There would be the unsurprising and unimpeachable qualification of the ‘manifest illegality’ 
test – or its refinement in this context, to ‘manifest treasonableness’. Accused persons would 
be excused for obeying any order which were in fact treasonable, provided it were not 
blatantly so. I suggest that the determination of the order’s manifest treasonableness would 
be a question of law. The issue may also be blurred with employees of so-called independent 
state-financed bodies carrying out the functions of government away from direct Ministerial 
supervision.  
Again, this is a significant aspect of the modelling of this offence in which Scottish treason 
might be expected to be different – thus justifying a separate Scottish law. There may be no 
principled reason why the two jurisdictions should take a different approach. The reform 
process at UK level might lead to a similar conclusion – particularly given that the defence 
(with its ‘manifest illegality’ qualification) is now reaffirmed under international criminal 
law. But the English lacuna remains. 
 
 
 
95 “We’re not ‘traitors’ or ‘remoaners’ – but this is a dark time to be a civil servant” Guardian (1 October 2019): 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/01/traitors-remoaners-civil-servant-brexit-language 
See also J. Richard Broughton, “Constitutional Discourse and the Rhetoric of Treason” (2020) 47(2) 
HastingsConstLQ 303, 335 
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V. Contemplated New Specific Defences: 
I now consider what provision might be made for new specific defences which would be 
consistent with and permissible under this duty-based contractual model.  
 
(i) Justification Defences: 
(a) ‘Public Interest Defence’: 
I propose the operation of a ‘Public Interest Defence’ – particularly in relation to non-violent 
categories of treason, such as ‘Espionage Treason’ or propagandising for the enemy. As this 
might countenance subjectively ‘necessary’ political violence, acts of sabotage or 
humanitarian activity in enemy territory, it might be considered as an aspect of or sub-
category of the necessity defence. This is a development of the notion of a legitimate motive 
to defend the nation’s interests (possibly longer-term interests rather than its immediate 
military situation) in a different way.  
This kind of defence also reflects the compelling logic of the posited allegiance contractual 
model – whereby the contract could be unilaterally revoked by the protected person on 
grounds of a repudiatory or fundamental breach of contract – if, on a reasonable view, the 
British state has behaved in such a way that they consider themselves discharged from 
wholly honouring the contract on this discrete issue – equating to intervening illegality or 
frustration. Rather than ‘my Country, right or wrong’, this might be conceived as ‘my 
Country, right only’. This connotes the idea that you can be a ‘patriotic traitor’ – that in your 
own mind, you did the right thing.96 This resonates with the concept of the ‘conscientious 
traitor’ which was mooted in left-wing Weimar Republic circles but never enacted – that the 
German law of ‘Exterior Treason’ should not apply to the whistleblower justifiably 
disclosing rearmament violations of the Treaty of Versailles – on the ground that they owed 
a higher sense of duty to the world than to any individual state (including their own).97 
Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and the other conspirators behind the abortive ‘20 July’ plot 
(Operation Valkyrie) agonised about whether they were committing treason. They were, 
 
96 J. Richard Broughton, “The Snowden Affair and the Limits of American Treason” (2015) 3 LMULawReview 
5, 22; Newt Gingrich, “Meet the Press Transcript”, NBC (1 June 2014):  
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-june-1-2014-n121571 
97 John N. Hazard and William B. Stern, “Exterior Treason: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law” (1938) 
6(1) UChiLRev 77, 90 
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particularly after having sworn an oath of loyalty to Hitler, Germany’s legal ruler. But as 
they could be held to have acted against tyranny, to wrest political control of Germany and 
its armed forces from the Nazi Party, to ensure continuity of government and make peace 
with the Western Allies, their conduct was morally defensible – and, following any regime 
change and restoration of the rule of law, would have been legally-defensible on this basis. 
Jane Fonda’s prima facie treasonable actions in 1972 of posing in an NVA anti-aircraft 
battery in the infamous ‘Hanoi Jane’ photo-shoot98, making at least ten radio broadcasts from 
North Vietnam,99 excoriating American servicemen as war criminals100 – could be defensible 
under this proposition. Simply invoking Constitutional freedom of speech protections would 
not have sufficed because propagandising for the enemy may not have First Amendment 
protections.101 She was still arguably acting in the broader American public interest – on an 
ostensibly reasonable and not unpopular view of it – by protesting "against the (war) crimes 
committed in our name".102 Even if this defence had been removed from a jury’s 
consideration, it is doubtful whether a unanimous verdict could have been secured at such a 
politically charged time.103  
US Army Private Manning was court-martialled for passing classified material to WikiLeaks. 
In 2013 Manning was convicted of various espionage and military offences though the 
military judge ultimately acquitted Manning of the most serious charge of aiding the enemy 
 
98 AP footage (22 July 1972): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBViVboG0Mk 
99 The Vietnam War, ep. 9 (2017) Ken Burns and Lyn Novick, dirs.: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnFVFz9d6vU 
100 AP footage (27 July 1972): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zn7g2MMzBmM 
101 Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir 1948), 939; 
United States v. Burgman, 87F Supp 568 (DDC 1949), 571; Douglas A. Kash, “The United States v. Adam 
Gadahn: A Case for Treason” 37 CapULRev 1, 23 
102 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSfWDQzmpr8 
103 There was evidently no political will to prosecute. The administration was perhaps rightly afraid "she would 
make a monkey out of (them)" in what would have been a disastrous show trial, circus even – as conceded in 
Henry and Erika Holzer’s polemical case for her prosecution, Aid and Comfort: Jane Fonda in North 
Vietnam (2006): 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?171009-1/aid-comfort 
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(by knowingly giving out intelligence through indirect means).104 The prosecution argued 
that Manning was not a whistleblower, but a traitor, who understood the value of 
compromised information in the hands of the enemy and took deliberate steps to ensure that 
they, along with the world, received it. It was argued that Manning’s "wholesale and 
indiscriminate compromise of hundreds of thousands of classified documents" for release by 
WikiLeaks staff – "essentially information anarchists" – was not an ordinary journalistic 
disclosure, but a bid for "notoriety, although in a clandestine form."105 The judge did not 
permit Manning to raise a defence of motive for his guilt and sentenced Manning to 35 years’ 
confinement. Though some of the documents Manning disclosed were of little or no public 
interest, many were – thus, an amicus brief argued, justifying mitigation of sentence.106 The 
departing President Obama commuted Manning’s sentence to 7 years’ confinement.107 
Fugitive ex-CIA employee Edward Snowden professes that he did not indiscriminately 
disclose classified surveillance activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the 
Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance (FVEY) to journalists, evaluating every document to ensure 
that each was legitimately in the public interest108 – though his consistency is suspect and it 
is alleged that the improper redaction by the New York Times exposed intelligence activity 
 
104 United States v. PFC Bradley E. Manning (30 July 2013): 
https://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/032912-dismiss-ch1.pdf 
https://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/appeal-053118.pdf 
105 Charlie Savage, “In Closing Argument, Prosecutor Casts Soldier as ‘Anarchist’ for Leaking Archives” NYT 
(July 25, 2013): 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/politics/closing-arguments-due-in-manning-leaks-
case.html?hp&_r=0 
106 “United States v. Private First Class Chelsea Manning” Open Society Justice Initiative (17 May 2017):  
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/litigation/united-states-v-private-first-class-chelsea-manning 
107 Charlie Savage, “Chelsea Manning to be Released Early as Obama Commutes Sentence” NYT (17 January 
2017): 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/obama-commutes-bulk-of-chelsea-mannings-sentence.html 
108 Glenn Greenwald, “Edward Snowden: the whistleblower behind the NSA surveillance revelations” 
Guardian (9 June 2013): 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance 
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against Al-Qaida.109 Snowden self-identifies as a whistleblower, distinguishable from a 
‘leaker’ who "only distributes information for personal gain."110  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a ‘Public Interest Defence’ is not countenanced under Britain’s 
secrecy laws, even in circumstances where the threat engaged does not involve espionage by 
foreign powers and terrorist groups. In 1985 Civil Servant Clive Ponting was prosecuted 
under s. 2 of the OSA 1911 for disclosing documents concerning the sinking of ARA General 
Belgrano to Labour MP Tam Dalyell. His defence was that disclosure to a Member of 
Parliament was in the public interest and was protected by Parliamentary Privilege. The trial 
judge excluded his ‘Public Interest Defence’ – with a notoriously narrow direction which 
scarcely survives history’s judgment: "the public interest is whatever the Government of the 
day says it is". Though there was no defence left for them to consider, the jury still acquitted 
– in defiance of judicial instruction – the jury’s prerogative.111 This act of jury nullification 
does seem to be regarded as de facto precedent for a ‘Public Interest Defence’.112 There has 
been a broader recognition of whistleblowing as legitimate since the 1980s.113 But while the 
inclusion of a ‘Public Interest Defence’ was the subject of Parliamentary debate, it was not 
ultimately incorporated in the final version of the OSA 1989 which repealed the public 
interest defence in s. 2 of the OSA 1911. This defence is also omitted from secrecy laws in 
 
109 Alan Yuhas, “John Oliver presses Edward Snowden on whether he read all leaked NSA material” Guardian 
(6 April 2015): 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/06/edward-snowden-john-oliver-last-week-tonight-nsa-
leaked-documents 
110 “Edward Snowden Condemns Trump’s Mistreatment of Whistleblower Who Exposed Ukraine Scandal” 
Democracy Now! (26 September 2019): 
https://www.democracynow.org/2019/9/26/edward_snowden_on_writing_his_memoir 
111 “1985: Falklands' row civil servant resigns” BBC: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/16/newsid_2545000/2545907.stm  
Martin Rosenbaum, “Clive Ponting case: Where is the investigators' report?” BBC (18 May 2011): 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13430012  
112 Andrew Pierce, “Editors defend Telegraph decision to pay” Telegraph (26 September 2009): 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/mps-expenses-rebuilding-politic/6231381/MPs-
expenses-whistleblower-prosecution-acquitted-Clive-Ponting-The-Observer.html 
113 Gehan Gunasekara, “Whistle‐blowing: New Zealand and UK Solutions to a Common Problem” (2003) 
24(1) StatuteLawRev 39. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 formalised protections from workplace 
victimisation for employees making public interest disclosures (albeit employees could previously invoke a 
public interest defence to being litigated against for breach of confidence) – though they will not be qualifying 
disclosures if offences are committed by making them. 
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other countries which used the OSA 1911 as a blueprint – except Canada which has added 
this defence to its Security of Information Act 1985. Nonetheless, its operation is limited to 
situations in which the accused has complied with certain preliminaries before making 
disclosure and their purpose in doing so is to reveal an offence committed by another in their 
official duties.114 In R. v. Shayler the House of Lords held that a defendant charged under ss. 
1(1) and 4(1) of the OSA 1989 could not mount a ‘public or national interest defence’ in 
respect of unauthorised, whistleblowing disclosures which he, a former member of the 
security services, had admittedly made.115 It also held that the OSA – which afforded no 
‘Public Interest Defence’ to disclosure of classified information – did not breach art. 10, 
ECHR. While the aims and the legal basis of the OSA can comply with art. 10(2), the 
appellant had argued that the matters which he had wished to disclose, were not being kept 
secret in the interests of national security – it being the right of the public to be informed 
about the abuse of the powers given to the security services – leading to pressure for reform 
– and that the lack of any ‘Public Interest Defence’ was incompatible with art. 10(2). Lord 
Hope did feel that the non-availability of such a defence rendered the OSA vulnerable to 
criticism on the ground that it lacked the necessary ‘sensitivity’.116 But there was a 
competing public interest in play – specifically, the public interest in national security. 
Striking that balance required the Court to speculate as to the consequences in national 
security terms if the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt any potential damage 
to the security system if a particular disclosure were made. Lord Hope stated: "Damage 
already done may well be irreparable, and the gathering together and disclosure of evidence 
to prove the nature and extent of the damage may compound its effects to the further 
detriment of national security."117 The strict controls requiring official authorisation could 
not be considered disproportionate. Ultimately, the interference was justified by the 
legitimate objectives secured by the legislation. Sufficient and adequate safeguards to satisfy 
art. 10(2) had been provided. Limited whistleblowing was permitted, that the accused might 
bring their concerns over security issues to the authorities’ notice without disclosing 
restricted matters to the media. Judicial Review was a further remedy if any potential 
whistleblower took issue with the refusal of authorisation for disclosure – it being for the 
 
114 S. 15 
115 [2002] UKHL 11 
116 Para. 70 
117 Para. 85 
181 
 
 
 
Court to ultimately determine whether refusal is justified and within the range of reasonable 
responses.118  
The Australian Criminal Code provides a defence to the offence of materially assisting the 
enemy for acts done in good faith. The defence is established where the person ‘tries in good 
faith’ to show that the Sovereign, Governor-General, or Prime Minister is ‘mistaken in any 
of his or her counsels, policies or actions’. The Court may consider whether the acts were 
done for purposes ‘intended to be prejudicial to the safety or defence of the Commonwealth’ 
– or ‘with the intention of causing violence or creating public disorder or a public 
disturbance’.119 But the defence is not available for treason. 
 
(b) ‘International Law Defence’: 
Inspiration for an ‘International Law Defence’ might be found in the above-mentioned 
Weimar-era concept of the ‘conscientious traitor’. This also reflects the notion of the 
‘contract’ with the protected person being repudiated in circumstances in which the 
sovereign power has breached it on grounds of illegality.  
It is difficult to go behind the decision in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) which 
makes it clear that an individual cannot rely on customary international law as a defence to 
a domestic criminal charge. There was no adjudication in the Gun prosecution, and, in any 
event, the contemplated defence was necessity. While informed by an asserted material 
breach of international law, it was not conceptualised as an ‘International Law Defence’.  
Further, there can be a lack of legal certainty as to what international law (customary or 
otherwise) is. Ascertaining what it might be – and proving what it might be – presumably by 
conflicting expert opinion – is fraught with subjectivity. Even then, it may not always be 
just, rational, binding, or enforceable. It may conflict with the sovereignty and authority of 
the British state. The legitimacy of international law – its legal validity, particularly in the 
domestic context – is outwith the parameters of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is doubtful if any 
UK Government would allow its wartime foreign policy to be challenged or undermined, by 
 
118 Shayler also unsuccessfully attempted to argue a defence of necessity – on the basis that he committed the 
crime "to avoid imminent peril of danger to life or serious injury to himself or towards individuals for whom 
he reasonably regarded himself as responsible." 
119 Criminal Code Act, s. 80.3 
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proxy, in a criminal court by maverick accused persons running a legally dubious defence 
predicated on nebulous ideas of what international law should be – and thus publicly subvert 
the national interest (or at least the prevailing Government’s view of it). A Scottish 
Government of a difficult political complexion from the UK Government might not be so 
troubled.  
I do not propose to expressly provide for such a free-standing ‘International Law Defence’. 
Only a necessity defence could meet the immediacy requirement. There may be cases in 
which the defence could argue that there is an absence of treasonous mens rea in 
circumstances in which the UK is in (continuing) breach of customary international law – 
but I submit that the essential fact of enemy agency (as commended in Chapter 3) cannot 
justify or excuse treasonable conduct on this pretext only. 
 
(c) ‘Justified Government Whistleblowing’: 
I propose that there should be express provision for a specific ‘Justified Government 
Whistleblowing Defence’120 – a ‘Public Interest Defence’. The essence of ‘Espionage 
Treason’ is betraying state secrets and this justification defence could apply in circumstances 
where the accused has made unauthorised disclosures of state secrets – even if designed to 
harm the Government and otherwise culpable under the OSA – but has done so in the public 
interest where the disclosure could have reasonably been believed to reveal grave 
government wrongdoing. 
Whistleblower protection laws and political philosophers commonly state that a breach of 
state secrecy by disclosing classified documents is justified if it serves the public interest.121 
We should want to protect whistleblowers because, as a starting proposition, government 
whistleblowing can be regarded as ethical in circumstances in which the aim is to protect the 
public from government wrongdoing. A government acting unethically or illegally, is not 
acting in its own and its people’s best interests – and a citizen (or subject) is not acting 
disloyally in blowing the whistle. Properly, we should recognise the public value of 
government whistleblowing. Responsible people – including and even especially those who 
 
120 The term coined by Candice Delmas, “The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing” (2015) 41(1) 
SocTheoryPract 77 – see also Eric R. Boot, “The Feasibility of a Public Interest Defense for Whistleblowing” 
(2020) 39(1) LawPhilos 1, who conceives this as ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing’. 
121 Ibid. 
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have signed the OSA – should reasonably do so when they believe more harm than good 
will occur if they should otherwise stay silent. It can be reasonable to act against the state in 
the true interests of society. Virtuous whistleblowers are to be commended if they genuinely 
and reasonably believe that they have acted in protecting the greater public interest. They 
are not disloyal in reality – and, if anything, could show greater loyalty (to country). A 
whistleblower would be entitled to act according to Kantian deontological (or duty-based) 
ethics, where moral obligations will have nothing to do with consequences – or possibly on 
utilitarian grounds, contingent on a cost-benefit analysis. This might be conceived as a form 
of political vigilantism which can be justified if exposing information that the public should 
know and deliberate about – and as approximating to civil disobedience as a collective 
cognition and legitimacy enhancing device.122 
 
(d) ‘Humanitarian Defence’: 
Problematically, providing humanitarian aid could be deemed consistent with aiding the 
military operations of the enemy – and to do so by providing even material assistance.123 
Humanitarian activity which has assisted the enemy (and thus provided them with aid and 
comfort) – feeding an enemy army, even by recklessness or negligence – could expose the 
protected person to the risk of treason prosecution. Under ‘current’ treason law, a 
‘Humanitarian Defence’ could not even be creatively argued in terms of an absence of mens 
rea – or as a form of necessity or ‘Reasonable Excuse Defence’ (given their uncertain 
availability) – or, where inadvertent aid and comfort is given, as a defence of error as to fact 
(albeit ‘accident’ is a denial of mens rea, rather than a defence as such). More desperately, 
it would be a matter for jury nullification.124 This is unsatisfactory, and I draw on the ‘new’ 
Australian statutory humanitarian defence in making provision for such a statutory 
 
122 Ibid. 
123 We would reasonably expect our military to provide such ‘material assistance’ to captured enemy 
combatants – to feed, shelter and medicate them. The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(2004) provides that in international armed conflicts, wounded and sick POWs must be given necessary 
medical treatment without discrimination on non-medical grounds:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP
3832004Edition.pdf 
124 See the discussion of the Clive Ponting prosecution in 1985 
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defence.125 I propose that the evidential burden for establishing this defence falls on the 
accused – in accordance with the specific provision made in the Australian Criminal Code.126  
To alleviate the harsher consequences of a strict application, this defence is justifiable on 
normative grounds and might also be conceived as an aspect of ‘Good Samaritan’ laws 
where, though there is no legal duty to assist, there may be an ethical obligation to do so. 
However, I would not insist on the American qualification whereby ‘Good Samaritan’ 
protections apply to aiding and assisting people only in imminent peril or danger – because 
people in a conflict zone are self-evidently in imminent peril or danger – any such additional 
condition being superfluous. As a matter of principle, the Courts should be reluctant to 
penalise people who are attempting to bring aid to the victims of war, even in enemy 
territory, or where they might be found in what has recently been enemy territory. To 
disincentivise relief work – or to introduce an avoidable impediment to it – when people may 
be dying – is immoral and unethical. Even if sceptical of the notion of an ethical foreign 
policy, it could be at variance with the pursuit of a foreign policy with an ethical 
dimension.127  
When Australian treason law was modernised by the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002, provision was made, at the Labor Party's insistence, for the 
availability of such a defence to the treason offence of assisting the enemy (to engage in 
military conflict). It had not hitherto existed.128 Concerns had been raised during the 
precursor 2002 Senate inquiry that the definition of ‘assist’ was sufficiently broad as to 
encompass the provision of humanitarian relief.129 This was rectified by providing express 
exemption where assistance constitutes humanitarian relief. The Australian Criminal Code 
expressly provides for a ‘Humanitarian Defence’ to a charge of treason if the accused has 
engaged in conduct solely for the provision of aid or assistance of a humanitarian nature, the 
 
125 Criminal Code Act, s. 80.3 
126 S. 80.1AA (6) 
127 “Robin Cook's speech on the government's ethical foreign policy” Guardian (12 May 1997): 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy 
128 The pre-amendment law was found in the Crimes Act 1914, s. 24 
129 Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Review of Security and Counter 
Terrorism Legislation (4 December 2006), Ch. 4.8 
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accused bearing the evidential burden.130 This might be considered a sub-category of 
necessity.  
Suffice to say, there is no interpretative case law on the Australian ‘Humanitarian Defence’ 
– there continuing to be an absence of Australian treason prosecutions. But it might be 
expected that the obviousness of this factor would arise at the investigative stage as to 
preclude prosecution. It would be hoped that express provision should put investigators and 
prosecutors on notice as to its possible application and remedy the risk of confirmation bias 
in disregarding inconvenient evidence to their favoured hypothesis in what is an emotionally 
charged offence.131  
 
VI. Objections: 
I now consider what problems or issues might potentially arise with these affirmed defences 
and new defences. 
 
(i) Justification Defences: 
(a) Necessity: 
The plea of necessity is scarcely tolerated as a general defence elsewhere in the criminal law, 
the possibilities for abuse being considerable.132 It would be difficult to argue that the 
competing value in any value-conflict is greater than the invariably overriding or absolute 
values associated with treason law, such as national security. The great negative value of the 
crime of treason must surely always tip the balance.133 In any assessment of the hierarchy of 
values, could the state ever concede that there might be greater values than its own integrity 
and survival? Then again, there is no generally accepted hierarchy of values and relative 
values change from time to time.134  
The greater and entrenched availability of defences of necessity (and coercion) would not 
necessarily make for legal certainty. Assuming adoption of the strict limitation in the Draft 
 
130 Criminal Code Act, s. 80.1AA 
131 Barbara O'Brien and Phoebe Ellsworth, “Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations” (2006) SSRN 
132 Gordon, Criminal Law, para. 13.09 
133 Ibid., para. 13.11 
134 Ibid., para. 13.04 
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Scottish Criminal Code – "only if that is done to save human life"135 – this could allow an 
accused to present as arbiter of what human lives have lesser value. It is scarcely desirable 
if an accused should be able to legitimately argue that their life was somehow more important 
than others’ – especially their co-citizens, in wartime. But these are defences which would 
be carefully regulated by the Court – on a ‘case-by-case’ basis – removable from the jury’s 
consideration if exacting relevant criteria were unfulfilled. It is one thing to make these 
defences available, another to prove them. This is not unique to the crime of treason. How 
the decision of a private citizen, in ‘Homicidal Treason’, to unilaterally take another’s life 
might be justified or excused poses complex legal, ethical, and philosophical dilemmas.  
It might be considered incongruous that this defence be extended to treason involving 
assassination of the monarch. In Chapter 3 I argued that compassing and imagining the death 
of the sovereign should survive in the narrow form of impeaching a foreign state-sponsored 
attack on the monarch – because such acts involve symbolically perpetrating harm to 
national security and/or the British people – and that its retention recognises that an attack 
on the person of the monarch will be an attack on the British state (and people). It may well 
be that this head of treason is so egregious as to defy the prevailing trend for the greater 
availability of these defences and the momentum created by the Draft Scottish Criminal 
Code. If not excluded, would there be less justification or excuse for attacking the person of 
the monarch than that of other co-citizens – and thus placing a higher onus on the accused 
to discharge the evidential burden? 
 
(b) ‘Public Interest Defence’ (including ‘Justified Government Whistleblowing’): 
It might be thought that propagandising for the enemy could be justified on free speech 
grounds – under reference to art. 10, ECHR. But that approach would be based on only a 
cursory and incomplete understanding of art. 10 and without regard to its obvious 
restrictions.136 
While I have suggested that as a starting proposition, whistleblowing can be regarded as 
ethical – and thus normatively justifiable – a compelling counter-argument can be readily 
made that it is neither ethical nor moral. Though transparency informs public debate and 
ensures public accountability, it is still necessary and legitimate for governments to keep 
 
135 Clauses 24(3) and 29(3); Gordon, Criminal Law, 3rd ed. Suppl., para. 13.22, n. 94 
136 See n. 101 
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certain information, particularly that pertaining to national security, secret. Governments are 
entitled to have their secrets protected – and the proposition that anyone can justify 
disclosing secrets for a good cause is problematic.137 Whistleblowing causes harm – in the 
sense that public trust is damaged and national security threatened. To insist upon complete 
transparency and reject legitimate secrets is anarchic. 
The choice which the whistleblower makes is not a matter of objective duty. Given it values 
the few over the many, it appears to be incompatible with basic assumptions of morality. 
The state or sovereign power is or should properly be the overriding object of their duty of 
loyalty or allegiance for the reasons I have set out in Chapter 2. External whistleblowing is 
wrong because the subject has the contractual duty of allegiance to the sovereign power. It 
is not merely a prima facie duty of allegiance which can be whimsically breached.  
Then again competing interests are involved – a principle of lesser evils – a matter ultimately 
for adjudication. A complicated balancing exercise could be involved in circumstances 
where though the enemy has been materially assisted, and their interests seemingly put above 
the nation’s short-term interests, the assistance may not have been to the detriment of the 
nation’s longer-term interests. 
In issue with any defence of ‘Justified Government Whistleblowing’ is that the operative 
concept – the public interest – is invariably left unclarified, creating legal uncertainty. This 
leaves potential whistleblowers without sufficient certainty that their disclosures will be 
protected by this defence – leading many to err on the side of circumspection and thus 
depriving the public of much-needed information (the ‘chilling effect’).138 Invariably, 
defining the public interest is challenging and complex. It may be a familiar part of the legal 
lexicon – but it is an amorphous political concept as much as a legal concept – and 
notoriously difficult to pin down exactly what it means. There is no overarching definition 
– and it must be contextually determined on a case-by-case basis. It must be interpreted in 
light of present-day conditions and changing perceptions. How egregious does government 
wrongdoing have to be to warrant external whistleblowing? How reasonable does the 
whistleblower’s belief in that wrongdoing have to be? How damaging must their disclosures 
be in terms of meeting the posited actus reus of materially assisting the enemy – as to engage 
proportionality considerations? Disclosures containing nuclear launch codes or 
 
137 George P. Fletcher, “Ambivalence About Treason” (2004) 82 NCLRev 1611, 1625  
138 Boot, “Whistleblowing” 
188 
 
 
 
compromising intelligence agents will be less excusable than those which simply embarrass. 
Failing an agreed upon definition of the public interest or a process to determine it, judges’ 
applications of the public interest in whistleblowing cases have been criticised for 
demonstrating ‘judicial idiosyncrasy’.139 Admittedly, this defence is not without its 
difficulties, but it can be rendered workable and feasible. I commend Boot’s approach of the 
civic account of the public interest – a common-interest approach that public interests are 
those interests that we all share in our role as members of the public, including the shared 
interest in the rule of law, fundamental human rights, legal certainty and political 
accountability. Determining where the public interest lies – and the weight to be assigned 
competing interests – requires careful judicial consideration of the gravity of the harm to 
national security likely to ensue from the disclosure and the significance of its benefit. It 
should be appreciated that given that in a treason case the ‘national security harm’ principle 
(identified in Chapter 3) will (or should) already be engaged, it may be difficult for the 
whistleblower to argue that they have minimised that harm. In any event, Boot’s approach 
should provide sufficient guidance for judges to undertake the necessary proportionality 
style balancing exercise and thus curb the excesses of judicial discretion that lead to legal 
uncertainty. 
There is the familiar dilemma of whether the posited ‘reasonable belief’ test would be 
subjective or objective. Whistleblowers may not always act from the purest motives in 
exposing government wrongdoing. They may not always act in a responsible manner – but 
capriciously, even malevolently – far-removed from the dutiful Kantian agent. While there 
may be personal sacrifice involved, there should be no presumption that their activities are 
a courageous act of conscience. Characteristically, they can be saboteurs, not heroes. 
Assessment of their conduct and motivation in determining whether they have acted 
reasonably is a value judgment. Is that assessment to be based on subjective or only objective 
criteria? Paradoxically, they may do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I argue that the 
‘reasonable belief’ test be not only subjective, but also objective – in respect that not only 
must the whistleblower themselves believe their disclosure would be in the public interest, 
their subjective belief must also be objectively reasonable.140  
 
139 Ibid. 
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A strategic trial concern for the prosecution might be that a jury would be needlessly 
confused by the availability in ‘Espionage Treason’ cases of such a statutory ‘Public Interest 
Defence’ when juxtaposed against its non-availability as a statutory defence to alternative 
charges under the OSA – and conflate the two and thus erroneously apply this defence to the 
OSA aspect of the case despite its non-application. It might be preferable to stick with an 
absolute rule about protecting state secrets.141 But the jury would surely be presumed and 
expected to follow careful judicial directions – to the effect that the OSA framework is 
conceptually different, because by signing the OSA, the Crown Servant is committing to a 
further allegiance – a lifelong commitment to HMG (and not the British people as Keira 
Knightley’s Gun asserts in Official Secrets). 
It might be thought that if a ‘Public Interest’ Defence were not permitted under the present 
OSA, then why should it be countenanced under a revised treason law – particularly since 
treason is a more serious category of offence still? Its recognition in treason law may detract 
from coherency and consistency in the body of offences against the State – sending mixed 
signals by that. The OSA provides for offences of strict liability in connection with some 
kinds of disclosure. It is not intended to deal exclusively with threats to national security. 
While the fact of public interest disclosure is not an operable defence to an offence under 
the OSA, I submit that a ‘Public Interest’ Defence to treason should still be available in such 
circumstances. Causing ostensible harm to the Government’s interests – to the apparent, 
present, narrow national interest – in this way could be criminal but would not necessarily 
be treasonous if done to secure the broader, future public interest. The availability of this 
defence to the charge of treason does not mean that you should be allowed to commit secrecy 
offences with impunity. The OSA is not invalidated (though whether a ‘Public Interest’ 
Defence should be countenanced under the OSA is another argument). It should be 
remembered that the point of civil disobedience or dissidence is that the cause should be 
sufficiently important that you are willing to suffer the consequences of your conduct and 
you may still fall foul of the OSA. But treason is in a different category – a more serious 
offence with the sentencing entry point of life imprisonment – that should be hard to prove.  
Though there may be a tendency for the mainstream media to demonise leakers, then again, 
any such prejudice and alleged oppression will always be curable by direction. Further, they 
tend to be competent in utilising social media to create a rebuttal narrative.  
 
141 Fletcher, “Ambivalence”, 1625  
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It might be thought that the prospective whistleblower should surely avail themselves of the 
more obvious legal avenues available in terms of reporting their grievances to internal 
authority (‘Internal Whistleblowing’). Even allowing for trust issues, why should it be 
acceptable for them to be allowed to circumvent the internal mechanisms and escalate 
disclosure to external authority or the public (‘External Whistleblowing’)? That requires 
compliance with a convoluted disclosure regime – of first resort to recognised authority 
figures (unless the communication were necessary to avoid death or severe injury). In the 
Wikileaker scenario, the purpose is to make very public disclosures – not directly prompt 
internal government investigation of abuses. Prior resort to relevant authority figures should 
not be a sine qua non for availability of this defence to treason. As was recognised in Shayler, 
no such other avenues may be open. That the accused may not have exhausted these 
possibilities would not necessarily mean that they intended to betray the UK – though 
attempted prior disclosure to suitable authority figures could corroborate this defence and 
bolster credibility. 
Express protection of whistleblowing may also be considered a superfluous provision – 
because if the actor lacked treasonous mens rea, then a defence would not be strictly 
necessary. But its formal recognition simply reflects the likelihood of this issue already being 
in play, particularly in cases of ‘Espionage Treason’. Though the relationship to mens rea 
may sometimes be close and direct – to the extent that general defences could occasionally 
overlap with the negation of mens rea – approaching matters on the basis of the separation 
of defences is more conducive to fairness in the administration of justice.142 
Necessity defences involve a high threshold – and the availability of these new derivative 
defences might afford an accused too much latitude, allowing them to turn their trial into a 
political circus. While contingent on an objectively reasonable construction of the actor’s 
subjective motivation, this, of course, is still a subjective exercise, removed from the norms 
of legal certainty. The prosecution might be expected to attempt to argue that a bogus 
justification is an abuse of the defence, rendering it irrelevant – but the accused is surely 
entitled to testify in detail about the political views motivating their action as an aspect of 
mens rea in any event. If an accused is inevitably asked the big, open question of why they 
 
142 Claire McDiarmid, “How Do They Do That? Automatism, Coercion, Necessity, and Mens Rea in Scots 
Criminal Law” in General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Substantive 
Issues in Criminal Law) (Alan Reed et al., eds., 2014), Ch. 11 
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did something, the prosecution cannot legitimately object to their answer. It should be 
remembered that a lay jury will be the ultimate arbiters – making the definitive assessment 
of whether the accused’s belief or motivation are objectively reasonable. Their determining 
a political defence is appropriate in the prosecution of a political crime, where there may be 
the perception and/or narrative of a politically motivated prosecution. This is a vital check 
and balance against a politically-inspired abuse of process – or neutralising the perception 
of such. A criminal prosecution of a political crime must be expected to allow for the 
ventilation, scrutiny, and rebuttal of political defences. 
 
(c) ‘Humanitarian Defence’: 
Humanitarian assistance is not without its complications. While civilian humanitarian relief 
in an enemy war zone is commendable, it is moot whether it should legitimately extend to 
working on critical infrastructure – lest it be militarily deployed. Building a well or the 
provision of medical treatment might be an understandable, defensible human impulse. 
Constructing a road or a helicopter landing pad (which might be used by military traffic) is 
fraught with difficulty. In essence, humanitarian aid should be about providing material and 
logistical assistance to people desperately needing help – particularly in conflict zones. Its 
primary objective is saving lives, alleviating suffering, and maintaining human dignity.143 
But its efficacy – particularly food aid – in conflict-affected situations has been heavily 
criticised – with reported accounts, ironically and counterintuitively, of aid aggravating 
conflicts in recipient countries. Malnourished armed groups can seize aid – money, goods, 
food – diverting it from its intended recipients.144 Of course, its providers should be 
accountable, but their coming into direct or indirect contact with proscribed groups is an 
occupational hazard. There may be unavoidably difficult issues of proof – and providing 
effective rebuttal – in circumstances in which an accused has been found ensconced in 
enemy territory. Again, there is obvious potentiality for the abuse of this defence. The family 
of Jack Letts claim that he was carrying out humanitarian work in ISIS-controlled 
territory.145 Ruhal Ahmed of the so-called ‘Tipton Three’ originally claimed to be doing 
 
143 Good Humanitarian Donorship, Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (2003), para. 1:  
https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html 
144 Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian, “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict” (2014) 104(6) AmEconRev 1630 
145 Darshna Sonni “‘Jihadi Jack’ has mental health condition, say parents” Channel 4 (4 February 2006): 
https://www.channel4.com/news/jihadi-jack-has-mental-health-condition-say-parents 
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charity work when found in criminative circumstances in Afghanistan.146 It is doubtful 
whether Ahmed genuinely was the literal innocent abroad given his Islamist antecedents. 
You might well have a low threshold of suspicion about the veracity of such claims – 
particularly unilateral missions without involvement of recognised aid agencies. But it is 
precisely in a warzone that humanitarian work will be required – such that it should be 
recognised. In any event, it is not as if an accused would be required to discharge the 
evidential burden by corroborated evidence – though they may have presentational 
difficulties absent it. There will be inevitable grey areas – it being for the factfinder to 
determine the accused’s true motive and intent when providing aid in enemy territory.  
 
(ii) Excuse Defences:  
(a) Coercion: 
Just as the general policy of the law in relation to coercion is to discourage association with 
criminals and promote wariness in excusing the criminal conduct of those who do so,147 the 
policy of the law in relation to coercion in treason should be discouraging association with 
the enemy and only scrupulously excusing the treasonable conduct of those keeping such 
company. Per Lord Bingham in Hasan: "the defence of duress is excluded when as a result 
of the accused's voluntary association with others engaged in criminal activity he foresaw or 
ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats 
of violence".148 There are also policy problems in relying on duress as a mitigating factor in 
respect that the general approach should be to maintain that the stronger the temptation or 
pressure to commit a crime, the stronger the law’s threat should be to counter-balance it.149 
Coercion defences are open to abuse. Smith observed unremarkably: "… duress is a unique 
defence in that it is so much more likely than any other to depend on assertions which are 
peculiarly difficult for the prosecution to investigate or subsequently to disprove".150 There 
is a low threshold of suspicion where such a defence is engaged – and this would be 
particularly so in extraterritorial cases where the investigative difficulties will be even 
 
146 The Road to Guantánamo (2006) Michael Winterbottom, dir. 
147 Hasan, para. 38 
148 Ibid., para. 39 
149 Ibid., para. 71 
150 J.C. Smith’s commentary on R. v. Cole [1994] Crim LR 582, 584 
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greater. The Law Commission’s 1993 Working Paper on offences against the person 
recommended that the persuasive burden of proof shift to the accused to establish duress on 
balance of probabilities – though this has never been acted upon.151 But placing the 
persuasive burden on the accused is unlikely to be consistent with the Human Rights Act 
and would violate the presumption of innocence articulated in art. 6(2), ECHR. Any such 
reverse onus clause is only acceptable if proportionate. Properly, this should be characterised 
as an evidential burden, with the accused only being required to raise the issue which the 
Crown then must disprove to the normal criminal standard.152 
The form of direction for a general defence of coercion in the (Scottish) Jury Manual 
combines objective and subjective elements which is recognised as leading to difficulties in 
formulating jury directions and great care would be required in selecting the appropriate 
form of words to use in any particular case.153 This is one of the hardest defences to prove. 
It should be, because the accused is effectively putting themselves forward as the arbiter of 
what was lawful conduct. Even if available to a charge of treason, the practical difficulty in 
proof – before a lay jury – would be of an accused, possibly having been found in criminative 
(‘treasonous’) circumstances, claiming that their life is more important than their co-citizens. 
Should a jury be afforded this ‘moral elbow-room’? Then again, the issue must be couched 
in terms of the strict limitation in the Draft Code – "only if that is done to save human life".154  
  
(b) ‘Superior Orders Defence’: 
Enshrining a ‘Superior Orders Defence’ in such a significant statute – even if only to 
preserve the intermediary position – would not be consistent with House of Lords precedent 
– and with perceived international norms, if not current international law as such. Then 
again, the Lords’ obiter rejections preceded its ‘restoration’ by the Rome Statute. Continuing 
recognition in Scots law would be acknowledgement of the legally correct and consistent 
position. Of course, if it already exists as a general defence in Scots law, why the requirement 
to restate it? In rebuttal, it is precisely because of the lack of legal certainty arising from the 
 
151 Law Commission, Offences Against the Person and General Principles (Law Com No 218, 1993), paras. 
28.6; 31.1-31.8; and 33.1-33.12b 
152 R. v. Lambert [2001] UKHL 37 
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Lords’ decisions, particularly given their obiter status, that the defence should be enacted 
anew in any Scottish treason law – this being a crime where it could have practical 
application. That this would be a specifically Scottish refinement underlines the case for a 
separate Scottish treason law. 
A complication might be with the significance of an order which though manifestly illegal, 
is not manifestly treasonable. Gordon suggests that in the general application of this defence, 
resolving the ‘manifest illegality’ test might be a matter of degree, depending on the 
circumstances, and particularly the rank of the officer giving the illegal order. The question 
becomes one whether an accused could reasonably consider themselves bound to obey the 
order last given by an officer on the spot and whether they could be reasonably expected to 
risk the consequences of disobedience. Such a situation approaches one of true coercion, 
since the serviceman would be placed in a dilemma in which it would be unreasonable to 
saddle them with responsibility for their superior’s illegal (treasonable) orders, and in which 
they might be said to have been ‘coerced’ by their superior orders.155 I suggest a treasonable 
order would be perceptibly more manifestly illegal still – and less excusable in the conduct 
of any such balancing exercise. But it should be appreciated this defence has been used to 
excuse homicides in pursuit of illegal orders in circumstances in which the accused have 
acted honestly and with the intention of carrying out what they have believed to be their 
duty.156  
 
VII. Conclusion: 
This re-conceptualisation in terms of a duty-based contractual model allows for the greater 
application of necessity and coercion defences, their hitherto application to the crime of 
treason being somewhat moot, given the existence of competing authorities. The confirmed 
availability of a necessity defence – suitably contextualised by the ‘national security harm’ 
principle – allows for the emergence of specific defences – such as a ‘Public Interest 
Defence’ and a ‘Humanitarian Defence’. Despite its non-availability otherwise under 
parallel legislation such as the OSA, I submit that ironically, with the more serious offence 
of treason, there should be scope for a ‘Public Interest Defence’. I make no provision for a 
specific ‘International Law Defence’. This expansion of available defences hopefully 
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provides for greater balance in the relationship between the sovereign power and the 
protected person. It provides a salutary reminder of how we might wish to behave if living 
under tyrannical or usurpative government – and whether we could (and rightly should) 
contemplate disloyalty.157 Given that the offence elements comprise concert with the enemy, 
they may only apply in very discrete circumstances. Meanwhile, the jury can be entrusted as 
gatekeepers against any perceived politically-motivated abuse of process – and equally 
against abuse of any legal political defences. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion and Recommendations: 
The purpose of this thesis has been to see how we might go about updating Britain’s dormant 
treason law for a Scottish context. Although historically, few have been indicted for treason 
that does not mean that the commission of the crime of treason is rare. Much modern conflict 
involves conflict falling short of international conflict and non-international conflict – 
asymmetric warfare, characterised by mass-casualty domestic terrorism, directed by states 
and non-state organisations (themselves often proxies). Criminal justice insider Black 
recognised: "if the nature of conflict is to be internal terror directed by phantom foreign 
enemies and smuggled in and associated with domestic malcontents, a revival is possible. 
… public outrage could revive the concept of this most odious and stigmatizing offence".1 
The demonstrable eagerness of some of our co-citizens to join with enemy terrorist 
organisations, when combined with the capabilities of modern digital technology for 
detection and investigation, renders the prospect of treason prosecutions perfectly plausible. 
I began by asking whether there should be a separate Scottish treason law and now answer 
my primary research question in the affirmative. There is a principled case for fully 
repatriating Scottish treason law on the basis that it need never have been subsumed under 
English treason law in the early post-Union period in the first place (albeit it should have 
perhaps been ‘modernised’). This is about affirming the integrity of Scottish criminal law 
(as originally envisaged by the Treaty of Union). This would be a further logical 
manifestation of Scotland’s ever-evolving devolution settlement and the enhanced 
‘Provincial’ statehood of the Scottish political system, particularly as the post-EU UK is 
increasingly perceived as a confederation. That viewpoint may not reflect the constitutional 
reality, but the prevailing ‘four nations’ political rhetoric suggests that people might be 
receptive to the notion of one of the nations (a devolved state) also having its own treason 
law. A ‘local’ treason law is unremarkable in the federal common law experience. Creating 
a separate Scottish treason law would not involve, in practical terms, a significant transfer 
of reserved powers – effectively facilitating the prosecution of what is otherwise generally 
prosecutable in Scotland already, but under a different nomen juris. I maintain that there are 
also proper and substantive legal reasons for creating a separate Scottish treason law – 
particularly to reflect what would be a Scottish deviation from British treason law in the 
 
1 Conrad Black, “Treason From 16th-century England To 9-11” C2C Journal (1 March 2010): 
https://c2cjournal.ca/2010/03/treason-from-16thcentury-england-to-911/?_post_id=338 
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availability and operation of common law general defences of necessity, coercion and 
obeying superior orders; and the removal of the allied offence of misprision of treason.  
Meanwhile, the case for a separate Scottish treason law is naturally predicated on the 
argument for reviving treason law generally – and I have argued in Chapter 1 that it is worth 
modernising the law of treason because it continues to capture the essence of the still 
pertinent moral wrong of betrayal – of disloyalty to and betrayal of the modern nation-state, 
of community, and of neighbour – and that in so doing, fits with fair labelling sensibilities, 
achieving retribution in a way that the anodyne statutory alternatives do not. Given that life 
imprisonment is mandatory, successful treason prosecutions could allow for more effective 
management of what would ultimately be paroled IE life prisoners, who can be more closely 
monitored on pain of immediate recall – in a more efficacious way than preventive detention 
measures or determinate sentencing, and in a manner more consistent with due process and 
fair hearing requirements. That lacuna could of course be otherwise addressed by reform of 
the anti-terrorist sentencing framework, but this has hitherto been lacking. 
 
Summary of Findings: 
Unremarkably, any such Scottish treason law would have to be made consistent with modern 
sensibilities and progressive notions of human rights to meet the obvious criticism that it is 
anachronistic. While there is still much merit in the basic substance of many of the offences 
of treason, the form and detail are desperately in need of re-definition.  
 
Allegiance: 
In Chapter 2 I have argued that modernising treason law can be done by rethinking its core 
idea of allegiance. Allegiance can still be made to work – reinvented by the adoption of 
Williams’ paradigm of a non-patriotic, contractual, ‘duty-based’ model – by his theory of 
the crime of treason, predicated as it is on the British Citizen’s (or resident’s) duty of 
allegiance as a corollary of the British state’s duty of protection. This provides a viable 
contemporary working model for the modern social democratic state, reflecting the notion 
of the object of allegiance being institutional and consistent with the social contract. 
Rediscovering and championing a distant article of the prodigious Williams is scarcely a 
core intellectual contribution. My contribution to human knowledge is to take from Williams 
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and then add to it by seeing how his model might be expected to play out in the modern 
Scottish context and inform a new Scottish treason offence. I then argue that the duty of 
allegiance should comprise only a negative duty of allegiance – to do no (enemy-backed) 
harm (to the homeland), adopting the shorthand of the ‘Do-No-Harm’ principle. This further 
refines the characterisation by the Policy Exchange Paper of a narrow duty of non-betrayal. 
The concept of allegiance is thus reducible to a legal duty of the British subject not to be 
disloyal. Being disloyal in a cultural sense – not doing certain overtly patriotic acts such as 
snubbing the national anthem or the wartime conscripted refusing to fight on conscientious 
grounds – would not engage a breach of the duty of allegiance as to ever amount to treason.2  
Nonetheless, this minimalist legal duty is an obligation which can still be said to be 
influenced or infused with British and/or Scottish values – because these values explain 
something of why the duty of allegiance exists in the first place. They illustrate the theory 
or justification behind the crime – if not contributing to any definition of its essential 
elements as such. If a purposive interpretation were to be applied to any new treason 
legislation, these values are what it might also reasonably be intended to protect. Inevitably, 
ideas of sovereignty and allegiance must be about British and Scottish identity – for the 
subject cannot be completely isolated or alienated from the state and the society they inhabit.  
This is about not losing one’s loyalty altogether. It is about recognising a residual duty of 
loyalty of the subject to the British state – and criminalising actions which fall far below that 
minimum. Save for the most exceptional scenarios, this should only ever be a passive and 
scarcely an active duty. This is a negative duty discharged by simply not taking positive 
steps to reject your allegiance and transfer it to the Queen’s enemies.  
 
Actus Reus: 
I argued in Chapter 3 that treason can be further modernised by taking this allegiance 
modelling and defining the breach of the duty of allegiance in terms of relevant harm being 
referable to a ‘national security harm’ principle – such that the central elements should only 
be regarded as criminal (treasonable) if the ‘national security harm’ principle were satisfied. 
The compelling logic of the negative duty is that treason can no longer be committed by 
omission. Proof of the requisite overt act is more readily achievable given modern evidence-
 
2 S.C. Biggs, Treason and the Trial of William Joyce (1947), 162  
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gathering capabilities. Consistent with the operation of only a negative duty of allegiance 
and a general narrowing-down exercise, I do not propose to re-enact the allied common law 
offences of misprision of treason and compounding treason. This is an analytical framework 
which allows for a shift away from any misconceived notions of patriotic treason and a 
patriotic allegiance. Reappraisal through the prism of this new theory of the crime allows for 
the more anachronistic aspects of the offence to be culled – for no harm to national security 
is truly involved in violating the King’s consort, disputing or hindering the succession, 
killing judges or counterfeiting Scots seals. A streamlined, tighter, more credible offence 
emerges, stripped down to its three main heads: adhering to the sovereign’s enemies; 
compassing the death of the sovereign; levying war against the sovereign in the realm 
(‘Levying War Treason’) – though the latter two only as sub-categories of adhering to the 
sovereign’s enemies, necessarily committed in circumstances involving the assistance of a 
foreign enemy. The idea of political dissent or subversion – republican agitation – being 
remotely regarded as a treasonable (or seditious) act has long since been discredited but this 
conceptual model militates against that possibility. There should be no scope for purely 
domestic ‘Seditious Treason’ or ‘Republican Treason’. The new Scottish treason offence 
will be crafted in a way to prevent such abuse. The core of this idea should be captured by 
the concept of what might be generically labelled ‘Adherence Treason’. This represents 
something of a departure from the historical focus in English or British treason law where 
the dominant treason offence would seem to have been compassing the sovereign’s death, a 
consequence inevitably of the centrality of the monarchy. ‘Adherence Treason’ should now 
emerge as the core form of treason, being at the heart of this new law. Adherence (to the 
enemy) can be conceived in terms of being the opposite (or ‘flip side’) of allegiance – the 
abandonment (or non-performance) of the duty of allegiance – and which finds expression 
in the giving of assistance to the enemy.  
The surviving core offences should be re-defined in the following terms: 
• A narrower and simpler category of compassing the death of the sovereign will be 
posited – viz., killing the Sovereign, or attempting to kill the Sovereign, or otherwise 
assaulting, imprisoning or restraining the Sovereign – with intent to assist an enemy 
at war with the Sovereign, whether or not the existence of a state of war has been 
declared  
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• Levying war, or doing any act preparatory to levying war, against the Sovereign – 
with intent to assist an enemy at war with the Sovereign, whether or not the existence 
of a state of war has been declared 
• Assisting by any means whatever, with intent to assist, an enemy at war with the 
Sovereign, whether or not the existence of a state of war has been declared 
 
Relevant harm under the ‘levying of war’ head should be harm that materially compromises 
national security. This should involve acts of sabotage perpetrated against political 
institutions, critical infrastructure, and key military installations, against the general safety 
of the state – and with enemy agency. The creation of a national security risk – invoking a 
‘national security harm’ principle – corresponds to the criteria for self-defence in 
international law. 
This rare and special criminality arises from these core treasonable acts being committed in 
a special capacity – and the fact that the accused possesses the qualification necessary to the 
commission of the offence – being a ‘protected person’ – is what triggers the breach of the 
‘contractual’ duty of allegiance.  
The burden of proof resting upon the prosecutor should be a high one.3 Certainly, it might 
be hoped that its prosecution is confined to only the kinds of conduct which are capable of 
reasonably sure proof.4 I do not propose to say anything about the evidentiary safeguards 
operable in other jurisdictions – such as the former two-witness rule (albeit repealed in 
England by the Treason Act 1945) – because the corroboration requirement still (just) 
remains a defining feature of Scottish criminal evidence.5 This does not require to be put on 
a statutory footing – as it had historically been in England – or as it continues to be under 
the US Constitution.6 
 
3 Alan Wharam, “Treason in Rhodesia” (1967) 25(2) CLJ 189 
4 Cramer v. United States, 325 US 1 (1945), 39 
5 Ironically, while the 1945 Act repealed the historic statutory requirement for corroboration (provided for 
under the Treason Act 1695), it also abolished the rule that treason trials in Scotland had to be conducted 
according to the rules of English criminal law – thus ensuring the Scottish corroboration requirement persisted 
for treason trials in Scotland. 
6 US Constitution, art. III, s. 3  
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Not all terrorist activity will be treasonable – possibly not quite reaching the relevant 
threshold of targeting critical infrastructure and threatening the security of the state. Many 
terrorist spectaculars will fall short. But where jeopardy is threatened, this should be a 
significant symbolic and popular response. 
Enemy-sponsored sabotage of critical infrastructure – including Scottish political 
institutions, even though these are sub-national institutions – and also of what might be only 
critical infrastructure in the Scottish if not the national UK context – should fall within the 
ambit of this crime.  
 
Mens Rea: 
To reiterate, the critical thing about treason is its intent. The intent to betray is an essential 
element of treason. I suggested in Chapter 4 that the mens rea of the new Scottish crime of 
treason be defined in terms of the intent to betray the UK by aiding its enemies – or the intent 
to betray the UK to its enemies. I have proposed a conjunctive test – whereby there must be 
intent to both betray the country and assist an enemy state or organisation at war with the 
UK. Both aspects must be engaged to fulfil the relevant threshold for treasonable mens rea. 
Treason’s mens rea should reflect the two correlating but subtly distinct aspects of the moral 
wrong of treason which are the intent to betray country – and the intent to betray country to 
an enemy state or organisation, specifically made manifest by overt act. This will necessarily 
involve a deliberate and intentional act – only the highest form of mens rea being appropriate 
to what is the ultimate offence. 
 
General and New Specific Defences: 
Given prevailing uncertainty, I proposed in Chapter 5 that any Scottish statute should 
expressly confirm that defences of coercion, necessity and obeying superior orders are 
available – under certain obvious parameters consistent with treason case law. What is 
proposed is consistent with the Draft Scottish Criminal Code which goes considerably 
further than previously, countenancing the operation of coercion and necessity defences to 
all crimes even where human life has been taken. As an appropriate counter-balance, the 
recognised necessity defence – particularly when considered in the context of the ‘national 
security harm’ principle – allows for the emergence of more specific defences such as a 
‘Public Interest Defence’ for certain kinds of treason, particularly ‘Espionage Treason’; and 
a ‘Humanitarian Defence’. The ‘public interest’ will invariably be negated by the 
202 
 
 
 
perpetration of harm to national security and in this respect the ‘Public Interest Defence’ will 
have to engage with the ‘national security harm’ principle – which might be expected to be 
the overriding consideration in determining the ‘public interest’. 
 
I thus answer the second principal research question as to what a separate Scottish treason 
law would (or should) look like. A streamlined version of the offence emerges, more readily 
comprehensible in contemporary lexicon. While the offences elements of the suggested new 
offence do not have a distinctively Scottish dimension to them (save for issues of definition 
of Scottish critical infrastructure), the defence elements do, thus providing a principled 
justification for a separate Scottish offence. I have explained how it might be modernised 
and made relevant – including with ‘generous’ general and specific defences – that it might 
be successfully litigated from both prosecution and defence perspectives. This underlines 
the break from past historical abuses. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research: 
Subsidiary Definitional and Construction Issues: 
This is not a policy paper or mini-codification exercise. Predictably, there are further 
definitional problems and issues of construction in framing a working conduct definition for 
a Scottish crime of treason, which I have been unable to address because of constraints of 
space. For example, jurisdiction requires careful consideration. Who would be and not be 
subject to a Scottish treason law? Should it be predicated on Scottish domicile or residence 
of the protected person? Should citizens of other parts of the UK be able to undermine 
Scottish political institutions with impunity, and how would any such distinctions be drawn 
without a concept of Scottish nationality? Is extra-territorial reach for treasonable acts 
committed furth of Scotland, including elsewhere in the UK, appropriate? Should a Scottish 
treason law have concurrent jurisdiction with any new UK treason law? At issue would be 
how the duty of allegiance, if conceived in terms of a voluntary contractual obligation and a 
departure from perpetual allegiance, be extinguished. Might you set a higher age of criminal 
responsibility for treason – consistent with the concept that affirming or shedding of 
allegiance is (or should be) an adult decision – and with the age of majority in Scots law still 
being 18? The so-called ‘Cultural Defence’ as an excuse defence in treason law is also a 
potentially interesting area for further research because it engages with the recurring issue 
of dual nationality and competing allegiance. Consideration might be given to the 
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appropriateness of various ancillary sentencing and administrative orders (such as 
disqualification from public office and public employment, loss of state or public pension, 
disenfranchisement, deprivation, and nullity of British Citizenship). Since the abolition of 
automatic forfeiture of goods and land under Forfeiture Act 1870 did not apply to Scotland, 
might the confiscation recovery machinery (under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) form 
part of the criminal sentencing exercise? These issues all involve future work within this 
hypothesis.  
 
Implications of Study for Theory: 
Citizenship, Nationality, and Immigration Law: 
I argued in Chapter 2 that citizenship has its limitations in understanding the normative 
aspects of the crime of treason – treason being about a breach of allegiance and not a breach 
of citizenship as such – and that while allegiance might be an essential element of citizenship, 
citizenship is not an essential element of allegiance. So, while citizenship might not be a 
relevant or appropriate basis for grounding the law of treason or its major concept of 
allegiance, could this new allegiance modelling inform notions of citizenship? 
Vasanthakumar suggests that a renewed interest in allegiance may provide a basis on which 
to articulate and ground the duties of citizenship – possibly distinguished from the prevailing 
liberal model which casts citizenship as an entitlement – and of citizenship instead being a 
political status requiring a particular political orientation on the part of citizens.7 I argued for 
a ‘thinner’, minimalist approach towards allegiance, involving obeying only treason law, for 
the purposes of treason law. But further research might be done on whether allegiance can 
inform a more robust conception of British Citizenship – generating a more nuanced 
appreciation of it, including cultivating civic virtue, communitarianism, patriotism, national 
identity, and shared values – providing an analytical framework for understanding multiple 
citizenship – with implications for renunciation, naturalisation, denaturalisation and dual 
nationality, subjecting these practices to normative scrutiny.8 Notwithstanding the passing 
of the Scottish Elections (Franchise and Representation) Act 2020, allegiance could inform 
 
7 Ashwini Vasanthakumar “Treason, Expatriation and 'So-Called' Americans: Recovering the Role of 
Allegiance in Citizenship” (2014) 12 GeoLJ 187, 223 
8 Ibid., 224 
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debate about extending enfranchisement of foreign nationals to future referenda, particularly 
in the Scottish context. 
 
Theoretical/Jurisprudential Implications: 
Treason could again become one of those prominent, influential crimes that might influence 
particularly how we think about criminal justice policy, criminal law, and the law of 
evidence and procedure in Scotland. A theory of criminal law tends to abstract (or deduce) 
general principles from the details of certain crimes. History, venerable statutes, and 
prominent cases testify to the significance of treason in the structure of our criminal law – 
yet our casebooks and textbooks now totally ignore these materials. As long as we ignore 
treason in formulating our general criminal principles, we risk distorting the criminal law by 
overemphasising violent and sexual crimes against the person.9 Perhaps we should take this 
ancient crime more seriously in thinking about the general theory of criminal law and the 
mainsprings of criminal conduct. For example, could a government plausibly propose (or 
leverage) even in, or especially in times of crisis, the suspension of jury trials or the abolition 
of the corroboration requirement, if that also meant extending such policies to treason cases 
(assuming their prosecution had become a genuine possibility)? The prospect of justifying 
doing so with treason prosecutions would surely underline how sinister a constitutional 
threat would be engaged.  
 
Cultural Implications: 
"We laugh at honour, and are shocked to find traitors in our midst":10 
Looking at the issue more creatively, it might be thought that the affirmation of the traitor is 
a way by which our society can renew its own heroic values. This is not the Greatest 
Generation. We live in a ‘post-heroic’ society which is characterised by law and the pursuit 
of prosperity. We are not necessarily decadent but have become passive and soft, readily 
intimidated by the state. The traitor is the enemy, who thwarts our technological superiority 
and seeks to overcome the pampered, peaceful societies of the West – the super-villain, who 
is the manifestation of the dangers we face. We know that we are the target of their attacks, 
 
9 George P. Fletcher, “The Case for Treason” (1982) 41 MdLRev 193, 194 
10 C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (1943), 12 
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if rarely physically, always psychologically. ‘Post-heroic’ societies can survive colliding 
with such ‘heroic’ groups – though we require a foundation of heroic values if we are to 
challenge them. Such attacks lose their impact if the citizenry reacts coolly and calmly, our 
politicians decidedly, if the economy cannot be intimidated, and the media remains 
measured. There must be a willingness to sacrifice. We need composure and determination. 
We may even create our own makeshift heroes. As acquiring this ‘heroic’ composure might 
be considered a positive societal development – virtuous even – there might be times when 
a nation needs its villains, as well as its heroes – with the miscreants being properly labelled 
(as traitors) if this narrative were to have proper traction.11 There may be a need for a 
modern-day Guy Fawkes to foster public virtue. 
The existence of traitors in these depressing numbers also feels like a mark of failure – a 
failure of our society to engender loyalty, respect, or affection – which might be expected to 
provoke some serious national soul-searching. Should we even care about their motivation 
in having a deep emotional identification with our country’s enemies to the extent that they 
would betray us – or try to understand malcontents, seeking to avenge their personal 
humiliations and feelings of injustice, by projecting them into a political cause? Do we have 
to agonise over their myriad motives – as this may be a problem which probably cannot be 
fixed – and just accept that there is and will continue to be this significant constituency in 
our midst and deal with the bald fact of betrayal?  
Fletcher creatively reasoned that the decline of treason expressed a general cultural shift 
away from symbolic struggles towards the systematic and scientific control of violence. 
Treason belonged to an era in which crimes were understood as personal moral dramas and 
was emblematic of a moral struggle between community and deviant, where the criminal 
betrayed those they hurt. In the West, we no longer perceive great symbolic messages in 
criminal action, including terrorist attacks. We think impersonally about crime and danger. 
The criminal or terrorist may threaten us with physical harm but does not betray us.12 If 
anything, the less emotive or inflammatory statutory alternatives are more appropriate in this 
culture. Though an intriguing critique, Fletcher conceded this was conjecture and maybe we 
should carefully think about whether we still need symbolic messages in our criminal law. 
 
11 Hans Bachofner (2006), The vulnerability of post-heroic societies: 
https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=17738 
12 George P. Fletcher, “Ambivalence About Treason” (2004) 82 NCLRev 1611, 1627-1628 
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Whether Patriotism: 
Re-affirming and re-booting the duty of allegiance is not about making the case for a misty-
eyed, emotional patriotism. I have deliberately deployed a modelling to distance treason 
from patriotism – having argued that patriotism is not a relevant legal concept to its 
operation. But it might be supposed that patriotic sentiment goes some way towards 
explaining why the duty of allegiance exists. Insofar as the duty of allegiance might still be 
tangentially informed or instructed by patriotism, arguing for treason’s revival – even if 
presented in terms of only tacitly making the case for not being against patriotism – reviving 
treason law will inevitably precipitate a debate about patriotism. 
Treason has become an unfashionable allegation because it implies national moral 
superiority.13 There will be the unfortunate perception that treason law is nationalistic and 
that it is somehow a patriotic or even a political allegiance which is owed under it. For many, 
the problem with any revived treason law – whether British or ‘notionally’ Scottish – is that 
it may evoke a ‘patriotic’ treason which for them will involve patriotic connotations, or the 
‘wrong’ kind of patriotism, or a patriotism which is compulsive and not compelling. It is 
likely to provoke complaints that it would result in the targeting of minorities, or one sizeable 
community – or will be perceived to be so. It would risk enhancing, not diminishing social 
divisions – precipitating a descent into tribalism. There may be the perception that a new 
treason law would be nationalistic, ‘white identitarian’ and anti-minority – and championed 
for the wrong reasons. For some it will have unfortunate jingoistic connotations with populist 
nationalism, ‘blood and soil’ nationalism or British ethno-nationalism and nativism. This 
could repel and even antagonise minorities in an increasingly diversified population. It 
would be needlessly inflammatory – creating feelings of ‘otherness’ – fostering a sense of a 
divided, threatened group identity of a British ‘us’, distinct from the immigrant ‘them’ – 
provoking anger and hostility towards outsiders – and creating a culture of fear. ‘Symbolic’ 
threats, arising from perceived differences in values or beliefs will arouse greater enmity – 
with people being more likely to be antagonistic to immigrants if they perceive them as 
threatening the country’s values than if they simply view them as direct competition for jobs 
or other resources.14 Perceptibly, treason will be regarded as a right-wing crime, doing little 
 
13 Black, “Treason To 9-11” 
14 Amanda Taub, “A Small French Town Infused with Us-vs.Them Politics” NYT (21 April 2017): 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/a-small-french-town-infused-with-us-vs-them-
politics.html 
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to restore trust with alienated communities15 – inconsistent with the cultural sensitivity that 
might win the proverbial ‘hearts and minds’ in any propaganda war against guerrilla 
insurgency.16 It will calcify divisions and make for toxic, culturally divided politics. You 
can only build trust on trust. If anything, a succession of treason indictments could needlessly 
ferment division and prove counterproductive.  
But consider the virtues of patriotism in making us behave unselfishly. It makes us recognise 
our obligation to the people around us. It is why we obey laws and pay taxes with which we 
disagree. Absent patriotism, a breakdown of responsible government and responsible 
citizenship ensues. This is not a political ideal to be diminished or neglected. MacIntyre 
argued that patriotism is not just a virtue, but the central virtue which holds together morality 
– that we learn and understand morality "in and through the way of life of some particular 
community".17 When Samuel Johnson notoriously quipped: "Patriotism is the last refuge of 
the scoundrel", he was not indicting patriotism in general, but excoriating false patriotism.18 
Abuse of patriotism and its occasional exploitation by the manipulative does not invalidate 
it as a meaningful civic virtue. The less cynical might prefer Byron’s sentiment: "He who 
loves not his country, can love nothing" – or Shakespeare’s Brutus: "Who is here so vile that 
will not love his country?"19 Medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun defined the all-important 
factor in human history as Asabiyyah or ‘group feeling’. The strength of any state lies in its 
ability to inspire Asabiyyah, without which it crumbles: "Strength is obtained only through 
group feeling which means affection and willingness to fight and die for each other."20 
Without Asabiyyah, he wrote, there could be no sovereignty or legitimacy – and people could 
only otherwise be ruled by force or fear.  
 
15 Kenan Malik, “If we want to build trust in society, a new treason law is no way to do it” Guardian (29 July 
2018): 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/29/if-we-want-to-rebuild-trust-in-society-a-new-
treason-law-is-no-way-to-do-it#comments  
16 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (1966) 
17 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” (1984) in Patriotism, Igor Primoratz ed. (2002), 43, 48; 
Youngjae Lee, “Punishing Disloyalty? Treason, Espionage, and the Transgression of Political Boundaries” 
(2012) 31 LawPhilos 299, 309 
18 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, (Christopher Hibbert ed., 1979), 182  
19 Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 2 
20 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (1967, 2015), trans. Franz Rosenthal, N. J. 
Dawood ed., 123 
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Patriotism can and should be rightly distinguished from nationalism – to assuage concerns 
of any such project being about ‘Nationalistic Treason’. George Orwell classically 
differentiated patriotism from the excesses typically associated with chauvinistic nationalist 
sentiment.21 "Nowadays, though, patriotism is a complicated matter."22 But without a shared 
sense of identity – and a loyalty to common political institutions – there is a real risk that 
devoid of a sense of purpose of national loyalty, other loyalties begin to take over. Race, 
ethnicity, religion, and/or political ideology fill that vacuum. People will group themselves 
instead by political allegiance, religion, or ethnicity – perceiving their opponents as enemies 
and not as co-citizens. It should be remembered that the proposed Scottish object of the duty 
of allegiance is not the Scottish or British people, but the abstract entity or shorthand for the 
local manifestation of the British state which is the Crown. It is not intended to be based on 
ethnicity.  
The case for the revival of the crime of treason is (or can be) an overriding normative value 
position which transcends identity politics. Fundamentally this need not be about stirring 
deep feelings of patriotism – though treason law could also help to generate and confirm a 
sense of national identity and pride – values which all of us can and should share, without 
being mandated. If they were, we would not be living in a free society – which would negate 
the case for being patriotic about it. That said, in a more relativist and globalist age, is the 
revival of a strong sense of national identity a legitimate objective of government or public 
virtue to be fostered? But, as I suggested in Chapter 1, the nation-state may be undergoing a 
reinvigoration.  
I reiterate that the duty of non-betrayal should not be conflated with a duty to be patriotic. 
In the final (legal) analysis, patriotism is only an emotion, hence my focus on a ‘patriotism-
free’ version of the duty of allegiance. Of course, patriotism – and the reasons to be patriotic 
– might substantially explain why the duty of allegiance exists. If you are patriotic then you 
will enthusiastically discharge this duty of allegiance. If you are unpatriotic or not 
particularly patriotic, there is still no good reason for you not to comply with this very 
discrete duty – specifically, because you owe this duty in return for the protection afforded 
to you by the sovereign power. You might discharge the duty patriotically – with patriotic 
 
21 George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism (1945), para. 2 
22 “Remembering Vietnam” NYT Editorial (18 May 1981): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/18/opinion/remembering-vietnam.html  
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fervour or grace – though there should be little to be excited about in discharging only a 
negative duty. This is only an adverb to describe a way in which a negative duty might be 
discharged. The duty implicitly involves or should involve some level of respect for the 
sovereign power – if not necessarily affection – while patriotic sentiment is the optional 
gloss to the duty. You will not fail to discharge this duty by showing ‘insufficient patriotism’. 
This is not about saying our country is in some way superior to others. Not unreasonably, 
we owe it a duty of allegiance – more specifically, a duty not to be disloyal to it – in much 
the same way that others may owe their own homeland a duty – and that these are some of 
the positive reasons behind that duty. Nor is that about invoking British exceptionalism, for: 
"No organised State can continue to exist without a law directed against treason."23  
If anything, by not prosecuting members of a significant minority group for treason, then we 
are, ironically, holding to a lesser standard and not quite treating them as being fully British. 
This, if anything, negates social integration and cultural assimilation in a multi-cultural 
society. It also suggests a lack of respect for the communities concerned. Consider the 
following quote attributed to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: "The way you see people is the 
way you treat them, and the way you treat them is what they become." You also create the 
perception that the authorities are not seriously grappling with this primary problem of IE – 
and cause a consequential secondary problem with the empowerment of radical far right 
protest movements. You do not want actual racists and Nazis to have legitimate grievance 
claims, exploiting that advanced demoralisation of the authorities, and disguising themselves 
as something they are not. Populist politicians may take advantage because the mainstream 
is seen to be soft-peddling. A fraught political calculus may be involved. 
 
Suggestions for Policy: 
Cui Bono – Who Cares or Should Care? 
Who might benefit from or be interested in this thesis? Not implausibly, the concept of a 
separate and distinct Scottish treason law could pique the interest of those involved in policy 
formulation for the current or future Scottish devolved administrations. As updating of UK 
treason law is now in contemplation, its timing is opportune. It is not remotely remarkable 
 
23 Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 150, per Latham CJ – see also 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v. The Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, 132  
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to state that members of the current administration are motivated to do things differently in 
Scotland, wherever they can – and that their appetite for further transfer of reserved powers 
is insatiable. This idea has traction for those whose agenda is to federalise the UK. It may 
even be covertly envisaged as a model treason offence for a newly-independent state. 
Admittedly, these would be contentious political or policy imperatives – though that would 
not invalidate the requirement for prudent legal modelling. However, this need not be about 
divergence for its own sake, given that there is already a principled (and not necessarily anti-
unionist) case for fully repatriating Scottish treason law on the basis that it need not (or 
should not) have been subsumed under English treason law. As the practical outcome will 
be the prosecution of precisely the same offenders on a Scottish indictment containing 
different charges from what are otherwise generally prosecutable in Scotland already under 
UK (anti-terrorist or espionage) legislation, this would, as a policy option, be a harmless, 
cost-neutral ‘concession’ for Scottish unionist politicians to make.  
This thesis could also inform those involved in the legislative process of updating British 
treason law – or those wishing to critique it. The arguments are broadly similar to those for 
creating a separate Scottish treason law. Indeed, the posited template offence may be 
generally indistinguishable from what might be envisaged as a modern UK offence – to the 
extent that I am conscious that this relatively marginal difference as to form might suggest 
that if there were a need for a specific law of treason protecting Scottish institutions, need it 
even be specifically Scottish? But I suggest that there remains a case for a separate Scottish 
treason law for policy and genuine legal reasons.  
Meanwhile, if legislators are seriously committed to creating a modern treason offence, I 
provide reassurance that treason law can still work and explain how it might be expected to 
work. Alternatively, if they were not inclined to presently proceed – or even proposed to 
repeal treason law altogether – they might at least first dialectically engage with the 
arguments advanced in this thesis, such that it still serves a meaningful and useful purpose 
by that. Then, if the view were ultimately taken that it is impossible or too difficult to 
modernise treason law – if allegiance were no longer deemed an explicable, relevant concept 
– the crime of treason might as well, for reasons of legal certainty, be formally abolished, 
rather than ignored. 
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Policy Limitations: 
I am conscious that a policy of reviving treason law has its limitations. It might be too 
controversial to develop any kind of political momentum, with legislators shying away from 
engaging with such a needlessly sensitive issue. Nonetheless, I argue that we should not 
shirk from discussing difficult subjects like treason and refrain from calling it out for what 
it is. It should also be appreciated that while the existential threat posed by IE may be a 
reason to consider reviving treason law, it is not the only reason. There are other valid 
reasons to do so – as I discussed in Chapter 1 – including fair labelling; capturing the moral 
wrong of betrayal; and promoting legal certainty. Indeed, the insensitive handling of this 
issue might be an unhelpful distraction from what I hope has been the intellectual case for 
doing so.24 
Presently, treason law is likely to suffer much reputational damage with the national security 
legislation the People’s Republic of China has directly imposed on the Hong Kong SAR, 
with the National People’s Congress bypassing the semi-autonomous territory’s elected 
Legislative Council. I suggest that the problem with what was foisted on Hong Kong is not 
with treason law per se – but with legality, process, overreach, and its opportunistic timing. 
There are myriad concerns: its putative breaching of the (1984) Sino-British Joint 
Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law25; lack of consent; the seemingly insurmountable 
problem of mass competing allegiance, with popular antipathy towards its intended object 
of allegiance (the Central People’s Government). The conflation of treason, secessionism, 
sedition, and subversion (a familiar concept in the PRC, but not in the common law) creates 
a broad, generalist framework – and the resultant ambiguity can only but facilitate 
‘constructive treasons. It is reasonably apprehended that it will be abused to quell pro-
democracy protest movements – creating a potentially chilling effect by that. Its ouster 
clause, excluding jurisdiction of Hong Kong’s foreign judges, is flagrant forum shopping. 
The prospect of disproportionate or even draconian punishments is exacerbated by the 
possibility of extradition.26 This thesis might prevent our legislators being dissuaded from 
 
24 Douglas A. Kash, “The United States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for Treason” 37 CapULRev 1, 25 
25 Art. 23 
26 Helen Davidson and Lily Kuo, “Hong Kong’s security laws: what are they and why are they so 
controversial?” Guardian (21 May 2020): 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/21/hong-kongs-security-laws-what-are-they-and-why-are-
they-so-controversial 
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the case for treason’s revival (at UK and devolved level) because of it being politically 
weaponised in another common law jurisdiction by the PRC and pro-Beijing legislators, and 
by the prospect of it being implemented without precisely the ‘safe’ modelling I recommend.  
These, of course, are only policy suggestions rather than imperatives or recommendations – 
the purpose of academic research merely being to inform, explain and investigate, never 
instruct. This thesis provides a viable theoretical framework and working template for any 
such project – and engages with the issues that might be expected to arise in it being pursued 
and debated. I simply make discrete, topical policy suggestions underpinned by academic 
research. 
 
Would it work? 
If treason law were deemed incapable of modernisation – or, assuming that could be 
accomplished, and prosecutors were prepared to enforce it, then any dismal policy view of 
modern juries’ reluctance to convict would soon be tested. If juries were unable to grasp the 
difficult concepts that would still necessarily be inherent in the law of treason, they would 
surely gravitate towards the statutory equivalent alternative charges featuring on the same 
indictment. The efficacy and viability of the exercise would soon be confirmed. 
Significantly, the lay jury would be the final brake on executive and judicial overreach, by 
the rounding and balancing effect of decision-makers comprising fifteen random members 
of the public. They can be trusted as gate-keepers against any perceived politically-motivated 
abuse of process (in a way that they might not be permitted to be in prosecutions under the 
OSA) – and, equally, against the abuse of any legal political defences. If it transpires that I 
am wrong about what juries might do, then just repeal the crime of treason!  
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Appendix: 
Resultant New Scottish Treason Offence: 
I propose that the new Scottish crime of treason be couched in the following terms:  
 
Treason – Aiding an Enemy State or Organisation: 
A person, who being a Scottish-domiciled or a Scottish-resident British subject, enjoying the 
protection of the Crown (in the protection that the Crown owes under Her Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Crown under the Scottish Administration) and 
thus owing a duty of allegiance to the Crown, commits the offence of treason if, in breach 
of that duty of allegiance, and acting with intent to betray the Sovereign and materially assist 
any enemy state or organisation at war with the United Kingdom (whether or not the 
existence of a state of war has been declared), he engages in the following conduct, in 
Scotland or elsewhere, including outside the United Kingdom:  
• murders the Sovereign, or attempts to murder the Sovereign, or otherwise 
assaults, imprisons or restrains the Sovereign; 
• impedes the operations of Her Majesty’s forces; 
• aids the military or intelligence operations of an enemy state or organisation; 
• prejudices the security and defence of the UK – by causing (or attempting to 
cause) harm which materially compromises national security – and including 
committing acts of sabotage against British military installations located in 
Scotland, Scottish political institutions including the Scottish Government and 
the Scottish Parliament, and critical infrastructure located in Scotland – all 
against the general safety of the British state and the Scottish political 
settlement; 
• does anything as an act of terrorism against the British people or for the 
purposes of terrorism against the British people; and his action would 
constitute an offence listed in section 63B of the Terrorism Act 2000 
 
Indictable-only Offence: 
This offence shall be tried only on indictment in the High Court of Justiciary. 
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Time Limit: 
An accused shall not be tried for any offence of treason committed only within the United 
Kingdom unless an indictment has been served on the accused within three years after the 
offence occurred and in the case of a continuous offence, within three years after the last 
date of such contravention. 
It shall be competent in a prosecution of a continuous contravention to include the entire 
period during which the contravention occurred. 
This time limit will not be available in circumstances in which an accused has murdered the 
Sovereign or attempted to murder the Sovereign, wherever that act has been committed. 
 
Defences: 
Availability of Special Defences of Coercion and Necessity and General Defence of Obeying 
Superior Orders: 
It shall be competent for an accused to plead a special defence of coercion or necessity. The 
defence of coercion will be available in circumstances in which an accused has acted under 
coercion by the enemy and has not voluntarily adhered to the enemy cause. 
It shall be competent for an accused, who is a member of the armed forces of the Crown and 
engaged in the course of hostilities, to plead a defence of obeying a superior military order 
in the execution of their duty if he did not know that the order was unlawful and treasonable; 
and that the order were not manifestly unlawful and treasonable. 
It shall be competent for an accused, who is a servant of the Crown (‘Crown employee’), to 
plead a defence of obeying a superior official order if he did not know that the order was 
unlawful and treasonable; and that the order were not manifestly unlawful and treasonable. 
Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful and treasonable is a question of law. 
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Defence for slavery or trafficking victims who commit treason: 
Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 will extend to Scotland for the purposes of the 
offence of treason. 
 
These defences will not be available in circumstances in which an accused has murdered the 
Sovereign or attempted to murder the Sovereign – or in circumstances in which the taking 
of human life has not been done to save human life. 
 
Public Interest Defence (including Whistleblowing): 
The offence of impeding the operations of Her Majesty’s forces, by disclosing classified or 
protected information, will not apply to disclosure solely by way of, or for the purposes of 
establishing the public interest – if disclosure were done in good faith – if disclosure has not 
resulted in material harm to national security – and if, in the reasonable belief of an accused 
making the disclosure, the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-
disclosure. 
 
Humanitarian Defence: 
The offence of impeding the operations of Her Majesty’s forces will not apply to engagement 
in conduct solely by way of, or for the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian 
nature – and for acts done in good faith. 
The accused bears an evidential burden in relation to establishing a humanitarian defence. 
 
Punishment for Treason:  
Subject to the subsections below, a person convicted of treason shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for life unless given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a 
sentence of imprisonment for life would be manifestly unjust. 
Where a person convicted of treason is under the age of 18 years he shall not be sentenced 
to imprisonment for life but to be detained without limit of time and shall be liable to be 
detained in such place, and under such conditions, as the Secretary of State may direct. 
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Where a person convicted of treason has attained the age of 18 years but is under the age of 
21 years, he shall not be sentenced to imprisonment for life but to be detained in a young 
offenders institution and shall be liable to be detained for life. 
 
Explanatory Note: 
‘British subject’ will be defined in terms of constitutional law and ‘current’ treason law – 
and not its discrete, restrictive meaning under immigration law.1 Constitutionally, we all 
continue to remain the Queen’s subjects, there having been no formal or legal transition from 
British subject to British Citizen in the constitutional and devolved context.2 
Section 63B of the Terrorism Act 2000 lists such offences as inter alia murder, culpable 
homicide, rape, assault causing injury, assault to injury, abduction or false imprisonment, 
malicious mischief, wilful fire-raising, and various statutory counterfeiting offences. 
This includes what might be described as the more conventional form of treason which is 
‘Military Treason’ – and also ‘Diplomatic Treason’ or ‘Espionage Treason’ which targets 
those citizens who interfere with the external safety of the British state by obstructing its 
foreign policy or relations other than militarily.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 British Nationality Act 1981, s. 51 
2 Scotland Act 1998, s. 99  
3 The terminology invoked by John N. Hazard and William B. Stern, “Exterior Treason: A Study in 
Comparative Criminal Law” (1938) 6(1) UChiLRev 77, 82-83 
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